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Abstract 
Theoretical arguments based on the "poverty of the stimulus" have denied a 
priori the possibility that abstract linguistic representations can be learned 
inductively from exposure to the environment, given that the linguistic input 
available to the child is both underdetermined and degenerate. I reassess such 
learnability arguments by exploring a) the type and amount of statistical 
information implicitly available in the input in the form of distributional and 
phonological cues; b) psychologically plausible inductive mechanisms for 
constraining the search space; c) the nature of linguistic representations, 
algebraic or statistical. To do so I use three methodologies: experimental 
procedures, linguistic analyses based on large corpora of naturally occurring 
speech and text, and computational models implemented in computer 
simulations. 
In Chapters 1,2, and 5, I argue that long-distance structural dependencies 
- traditionally hard to explain with simple distributional analyses based on n- 
gram statistics - can indeed be learned associatively provided the amount of 
intervening material is highly variable or invariant (the Variability effect). In 
Chapter 3, I show that simple associative mechanisms instantiated in Simple 
Recurrent Networks can replicate the experimental findings under the same 
conditions of variability. Chapter 4 presents successes and limits of such results 
across perceptual modalities (visual vs. auditory) and perceptual presentation 
(temporal vs. sequential), as well as the impact of long and short training 
procedures. In Chapter 5, I show that generalisation to abstract categories from 
stimuli framed in non-adjacent dependencies is also modulated by the Variability 
effect. In Chapter 6, I show that the putative separation of algebraic and 
statistical styles of computation based on successful speech segmentation versus 
unsuccessful generalisation experiments (as published in a recent Science paper) 
is premature and is the effect of a preference for phonological properties of the 
input. In chapter 7 computer simulations of learning irregular constructions 
suggest that it is possible to learn from positive evidence alone, despite Gold's 
celebrated arguments on the unlearnability of natural languages. Evolutionary 
simulations in Chapter 8 show that irregularities in natural languages can emerge 
from full regularity and remain stable across generations of simulated agents. In 
Chapter 9I conclude that the brain may endowed with a powerful statistical 
device for detecting structure, generalising, segmenting speech, and recovering 
from overgeneralisations. The experimental and computational evidence gathered 
here suggests that statistical language learning is more powerful than heretofore 
acknowledged by the current literature. 
xi 
Chapter 1 
Chapter 1 
Statistical language learning 
To what extent is language learnable from experience? Does the information 
available to the child in the form of statistical regularities allow learning core 
aspects of language such as syntactic structures, segmenting speech, generalising 
and recovering from overregularisations? The remarkable speed and apparent 
implicitness with which human infants acquire a language in their first years of 
life has lead many theorists to dismiss a priori the idea that statistical information 
inherent in the language plays a central role in acquisition. Theoretical arguments 
based on the `poverty of the stimulus' (Gold, 1967; Chomsky, 1965; Pinker, 
1984) have drawn attention to the fact that positive evidence available to the 
learner is insufficient to distinguish between grammatical and ungrammatical 
utterances, and that online speech is full with flaws and missing elements. 
Because the target language seems both underdetermined and degenerate, 
successful learning must occur despite the nature of the input on a deductive 
basis by means of an innate mental language system. 
This thesis takes on a recent and renewed interest in the analysis of 
language acquisition from an inductive perspective, and tries to assess 
empirically and computationally what can be learned from the environment. We 
can broadly term this field statistical language learning. Core issues tackled in 
this area are: (a) how reliable is statistical information for bootstrapping 
linguistic structure in the form of low-level prosodic, phonological, and 
distributional cues? (b) In the face of a combinatorial explosion of potentially 
valid hypotheses about some linguistic structure given the cues in the input, what 
psychologically plausible constraints should apply to the learning device? For 
2 
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instance, Redington, Chater, & Finch (1998) pointed out that a totally 
unconstrained search with n items and m syntactic categories (where each item 
belongs to a single syntactic category and assuming the number of categories is 
known a priori), would imply considering m° possible mappings, and that there 
are already more than a million permutations with only 20 items and 2 syntactic 
categories. From an empiricist point of view this task is even harder because the 
number of syntactic categories is not innately specified. Clearly, statistical 
analyses that entertain all possible relations among words would be 
computationally intractable; (c) Does language learning ultimately necessitates a 
language-specific device or Universal Grammar, or does it impinge on general- 
purpose mechanisms that support human learning broadly? As a result of a shift 
to nativism in American linguistics towards the late 1950s, the role of inductive 
learning - what can be learned from the environment given general-purpose 
inductive mechanisms - has been downplayed as not powerful enough. Recently, 
various researchers have started to reassess empirically and computationally both 
the amount of information inherently available in the linguistic input and the 
power and types of mechanisms that might be plausibly engaged in language 
learning; (d) What is the nature of linguistic representations in the brain - 
algebraic-like or statistical? 
The field of language acquisition has recently benefited from a wave in 
computational modeling. Computational models can be seen as intermediate 
tools that mediate between a purely "verbal" theory and a purely experimental 
paradigm (Broeder & Murre, 2003). As a computer implementation of a theory a 
computational model requires the modeller to make more explicit the 
assumptions underpinnings her theory. Because it involves an input, a process, 
3 
Chapter 1 
and an output, it can also be subjected to experimental manipulations that test 
different conditions of behaviour. As an intermediate between theory and 
experiment, a model can thus be judged in terms of how well it implements the 
theory as well as how well it fits the data gathered. In this thesis computational 
models are coupled with experimental paradigms in order to accumulate more 
robust evidence about a given issue. In this work I specifically focus on four 
related aspects of language learning from experience: detecting nonadjacent 
invariant structure, generalising beyond experience to novel instances given an 
invariant structure, segmenting speech into core constituents, and recovering 
from overgeneralisations. Detecting invariant structure and generalising are seen 
by many as the hallmark of discovering syntactic structure in language 
(Chomsky, 1957). Research on statistical learning in adults and infants has 
shown that humans are particularly sensitive to statistical properties of the input, 
for instance, transitional n-gram probabilities. Although this may help children 
segment speech (Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996) it has been argued, however, 
that this source of information may not help in detecting nonadjacent 
dependencies, in the presence of substantial variability of the intervening 
material (Gomez, 2002). Words in the language are organised into constituents 
called phrases, groupings of words that behave as units (typical constituents are 
Noun Phrases, Verb Phrases, Prepositional Phrases, Adjective Phrases). The 
position of such constituents is not fixed in a sentence because of the recursivity 
of syntax: for instance, a Noun Phrase constituent that contains a Prepositional 
Phrase can in turn contain another Noun Phrase. Recursivity generates non-local 
dependencies, the fact that two words can be syntactically dependent even 
4 
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though they occur far apart in a sentence. Consider subject-verb agreement in 
English in the following examples: 
(1) Mark runs, She runs, The rabbit runs 
(2) John and Mark run, The rabbit with the white fur runs 
(3) The woman with the blue dress is kind 
(4) The women with the blue dress are kind 
As one can see, a near-neighbour analysis such as *Mark run in (2) or the blue 
dress is kind in (4) does not yield the correct structural dependency. In Chapter 2, 
in particular, I discuss that detecting long-distance relationships like verb-noun 
agreement and tensed verbs are hard to explain in terms of simple distributional 
analyses based on n-gram statistics such as transitional probabilities. This is 
because the intervening material is extremely variable and hence has to be 
ignored for the structural constraints to be learned. Sequences in natural 
languages typically involve some items belonging to a relatively small set 
(functor words and morphemes like am, the, -ing, -s, are) interspersed with items 
belonging to a very large set (e. g. nouns, verbs, adjectives). Crucially, this 
asymmetry translates into patterns of highly invariant nonadjacent items 
separated by highly variable material (am cooking, am work qg, am goj g, etc. ). 
On the other end, nonadjacent contingencies such as number agreement may 
share the very same embedded material: consider sentence (1) versus (2) below: 
(5) The book on the shelf is dusty 
(6) The books on the shelf are dusty. 
5 
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In either case - large variability or no-variability of intervening items - 
knowledge of n-gram conditionals cannot be invoked for detecting invariant 
structure. The same chapter hence introduces the Variability Effect hypothesis, in 
which I empirically show that learners are better at detecting long-distance 
dependencies with either zero or high variability. I show a U-shape in learning 
long-distance contingencies as a function of the number of intervening items. 
Gomez (2002) has proposed that alternative sources of information may be 
attended to simultaneously by learners. With several potential cues in 
competition, human learning seems extremely flexible and naturally biased 
toward the most informative ones in an attempt to maximally reduce uncertainty. 
In chapter 3,1 discuss the extent to which simple associative mechanisms 
instantiated in connectionist models can account for the Variability Effect. A 
Simple Recurrent Network (SRN) is able to detect nonadjacent sequential 
contingencies by developing graded representations in hidden units that 
simultaneously maintain similarities and differences between several sequences. 
Crucially this happens in the presence of either zero variability or large 
variability, thus replicating the U-shape pattern obtained experimentally. 
Chapter 4 examines the extent to which a U-shape learning curve 
attributed to the Variability Effect is modality-independent and may be affected 
by training length. In two new experiments the same training and test stimuli 
used in chapter 2 were presented visually on a computer screen. The obtained U- 
shape curve is less marked when whole sentences appear on the screen. One 
possible explanation is that attending to visually presented stimuli is less 
demanding cognitively or makes the structure stand out visually, explaining the 
6 
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ceiling effect. In another experiment, presenting words one by one on the screen 
(thus mirroring the sequential presentation of the auditory version) yields results 
that are at the same time surprising and difficult to interpret, as the U-shape turns 
into an S-shape. In a third experiment, new participants were administered the 
same auditory experiment of chapter 2 with a halved training regime. This 
manipulation was initially motivated by the desire to reduce the large variation in 
scores between subjects within each condition, on the assumption that 20 minutes 
of training might produce boredom or distraction in participants. However, the 
U-shape did not emerge with 10 minutes of training exposure. Overall, the 
chapter tackles the limits of interpretability of single ALL results and cautions 
against drawing fast conclusions without a good battery of tests. In the AGL 
community it is often believed that because of their artificiality and abstractness 
artificial grammars capture the essence of learning at a highest, indeed abstract 
way. The results presented here point to different performance results depending 
on the training regime and the way the stimuli are perceptually perceived. The 
issue is explored further in Chapter 6 when phonological confounds are shown to 
explain away strong theoretical claims about the separability of statistical and 
algebraic computations. 
Generalisation is regarded as a core aspect of linguistic knowledge 
(Chomsky, 1957): although learners are exposed to a limited amount of language 
they produce an infinite number of sentences in their life. The ability to abstract 
beyond exemplars encountered is thus a critical feature of syntax acquisition. 
Chapter 5 discusses generalisation in the light of the variability results. Whereas 
the experiments in Chapter 3 test preference for grammatical items previously 
encountered in the training phase, in Chapter 51 test empirically whether 
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generalisation to novel stimuli is supported under the same conditions of 
variability involved in detecting invariant structure. 
Chapter 6 deals with speech segmentation and generalisation. The speech 
signal is mostly continuous and word boundaries are rarely marked by acoustic 
cues such as pauses. This poses a serious inferential problem to the child who 
lacks knowledge of the syntax and semantics of the language as well as the 
phonological properties of the lexicon. Here I discuss segmentation strategies 
with specific reference to an article by Pena, Bonatti, Nespor, and Mehler (2002). 
Many theories of language acquisition debate whether processing is dependent 
on statistical computations alone or whether it needs algebraic computations. 
Pena et al. recently argued that speech segmentation was a statistical process, 
whereas learning structural generalizations was due to algebraic computations. In 
a series of experiments, extending those by Pena et al., I found that participants 
had strong preferences for phonemes in certain utterance positions. I found no 
evidence for the statistical/algebraic distinction: the results from Peria et al. were 
a consequence of the impact of phonological preferences on language processing. 
I reassess the debate on algebraic versus statistical computation in the light of the 
obtained results. Chapter 6 ties in well with the previous ones for two reasons: 
firstly, they deal with the issue of exploiting long-distance dependencies for 
segmenting speech and generalising to novel items, thus adding another piece to 
the puzzle. Secondly, they elaborate on the methodological considerations started 
in chapter 5 about the perceptual non-neutrality of artificial stimuli, which is 
often incorrectly taken for granted. 
Chapters 7 and 8 conclude the statistical explorations into language by 
looking at the other side of generalisation, namely how a learner can recover 
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from overgeneralisations which are known to be spontaneously generated by 
children (such as *I disappeared the rabbit) without direct negative evidence, i. e. 
without direct correction from the caretaker. This is a general problem of 
inductive inference. Overgeneralizations are a common feature of language 
development. In learning the English past tense, children typically overgeneralize 
the `-ed' suffix marker, producing constructions such as *we holded the baby 
rabbits (Pinker, 1995). Language learners recover from these errors, in spite of 
the lack of negative evidence and the infinity of allowable constructions that 
remain unheard (Gold, 1967). It has been argued that this favours the existence 
of a specific language-learning device (e. g. Chomsky, 1980; Pinker, 1989). This 
is an aspect of the `Poverty of the Stimulus' argument. I report on a statistical 
model of language acquisition, which suggests that recovery from 
overgeneralizations may proceed from positive evidence alone. Specifically, I 
show that adult linguistic competence in quasi-regular structures may stem from 
an interaction between a general cognitive principle, simplicity (Chater, 1996) - 
based on the mathematical theory of Kolmogorov Complexity (Kolmogorov, 
1965) - and statistical properties of the input. Under what is known as Baker's 
Paradox (Baker, 1979) non-occurrence in the input is not in itself evidence for 
the incorrectness of a construction because an infinite number of unheard 
sentences are still correct. One type of irregularities that Baker referred to can be 
broadly labeled alternations (Levin, 1993; see also Culicover, 2000). For 
instance, the dative alternation in English allows a class of verbs to take both the 
double-object construction (He gave Mark the book) and the prepositional 
construction (He gave the book to Mark). Hence the verb give alternates between 
two constructions. However, certain verbs seem to be constrained to one possible 
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construction only (He donated the book to Mark is allowed, whereas *He 
donated Mark the book is not). Such verbs are non-alternating. From empirical 
studies we know that children do make overgeneralization errors that involve 
alternations, such as *I said her no (by analogy to I told her no, Bowerman, 
1996; Lord 1979). 
In chapter 7,1 present alternation phenomena from the CHILDES 
database (MacWhinney, 2000) of child-directed speech which will be used in the 
computer model. The simplicity principle (Chater, 1996; Chater & Vitanyi, 
2001) states that the cognitive system seeks the hypothesis that provides the 
briefest representation of the available data - here the linguistic input to the 
child. This model allows learning from positive evidence alone in a probabilistic 
sense, contrasting with Gold's (1967) negative theorems. Data gathered from the 
CHILDES database were used as an approximation of positive input the child 
receives from adults. I consider linguistic structures that would yield 
overgeneralization. Two computer simulations incorporating simplicity were run 
corresponding to two different hypotheses about the grammar: (1) The child 
assumes that there are no exceptions to the grammar. This hypothesis leads to 
overgeneralization. (2) The child assumes that some constructions are not 
allowed. By measuring the cost to encode a structure given its probability P of 
occurrence as 1og2(11P), the second hypothesis was preferred as it lead to a 
shorter input description and eliminated overgeneralization. 
While chapter 7 attempts to solve the long-debated logical problem of 
language acquisition, chapter 8 takes an evolutionary perspective. The relative 
diachronic stability of quasi-productive constructions in linguistic codes poses a 
puzzle for accounts based on the principle of parsimony of representation. The 
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logical problem of language evolution is concerned with how quasi-regularities 
such as alternations could have possibly emerged in natural languages and why 
they were not eliminated over generations, if these constituted a serious learning 
problem. In particular, I consider the fact that languages are never fully 
productive, although full productivity would be a desirable solution in terms of 
leamability over generations (Kirby, 2001; Hurford 2000). I present several 
simulations charting the emergence and stability of irregularities across 1000 
generations of artificial simplicity-based learners using an artificial language. In 
all simulations grammar induction is by simplicity. Randomly set proto- 
grammars are transmitted across 1,000 generations of communicating agents. At 
each generation a simplicity learner seeks the shortest representation of the 
available data. As a result, overgeneral grammars are not handed down over the 
next generation and alternations remain stable, at least across a number of 
generations. 
Finally, Chapter 9 pulls the lines of research on statistical language 
learning together, discussing the merits and limits of a distributional approach. I 
hope to show that beyond well-founded theoretical claims for the unlearnability 
of language in some deep sense, there is ample scope for setting a rigorous 
research agenda for evaluating experimentally and computationally what aspects 
of language can be learned from experience and what cannot. The relative 
recency of the area of statistical language learning as well as the preliminary 
nature of the investigations reported here can only warrant a cautionary position 
that eschews polarized views. Ultimately, it is suggested here that the human 
brain may be endowed with a powerful statistical device for detecting structure, 
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generalising, segmenting speech and recovering from overgeneralisations found 
in natural languages. 
This work is exploratory by necessity because none of the studies that I 
report can claim a definitive answer to a specific issue, although they are all self- 
contained projects that have been published or submitted for publication. I also 
perform a cursory exploration in language learning in as much as the experiments 
and simulations reported here do not deal with real linguistic utterances in real 
communicative contexts, but rather make use of simplified grammars technically 
known as artificial or finite-state grammars. The virtues of such a simplification 
will soon result apparent, particularly for the possibility of carefully controlling 
the conditions of learning in experimental settings, as well as making learning a 
computationally tractable issue in computer simulations. Using artificial 
language stimuli enables precise control over the learning environment, and 
allows systematic manipulation and testing of specific structures. As we shall 
see, artificial stimuli need not be entirely abstracted from real languages: both the 
experimental stimuli and the computer simulations reported here are empirically 
motivated by statistical analyses of large corpora of real language, such as the 
CHILDES database and the British National Corpus. 
The reader may also be struck to note that, although I deal with language 
acquisition throughout this work, none of the experiments involve infants or 
children. This is certainly a caveat. In recent times, insights and methodologies 
from two lines of research have been combined: one involving studies of 
artificial grammar learning (henceforth AGL) in adults (e. g. Reber, 1967,1969; 
Morgan & Newport, 1981; Valian & Levitt, 1996) and another examining infant 
learning examining infant learning of artificial language material (ALL). Because 
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the two areas are now beginning to be merged, and because the learning that 
results from adults is better understood, it is customary to gather preliminary data 
from adult performance as a baseline against infant performance to be tested 
later. 
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Chapter 2 
Detecting non-adjacent structural dependencies in language 
Research in artificial grammar learning (AGL) and artificial language learning 
(ALL) in infants and adults has revealed that humans are extremely sensitive to 
the statistical properties of the environment they are exposed to. This has opened 
up a new trend of investigations aimed at determining empirically the processes 
involved in so-called statistical learning. 
Several mechanisms have been proposed as the default that learners use to 
detect structure, although crucially there is no consensus in the literature over 
which is most plausible or whether there is a default at all. Some researchers have 
shown that learners are particularly sensitive to transitional probabilities of 
bigrams (Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996): confronted with a stream of 
unfamiliar concatenated speech-like sound they tend to infer word boundaries 
between two syllables that rarely occur adjacently in the sequence. Sensitivity to 
transitional probabilities seems to be present across modalities, for instance in the 
segmentation of streams of tones (Saffran, Johnson, Aslin, and Newport, 1999) 
and in the temporal presentation of visual shapes (Fiser & Aslin, 2002). 
Other researchers have proposed exemplar- or fragment-based models, 
based on knowledge of memorised chunks of bigrams and trigrams (Dulany et al., 
1984; Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990; Servan-Schreiber & Anderson, 1990) and 
learning of whole items (Vokey & Brooks, 1992). Yet others have postulated rule- 
learning in transfer tasks (Reber, 1967; Marcus, Vijayan, Rao & Voshton, 1999). 
In addition, knowledge of chained events such as sentences in natural languages 
15 
Chapter 2 
require learners to track nonadjacent dependencies where transitional probabilities 
are of little help (Gomez, 2002). 
In this Chapter I propose that there may be no default process in human 
sequential learning. Instead, learners may be actively engaged in search for good 
sources of reduction in uncertainty. In their quest, they seek alternative sources of 
predictability by capitalizing on information that is likely to be the most 
statistically reliable. This hypothesis was initiated by (Gomez, 2002) and is 
consistent with several theoretical formulations such as reduction of uncertainty 
(Gibson, 1991) and the simplicity principle (Chater, 1996), which states that the 
cognitive system attempts to seek the simplest hypothesis about the data available. 
Given performance constraints, the cognitive system may be biased to focus on 
data that will be likely to reduce uncertainty as far as possible'. Specifically, 
whether the system focuses on transitional probabilities or non-adjacent 
dependencies may depend on the statistical properties of the environment that is 
being sampled. Therefore, by manipulating the statistical structure of that 
environment, it is perhaps possible to investigate whether active search is at work 
in detecting structure. 
In two experiments, I investigated participants' degree of success at 
detecting invariant structure in an AGL task in 5 conditions where the test items 
and test task are the same but the probabilistic environment is manipulated so as 
to change the statistical landscape substantially. I propose that a small number of 
alternative statistical cues might be available to learners. I aim to show that, 
counter to intuition, orthogonal sources of reliability might be at work in different 
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experimental conditions leading to successful or unsuccessful learning. I also 
asked whether my results are robust across perceptual modalities by running two 
variations of the same experiment, one in the auditory modality and one in the 
visual modality. My experiments are an extension of a study by Gömez (2002), 
which I first introduce. 
Detection of invariant structure through context variability 
Many sequential patterns in the world involve tracking nonadjacent dependencies. 
For example, in English auxiliaries and inflectional morphemes (e. g., am cookies 
has travelled) as well as dependencies in number agreement (the books on the 
shelf are dusty) are separated by various intervening linguistic material. One 
potential source of learning in this case might be embedding of first-order 
conditionals such as bigrams into higher-order conditionals such as trigrams. That 
learners attend to n-gram statistics in a chunking fashion is evident in a number of 
studies (Schvaneveldt & Gömez, 1998; Cohen, Ivry, & Keele, 1990). In the 
example above chunking involves noting that am and cook as well as cook and ing 
are highly frequent and subsequently noting that am cooking is highly frequent too 
as a trigram. Hence we may safely argue that higher order n-gram statistics 
represent a useful source of information for detecting nonadjacent dependencies. 
However, sequences in natural languages typically involve some items belonging 
to a relatively small set (functor words and morphemes like am, the, -ing, -s, are) 
interspersed with items belonging to a very large set (e. g. nouns, verbs, 
adjectives). Crucially, this asymmetry translates into patterns of highly invariant 
We assume that this process of selection is not necessarily conscious, and might for example involve 
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nonadjacent items separated by highly variable material (am cooking, am working, 
am going, etc. ). Gomez (2002) suggested that knowledge of n-gram conditionals 
cannot be invoked for detecting invariant structure in highly variable contexts 
because first-order transitional probabilities, P(YIX), decrease as the set size of Y 
increases. Similarly, second-order transitional probabilities, P(ZIXY), also 
decrease as a function of set size of X. Hence, statistical estimates for these 
transitional probabilities tend to be unreliable. Gomez exposed infants and adult 
participants to sentences of an artificial language of the form A-X-B. The language 
contained three families of nonadjacent pairs, notably Al-Bj, A2-B2, and Ai-B3. 
She manipulated the set size of the middle element X in four conditions by 
systematically increasing the number from 2 to 6 to 12 and 24 word-like elements. 
In this way, conditional bigram and trigram probabilities decreased as a function 
of number of middle words. In the test phase, participants were required to subtly 
discriminate correct nonadjacent dependencies, (e. g. A2-XI-B2) from incorrect 
ones (*A2-XI-BI). Notice that the incorrect sentences were new as trigrams, 
although both single words and bigrams had appeared in the training phase in the 
same positions. Hence the test requires very fine distinctions to be made. Gomez 
hypothesized that if learners were focusing on n-gram dependencies they should 
learn nonadjacent dependencies better when exposed to small sets of middle items 
because transitional probabilities between adjacent elements are higher for smaller 
than for larger set sizes. Conversely, if learners spotted the invariant structure 
better in the larger set size, Gomez hypothesized that increasing variability in the 
context must have led them to disregard the highly variable middle elements. Her 
distribution of processing activity in a neural network. 
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results support the latter hypothesis: learners performed poorly with low 
variability whereas they were particularly good when the set size of the middle 
item was largest (24 middle items; see Figure 1). 
Total percentage endorsements (Gomez, 2002) 
ICY, 
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60% 
E 
75% 
70% 
i 
/ 
cJ"b l 
24 
V. Oi bdiry 
Figure 1. Total percentage endorsements from Gomez (2002) for the different conditions of 
variability of the middle item. 
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Testing the zero-variability hypothesis 
Gomez proposed that both infant and adult learners are sensitive to change versus 
non-change, and use their sensitivity to capitalize on stable structure. Learners 
might opportunistically entertain different strategies in detecting invariant 
structure, driven by a reduction of uncertainty principle. In this study I am 
interested in taking this proposal further by exploring what happens when 
variability between the end-item pairs and the middle items is reversed in the 
input. Gomez attributed poor results in the middle set sizes to low variability: the 
variability effect seems to be attended to reliably only in the presence of a critical 
mass of middle items. However, an alternative explanation is that in small set 
size conditions both nonadjacent dependencies and middle items vary, but none 
of them considerably more than the other. This may confuse learners, in that it is 
not clear which structure is non-variant. With larger set sizes middle items are 
considerably more variable than first-last item pairings, making the nonadjacent 
pairs stand out as invariant. I asked what happens when variability in middle 
position is eliminated, thus making the nonadjacent items variable. I replicated 
Gomez' experiment with adults and added a new condition, namely the zero- 
variability condition, in which there is only one middle element (e. g. A3-X1-B3, 
A, -XI-BI). My prediction is that non-variability of the middle item will make the 
end-items stand out, and hence detecting the appropriate nonadjacent 
relationships will become easier, increasing mean performance rates. 
Intuitively, sampling transitional probabilities with large context 
variability results in low information gain as the data are too few to be reliable; 
by the same vein, the lack of variability should produce low information gain for 
transitional probabilities as well, because it is just obvious what the bigram 
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structure is. Hence this should make nonadjacent dependencies stand out, as 
potentially more informative sources of information, by contrast. 
The final predicted picture is a U-shape learning curve in detecting nonadjacent 
dependencies, on the assumption that learning is a flexible and adaptive process. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty undergraduate and postgraduate students at the University of Warwick 
participated and were paid £3 each. 
Materials 
In the training phase participants listened to auditory strings generated by one of 
two artificial languages (L1 or L2). Strings in L1 had the form aXd, bXe, and cXf. 
L2 strings had the form aXe, bXf, cXd. Variability was manipulated in 5 
conditions, by drawing X from a pool of either 1,2,6,12, or 24 elements. The 
strings, recorded from a female voice, were the same that Gomez used in her 
study and were originally chosen as tokens among several recorded sample 
strings in order to eliminate talker-induced differences in individual strings. 
The elements a, b, and c were instantiated as pel, vot, and dak; d, e, and f, 
were instantiated as rud, jic, tood. The 24 middle items were wadim, kicey, 
puser, fengle, coomo, loga, gople, taspu, hiftam, deecha, vamey, skiger, benez, 
gensim, feenam, laeljeen, chla, roosa, plizet, balip, malsig, suleb, nilbo, and 
wiffle. Following the design by Gomez (2002) the group of 12 middle elements 
were drawn from the first 12 words in the list, the set of 6 were drawn from the 
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first 6, the set of 2 from the first 2 and the set of 1 from the first word. Three 
strings in each language were common to all five groups and they were used as 
test stimuli. The three L2 items served as foils for the L1 condition and vice 
versa. In Gomez (2002) there were six sentences generated by each language, 
because the smallest set size had 2 middle items. To keep the number of test 
items equal to Gomez I presented the 6 test stimuli twice in two blocks, 
randomizing within blocks for each participant. Words were separated by 250-ms 
pauses and strings by 750-ms pauses. 
Procedure 
Six participants were recruited in each of the five set size conditions (1,2,6,12, 
24) and for each of the two language conditions (L1, L2) resulting in 12 
participants per set size. Learners were asked to listen and pay close attention to 
sentences of an invented language and they were told that there would be a series 
of simple questions relating to the sentences after the listening phase. During 
training, participants in all 5 conditions listened to the same overall number of 
strings, a total of 432 token strings. This way, frequency of exposure to the 
nonadjacent dependencies was held constant across conditions. For instance 
participants in set-size 24 heard six iterations of each of 72 type strings (3 
dependencies x 24 middle items), participants in set-size 12 encountered each 
string twice as often as those exposed to set size 24 and so forth. Hence whereas 
nonadjacent dependencies where held constant, transitional probabilities 
decreased as set size increased. 
Training lasted about 18 minutes. Before the test, participants were told 
that the sentences they had heard were generated according to a set of rules 
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involving word order, and they would now hear 12 strings, 6 of which would 
violate the rules. They were asked to press "Y" on a keyboard if they thought a 
sentence followed the rules and to press "N" otherwise. 
Results and Discussion 
An analysis of variance with Set Size (1 vs. 2 vs. 6 vs. 12 vs. 24) and Language 
(L1 vs. L2) as between-subjects and Grammaticality (Trained vs. Untrained 
strings) as a within-subjects variable resulted in a main effect of Grammaticality, 
F (1,50)=24.70, p<. 001, a main Set Size effect, F(4,50)=3.85, p<. 008, and a 
Language x Set Size interaction, F(4,50)=2.59, p<. 047. I was particularly 
interested in determining whether performance across the different set-size 
conditions would result in a U-shaped function. Consistent with my prediction, a 
polynomial trend analysis yielded a significant quadratic effect, F(1,50)=5.85, 
p<. 05. In contrast to Gomez (2002), there was not a significant increase between 
set size 12 and set size 24, t(22)=. 57, p=. 568. This leveling off is responsible for 
a significant cubic effect, F(1,50)=9.49, p<. 005. Figure 2 summarizes total 
percentage endorsements for correct answers. 
23 
Chapter 2 
irni 
95% 
qoi 
asi 
uü 
`0 75Y 
'o r 
osq 
soya 
ljN 
\ 
\\ 
\ 
o 24 
varýahýry 
Figure 2. Total percentage endorsements in Experiment I for different variability. 
General discussion 
We used a simple artificial language to enquire into the way learners track 
remote dependencies. Knowledge of sequence events in the world, including 
language, involves detecting fixed nonadjacent dependencies interspersed with 
highly variable material. Gomez (2002) found what I dub a variability effect, i. e. 
a facilitatory effect in detecting invariant structure when the context is highly 
variable, but not when it is moderately or even little variable. In general, this 
points to it specific sensitivity to change versus non-change. Conditions 2 to 4 in 
my Experiment 1 replicate her findings, although performance in terms of 
percent accuracy seems to improve only gradually from set size 2 to 24, whereas 
Gomez found a significant difference between set size 12 and 24. 
24 
Chapter 2 
Overall, Gomez' original results do not square well with recent findings 
of learners' striking sensitivity to n-gram transitional probabilities. Because 
transitional probabilities are higher in set sizes 2,6, and 12, performance should 
be better. Instead, the opposite is the case. I reasoned that perhaps variability in 
both the middle item and end-point items leave learners in doubt as to what is the 
invariant structure. Hence, by eliminating variability in the middle item in a new 
condition, the variability of the nonadjacent items stands out again, this time 
reversed. However, the effect is, quite counter intuitively, not reversed. Indeed 
similar performance results are obtained for set size 1 and set size 24. In set size 
1 performance is near 100% and significantly better than set size 2 (Experiment 
1). One could argue that word trigrams, if recorded perfectly, could suffice to 
account for performance in set size 1, thus trivializing my results and explaining 
away the variability effect in this condition. However, as a counter to that it 
would be reasonable to expect good performance in set size 2 condition too, 
given the high number of repetitions (72) for only six type strings. A control 
condition could have been run involving learning six frames (instead of three) 
with 1 different middle item each (e. g. A3-X3-B3, A6-X6-B6) so as to reproduce the 
same number of type and token frequencies of set size 2, but with no middle item 
being shared by different frames. However, the doubt of rote learning will be 
solved in chapter 5, when generalisation to novel middle items will be tested in 
set size 1. 
Similarly, one could argue that good performance in set size 24 could be 
achieved by strikingly but not impossibly memorizing 72 type strings. However, 
this would imply good performance in all smaller set sizes as well and this runs 
counter to data. 
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Notice also that in all conditions, including set size 1, bigram transitional 
probabilities by themselves are not sufficient for detecting the correct string pel 
wadim rud from the incorrect one *pel wadim jic (example taken from L1) as 
both pel wadim, wadim rud, and wadim jic appear as bigrams during training. 
Moreover, Gdmez (2002) conjectured that perhaps low discrimination rates in 
small set sizes are due to overexposure of string tokens during training, resulting 
in boredom and distraction. My findings disconfirm this hypothesis: if it held 
true performance would drop even lower in the zero-vari ability condition, as the 
type/token ratio decreases even more. Crucially, the finding that there is a 
statistically significant difference in learning in the two conditions becomes 
intriguing for several reasons. 
The implications of my findings might inform in various degrees both the 
AGL community and researchers of language development. AGL researchers 
working mainly with adults have long debated whether there are one or more 
mechanisms at work in learning structured events from experience. My results 
suggest that associative learning based on adjacent material may not be the only 
source of information. There seems to be a striking tendency to detect variant 
versus invariant structure, and the way learners do it is extremely adaptive to the 
informational demands of their input. Without claiming exhaustiveness I 
explored two putative sources of information, namely n-gram transitional 
probabilities and the variability effect. At this stage I can only give an informal 
explanation of the reduction of uncertainty hypothesis. Intuitively, sampling 
bigrams involving middle items under no variability yields no information gain, 
as the middle item is always the same. Under this condition learners may be 
driven to shift attention towards nonadjacent structure. Likewise, sampling 
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bigrams with large variability yields no reduction of uncertainty, as bigram 
transitional probabilities are very low. In a similar way then, learners may be 
lead to focus on nonadjacent dependencies. With low variability, sampling 
bigrams may be reliable enough, hence "distracting" learners away from 
nonadjacent structure. Other sources may be at work and disentangling the 
contribution of each of them to learning is an empirical project yet to be 
investigated. For instance, post-hoc verbal reports from the majority of my 
participants suggest that, regardless of their performance, they were aware of the 
positional dependencies of single words in the strings. This piece of information 
may be misleading for the task: on the one side it reduces uncertainty by 
eliminating irrelevant hypotheses about words in multiple positions (each word is 
either initial, middle, or final), on the other side distinguishing pel wadim rud 
from *pel wadim jic requires more than positional knowledge. I believe that 
positional knowledge deserves more research in the current AGL literature. 
Studies of sequential learning have found that it is an important source of 
information. However, many nonadjacent dependencies are free ranging and 
hence non-positionally dependent. Further experiments are needed to investigate 
whether people can detect such non-positionally dependent constraints as 
Ax y_B, Ax y_w_B, A_x y_w_z_B, equally well. 
In the next chapter I will show that these results can be modelled 
successfully using simple recurrent neural connectionist networks (SRNs) trained 
in experimental conditions akin to the adult data reported here, obtaining a very 
similar U-shape curve. SRNs can be thought of as reducing uncertainty in that 
predictions tend to converge towards the optimal conditional probabilities of 
observing a particular successive item to the sequence presented up to that point. 
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The SRNs specific task was to predict the third nonadjacent element B, correctly. 
Minimizing the sum squared error maximizes the probability of the next element, 
given previously occurring adjacent elements (McClelland, 1998). This is 
equivalent to exploiting bigram probabilities. As we have seen, conditional 
probability matching only yields suboptimal behaviour. To overcome this, SRNs 
possess a stack of memory units that help them maintain information about 
previously encountered material. Crucially, they maintain a trace of the correct 
non-adjacent item A, under either no variability or large variability only. This 
happens by forming separate graded representations in the hidden units for each 
nonadjacent dependency. 
The reduction of uncertainty hypothesis may also be given a formal 
account in terms of active data selection (MacKay, 1992, Oaksford & Chater, 
1994), a form of rational analysis (Anderson, 1990). However, the details of such 
model are outside the scope of this chapter (see Monaghan, Chater & Onnis, in 
preparation). Overall, framing my results within a reduction of uncertainty 
principle should prompt new research aimed at discovering in which carefully 
controlled statistical environments multiple sources are attended to and either 
discarded or integrated. 
Finally, my findings might inform research in language development. 
Gomez (2002) found that infants attend to the variability effect. I am currently 
investigating whether the U-shape curve found in my experiments applies to 
infant learning as well. The fact that performance in the zero-variability 
condition is very good is consistent with various findings that children develop 
productive linguistic knowledge only gradually building from fixed item-based 
constructions. According to the Verb Island hypothesis for example (for a 
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review, see Tomasello, 2000) early knowledge of verbs and verb frames is 
extremely idiosyncratic for each specific verb. In addition, morphological 
markings are unevenly distributed across verbs. In this view I-am-eat-ing is first 
learnt as an unanalyzed chunk and it takes the child a critical mass of verbs to 
realize that the frame am-ing can be used productively with different verbs. 
Two- and three-year olds have been found to generalize minimally, their 
repertoire consisting of a high number of conservative utterances and a low 
number of productive ones. The speculation is that a critical number of 
exemplars is vital for triggering schematization. Perhaps then, young children 
exploit n-gram statistics as a default option, because their knowledge of language 
is limited to a few type items. This situation is similar to learning in small set 
sizes and it only works if each string is learnt as a separate item. When children's 
repertoire is variable enough (arguably at ages three to four), then switching to 
change versus non-change as a source of information becomes more relevant and 
helps the learner reduce uncertainty by detecting variant versus invariant 
structure. The fact that learners in the large set size discard the middle item could 
be interpreted as a form of generalisation for material in the middle item position. 
This hypothesis will be tested in chapter 5. At this stage the link between AGL 
results and language learning can only remain speculative, but invites to 
intringuing research for the immediate future. 
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Chapter 3 
The Variability effect: A graded, associative account 
Since Reber's early studies (e. g., Reber, 1967), Artificial Grammar Learning 
(AGL) research has provided a steady stream of evidence that infants and adults 
become sensitive, after necessarily limited and often purely incidental exposure 
to complex stimuli, to the deep structure contained in chained events such as 
strings of letters. In a typical AGL situation, participants are first exposed to 
numerous stimuli and asked to memorize or process them in some way. Next, 
they are informed of the fact that the stimuli all instantiate a specific set of rules 
(a grammar), and asked to classify further strings as grammatical or not. 
Typically, participants can achieve some success in this classification task 
despite the fact that their verbalizable knowledge about the features that define 
grammaticality remains very limited. The learning mechanisms involved in such 
situations remain controversial. Recent results point to an inbuilt sensitivity to 
the transitional probabilities of adjacent items (Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996). 
Other studies suggest fragment-based models involving memorised chunks of 
bigrams and trigrams (Dulany et al., 1984; Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990; Servan- 
Schreiber & Anderson, 1990), learning of whole items (Vokey & Brooks, 1992), 
or learning based on similarity with previous items (Pothos & Bailey, 2000). Yet 
others postulate abstract learning of a distinct algebraic type in transfer tasks 
where the surface form of test items bears no resemblance to the training items 
(Reber, 1967; Marcus, Vijayan, Rao & Vishton, 1999). 
The difficulty of identifying a single mechanism responsible for 
performance in AGL tasks should perhaps be taken as an indication that no such 
unique mechanism actually exists. Two points are worth highlighting in this 
respect. First, many of the proposed mechanisms actually turn out to be 
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equivalent at some level of description (Redington & Chater, 1998). Second, it 
appears likely that several sources of information might be used concurrently by 
subjects (as suggested by studies involving speech-like stimuli, e. g., Onnis, 
Monaghan, Chater, & Richmond, submitted). 
The recent results by Gomez (2002), however, challenge virtually all 
extant AGL models. Gomez found that nonadjacent dependencies, that is, items 
that are structurally dependent but separated sequentially by one or more items, 
are learned better when the variability of the intervening items is large. In chapter 
21 have further found that nonadjacent dependencies were also learned better 
when the variability of the intervening items is zero (i. e., when there is only one 
possible intervening item). In other words, learning is best either when there are 
many possible intervening items or when there is just one such item, with 
degraded performance for conditions of intermediate variability. This U-shaped 
relationship between variability and performance cannot be readily explained by 
any of the putative mechanisms listed above. In particular simple associative 
mechanisms that rely on knowledge of chunks of items (or n-grams) would not 
predict such results, which thus appear to be incongruent with recent findings 
that both infants and adults can discover patterns in sequences based solely on 
sensitivity to low-level statistics (e. g. Saffran et al., 1996). Gomez suggested that 
while humans are indeed attuned to distributional properties of the environment, 
they may also learn about which source of information is most likely to be 
useful, and that success might therefore depend specifically on the statistical 
properties of the stimulus environment they are exposed to. Crucially, Gömez's 
hypothesis is that learners capitalise on the most statistically reliable source of 
information in an attempt to reduce uncertainty (Gomez, 2003; Gibson, 1991; 
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Oaksford, & Chater, 1994; Chater, 1996). Thus, whether one becomes sensitive 
to the information contained in bigrams, trigrams or in nonadjacent structures 
may simply depend on the statistical properties of the specific environment that 
is being sampled. 
The results obtained by G6mez and the ones charted in chapter 2 suggest 
that distributional learning is more powerful, dynamic, and data-driven than 
heretofore acknowledged, thus challenging the current fragment-based models. 
In this chapter, I aim to demonstrate that Simple Recurrent Networks (henceforth 
SRNs, see Elman, 1990; Cleeremans et al., 1991) provide a unifying model that 
accounts for the dynamic U-shape pattern obtained experimentally. I discuss how 
connectionist networks can be seen as reducing uncertainty in a rational way 
(McClelland, 1998, Anderson, 1990). Performance strictly depends on 
developing separate graded internal representations of the hidden units for 
different nonadjacent dependencies in conditions of nil or high variability. It is 
suggested that reduction of uncertainty needs not be a conscious process, and 
might involve distribution of processing activity in a neural network. Perhaps 
then, humans are naturally and implicitly biased toward optimal learning. 
My main goal in this chapter is to demonstrate that associative learning 
mechanisms are in fact sufficient to account for the u-shaped relationship 
between variability of the embedded material and learnability of the nonadjacent 
dependencies. However, and this is a crucially important point, not just any 
associative learning mechanism will do. In particular, I will suggest that 
successful learning of such material critically depends on the availability of 
graded, distributed representational systems, such as instantiated by 
connectionist networks. The graded character of the representations learned make 
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it possible for each such representation to simultaneously convey information 
about both the embedded material and the outer elements in such a way that 
learning can be "focused" (yet not through the action of any attention 
mechanism) on the most relevant source of information depending on the 
distributional properties of the entire material. 
In the next subsection I present a connectionist simulation of Gomez 
(2002) for learning in highly variable contexts. Subsequently, I present a 
simulation of the results obtained in chapter 2 extending Gomez' data and 
incorporating learning with zero variability, resulting in a U-shape learning 
curve. 
Simulation 1- The Variability Effect Hypothesis 
To summarise, Gomez exposed infants and adults to sentences of an artificial 
language of the form A, _XX_B;, where 
ie {1,2,3}. The language contained three 
families of nonadjacent pairs, notably A1_B1, A2_B2, and A? _B;. 
Gomez 
manipulated the set-size of the middle element X1 in four conditions by 
systematically increasing the number from 2 to 6 to 12 and 24 word-like 
elements. In this way, conditional bigram probabilities P(XXIAi) and trigram 
probabilities P(BilAi_XX) decreased as a function of number of middle words. In 
the test phase, participants were required to subtly discriminate correct 
nonadjacent dependencies, (e. g. A2_Xj_B2) from incorrect ones (*A2_Xi_Bi). 
Notice that the incorrect sentences were new as trigrams, although both single 
words and bigram words (A2_X1, X1_B2, X1_B1) had appeared in the training 
phase with the same frequencies. Hence the test required very fine distinctions to 
be made. Gomez hypothesised that if learners were focusing on n-gram 
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dependencies they should learn nonadjacent dependencies better when exposed 
to small sets of middle items because transitional probabilities between adjacent 
elements are higher for smaller than for larger set-sizes. Conversely, if learners 
spotted the invariant structure better in the larger set-size, Gomez hypothesised 
that increasing variability in the context must have led them to disregard the 
highly variable middle elements. Her results support the latter hypothesis: 
learners performed poorly with low variability whereas they were particularly 
good when the set-size of the middle item was largest (24 middle items). 
Such scenario is problematic for associative learning mechanisms focused 
on processing local transition probabilities (i. e. from one element to the next) 
precisely because the embedded material appears to be wholly irrelevant to 
mastering the nonadjacencies: not only is there an infinite number of possible 
relative clauses that might separate The dog from is, but also structurally 
different nonadjacent dependencies might share the very same embedded 
material, as in The dog that chased the cats is playful versus The dogs that 
chased the cats are playful (Servan-Schreiber, Cleeremans, & McClelland, 
1991). 
While this state of affairs might suggest that nonadjacencies can only be 
mastered by structured, classical learning mechanisms (such as push-down 
automata), some authors have nevertheless suggested that associative learning 
mechanisms might in fact turn out to be sufficient to the extent that it is in fact 
seldom the case that the embedded material is completely independent from the 
head in natural language. To see this, consider for instance that a single dog and 
a pack of dogs are likely to be chasing different things. More generally, some 
embeddings are only possible after a singular dog (e. g., The dog that scratched 
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itself is very playful is grammatical, but *The dogs that scratched itself are very 
playful is not) and others are only possible after a plural dogs (e. g., The dogs that 
chased each other are very playful vs. *The dog that chased each other is very 
playful). Servan-Schreiber et al. (1991) demonstrated that associative learning 
mechanisms instantiated in Elman's SRN are sufficient to master such cases as 
long as the entire distribution of possible embeddings is statistically dependent 
on the head. This suggests that distributional approaches to language learning are 
more powerful than previously anticipated, provided that the environment 
contains even weak, statistical, relationships between the class of items that can 
form the elements of nonadjacent dependencies and the class of items that can 
form the embeddings. 
To find out whether associative learning mechanisms can explain the 
variability effect, I trained an SRN (Elman, 1990; see Figure 3) to predict each 
element of sequences that were structurally identical to Gömez's material. 
Stimulus t 
copy 
............................ Hidden units 
Context II Stimulus (t-1) 
Figure 3. A Simple Recurrent Network (after Elman, 1990) 
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Method 
Networks 
48 SRNs 2 with different random initial weights between +. 5 and -. 5 were trained 
and tested, corresponding to 12 subjects in each of the four conditions in Gomez 
(2002). Single words were instantiated in localist representations3, plus an End of 
Sentence (EOS) marker. Hence the networks had 31 input/output units (3 first 
words, 3 last words, and 24 potential middle words, 1 EOS), 15 hidden units, and 
15 context units4. 
Materials 
Training and test stimuli consisted of the strings generated from the finite-state 
grammar used by G6mez5. Test consisted of 6 grammatical and 6 ungrammatical 
strings. 
Procedure 
48 SRNs were trained and tested on a prediction task. At each stimulus 
presentation the task was to predict the next element in the string. After 
presentation of each string, the context unit activations were reset so that no 
information about the previous string was carried over. This corresponds to the 
networks receiving each string separately, as in the experimental setting. All 
networks in all conditions were given the same learning rate of .3 and 
2 All simulations implemented with the PDP simulator for Macintosh. 3 Each word was an input vector with all units set to zero and a specific unit set to 1. ° Context units provided the network with a memory of previous instances by copying the activation of 
hidden units at time i-I and merging them with the activation of hidden units at time I. 5 Gömez used two languages where the end-items were cross-balanced to control for potential confounds. 
Because all word vectors are orthogonal to each other, we created only 1 language. 
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Momentum of . 9. Training consisted of the same overall number of token strings 
in all conditions (432 strings Gomez, 1080 strings for the networks). Weight 
update was carried out at the end of each string presentation6. The networks used 
the backpropagation learning algorithm and sum squared error as a measure of 
error. 
Results and Analyses 
To obtain the closest possible data contact with the experimental paradigm, I 
considered each network as a single participant and averaged together results 
from 12 separate networks in each condition. Being interested in the specific 
prediction of the third element (B1, B2, B3) in each string, performance during test 
was assessed by recording the relative strength of the output unit corresponding 
to the correct successor of each middle element Xj. As a measure of weighted 
accuracy I used the Luce ratio (Luce, 1963), whereby the activation of the target 
output unit is divided by the sum of the activations of all output units7. A high 
Luce ratio indicates that most activation is placed on the correct target output 
unit, hence it can be taken as a measure of network's predicting power. To assess 
performance in a way that would correspond to human grammaticality judgement 
I computed the probability that each string would be classified as grammatical by 
entering the Luce ratio of the target output in the following standard expression 
(Dienes, 1992): 
p("grammatical") =I I+ e-k"Lure-T 
6 This is known as "online learning" as opposed to "batch learning", which consists of updating the weights 
after a number of training strings. 
7 Including target output, because in the case of the target unit "firing" alone, the weighted activation would 
be divided by zero. 
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where k is a scaling parameter and T is a threshold; both were adjusted manually 
so as to yield slightly higher numbers of grammatical than ungrammatical 
responses8. Probabilities over .5 were considered as a grammatical response 
while probabilities under .5 were considered as an ungrammatical response. The 
resulting probabilities for each test string were then averaged for each set 
condition over grammatical and ungrammatical sentences to yield global 
endorsement rates for each condition. Finally, I computed the percentages of 
correct classifications expected for grammatical and ungrammatical strings in 
each condition. The formula for correctness is: 
correct = [p(G)-(1- p(U))J/2 
where p(G) is the probability of grammatical endorsement and p(U) is the 
probability of ungrammatical endorsement. It is these final values that I 
compared directly with Gomez' Experiment 1 results (see Figure 1 in chapter 2 
and Figure 4 below). The SRN, trained in the same conditions as human subjects, 
displays a similar pattern of results. Performance does not improve gradually as a 
function of variability until a major boost occurs in condition 24. An analysis of 
the network's behaviour will clarify how and why performance increases with 
large variability only. 
8 This "positive bias" is a general trend in experimental settings where participants tend to respond YES 
more often than NO. Hence, k and T are not entirely free parameters, as their values are constrained by the 
requirement to reproduce the same overall positive bias found in the human experiments. 
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SRN data - Percent Accuracy 
for Simulation 1 
100% 
T 
90°i j 
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AI 
oj 
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50% 
40% 
26 
12 24 
Variability 
Figure 4. Percent accuracy for Simulation 1 across 4 conditions of variability. 
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Simulation 2- The zero-variability hypothesis 
Gomez attributed poor results in the middle set-sizes to low variability: the 
variability effect seems to be reliably effective only in the presence of a critical 
mass of middle items. In chapter 2a new condition was further investigated 
when variability in middle position is eliminated, thus making the nonadjacent 
items variable. I replicated Gomez' experiment with adults and added a new 
condition, namely the zero-variability condition, in which there is only one 
middle element (e. g. A_3_X1_B_?, AI_Xj_BI). They predicted that non-variability of 
the middle item would make the end-items stand out again, and hence detecting 
the appropriate nonadjacent relationships would become easier, increasing mean 
performance rates. Intuitively, sampling transitional probabilities with large 
context variability results in low information gain as the data are too few to be 
reliable; by the same token, the lack of variability should produce low 
information gain for transitional probabilities as well, because the probability 
P(XjlA; )=l, i. e. having seen any Ai will predict one X automatically. In other 
words, if learners try to reduce uncertainty they will ignore relations that just do 
not vary at all. Hence this should make nonadjacent dependencies stand out, as 
potentially more informative sources of information, by contrast. They obtained 
the final predicted picture of a U-shape learning curve (see Figure 2 in Chapter 
2). 
Method 
Networks 
60 SRNs were trained and tested, corresponding to 12 subjects in each of the five 
conditions in Chapter 2. The networks displayed the same structure and 
initialisation parameters as those in Simulation 1 above. 
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Materials 
Training stimuli consisted of the strings generated from the finite-state grammar 
used by Gomez plus the new condition introduced in Chapter 2. Test stimuli 
consisted of 3 grammatical strings and 3 ungrammatical strings repeated twice, 
as in Chapter 29. 
Procedure 
The networks were trained in exactly the same way as in Simulation 1 above. 
Results and Analyses 
The results obtained are plotted in Figure 6 below. A U-shape similar to human 
data shows considerably better performance at end-point conditions. 
SRN data - Percent accuracy for Simulation 2 
100% 
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80% 
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11 
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i 
50% 
16 12 24 
Variability 
Figure 5. U-shape learning curve in SRNs for Simulation 2. Error bars are SEM. 
'' Given that in the new set-size I humans and networks are trained on one middle item they can only tested 
on strings containing one middle item. unlike Simulation 1. Hence networks were tested on 6 strings 
repeated twice. For this reason we ran new networks in simulation 2 even in set-sizes 2.6.12, and 24. 
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Learning nonadjacent structure in SRNs 
An SRN trained to predict each element of sequences identical to those used by 
Gomez (2002) and in chapter 2 masters nonadjacencies in a manner that depends 
on the variability of the intervening material, thus replicating the empirically 
observed U-shaped relationship between variability and classification 
performance. In this section I provide an account of how the network learns 
about this material. 
From the network's perspective the task, on each trial, is to predict the 
successor to the element it is presented with as input. This is difficult when the 
relevant information is contained not in the current input, but in previously 
experienced sequence elements, just as in Gdmez. In such cases indeed, to 
achieve correct predictions of the tail element of a nonadjacency that spans 
irrelevant material, the network necessarily has to develop distinct internal 
representations in spite of identical inputs. This is easy if one imagines that a 
separate stream of processing can be dedicated to processing the embedding 
while maintaining information about the head, as traditional parsers such as 
push-down automata suggest. In the SRN, however, the internal representations 
associated with successive items are not stored or processed separately from each 
other, but rather they overlap in time. Achieving the required separation between 
internal representations in the face of identical inputs depends on the statistical 
properties of the input sequences and on the SRN's own architectural limitations. 
The graded character of the SRN's representational system prompted Servan- 
Schreiber et at. (1991) to describe such networks as graded state machines. 
Servan-Schreiber et al. showed that under certain conditions, these graded 
representations allow the processing of embedded material and of the material 
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that comes after the embedding, without duplicating the representations for 
intervening material. Hence the internal states of the SRN can be used 
simultaneously to indicate where the network is inside an embedding and, also to 
indicate the history of processing prior to the embedding. The identity of the 
initial element therefore simply shades the representation of states inside the 
embedding, so that corresponding elements have similar representations, and are 
processed using overlapping portions of the knowledge encoded in the 
connection weights. Yet the shading that the initial element provides carries 
information about the early part of the string through the embedding, thereby 
allowing the network to become sensitive to nonadjacent structure. 
How does the network achieve this necessary separation of internal 
representations, and why does this process depend on the variability of the 
intervening material? It is useful to conceptualize learning in this situation as 
involving two opposite forces shaping the internal representations that the 
network develops over its hidden units: a top-down, error-dependent, force to 
produce the correct output, and a bottom-up, similarity-based, force to develop 
similar internal representations for similar sequences of elements (Servan- 
Schreiber, Cleeremans, & McClelland, 1991). Concerning the first factor, SRNs 
tend to converge towards the optimal conditional probabilities of observing a 
particular successive item to the sequence presented up to that point by 
minimizing the sum squared error (McClelland, 1998; Servan-Schreiber, 
Cleeremans, & McClelland, 1991). This amounts to exploiting first- and second- 
order conditionals. Unfortunately for our task, matching conditional probabilities 
only yields suboptimal behaviour. For first-order conditionals, when a head item 
A; is presented, hidden units possess similar representations for predicting the 
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embedding XX, because all instantiations of the embedding occur after A;. This is 
also the case for predicting B;, because any B; occurs after any Xj. 
Backpropagation will also reduce the error by converging on the second-order 
conditional probability P(B, (A; _Xj). 
Interestingly, in Set-size 2 this probability is 
not extremely low (0.165) so we would expect the network to develop 6 separate 
representations, one for each string type. This process is overridden by the 
similarity of string types, which share the same embeddings. To discover the 
underlying structure the network has to "realise" that first- and second-order 
conditional probabilities lead to suboptimal solutions. 
Information contained in context units acts as a concurrent force on 
hidden units from the bottom, helping maintain relevant non-local context 
information of previously seen items. Upon receiving an Xj, the context units 
preserve information about the previous item A;. Backpropagation adjusts 
weights so that similar patterns on the output tend to be associated with similar 
patterns on the hidden units. In smaller set-size conditions similar representations 
develop for different tail predictions because the contribution from the shared 
embeddings is stronger than the contribution from the heads. To visualise the 
task, imagine that a trace of activation or shading from any head Al has to filter 
through the flack of irrelevant embeddings. The trace carried over by each head 
item through the context units has to be strong enough to allow three different 
hidden unit representations, one for each nonadjacency. This trace activation 
competes with the shading contributed by the shared embedding. It increases as 
the strength of the embedding decreases, i. e. as the activation from embeddings 
on large set-sizes contributes less and less to shading the hidden unit patterns. 
With little variability, e. g. 2 Xs, hidden units develop overlapping representations 
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for XI and X2. Figure 6 presents the two principal components of a Multiple 
Dimensional Scaling (MIDS) analysis over hidden units in condition 2, at the time 
of predicting the tail item over 15 different points in training. (Ungrammatical 
sequences are removed from the graph, because each produces exactly the same 
vector over the network's hidden units. Hence the graph displays 6 trajectories: 
one each for A_X1, A_X2, B_X1, B_X2, Q 
_X1, and 
C X2). 
For successful separation of Xs and correct prediction of the successor to 
that X, the trajectories are expected to be cleanly separated at the end of training. 
By the same token, the trajectories corresponding to different Xs (Xi vs. X2) 
should be close to each other. Hidden unit trajectories move across training in the 
reduced 2-dimensional space, but they do not separate at the end of training. 
Contrast this result with Figure 7, a similar MDS analysis over the hidden units 
of a network in Set-size 24. Hidden units move together in space up to a point 
when they separate in 3 different regions of the 2-dimensional space, 
corresponding to 3 separate representations for AI, A2, and A3. Hence, the 
presence of a large flack of 24 embeddings allows the trace from the relevant 
head item A; to be maintained more strongly in the context units shaping the 
activation pattern of hidden units. In general, the networks are better able to 
preserve information about the predecessor of the embedded sequence across 
identical embeddings provided the ensemble of potential pathways is 
differentiated during training (Servan-Schreiber, Cleeremans, & McClelland, 
1991). This is exactly the Variability Effect observed in human experiments. 
Regarding the striking difference in performance between set-size I and 
2, how do SRNs learn to predict the correct output in the former but not in the 
latter case? With variability comprised between 2 and 24 the networks reduce 
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error by providing a compact representation of the hidden units that groups 
embeddings together. Hence the information provided by the embeddings 
constitutes some sort of reduction of uncertainty in the form of information gain, 
although it leads to a suboptimal solution. Conversely, with zero variability the 
information contributed from the single embedding is minimal, i. e. it contributes 
nothing to reducing the error, as it is always the only item occurring in middle 
position. Hence the trace contributed by each specific head item suddenly stands 
out and becomes relevant enough to allow for separate hidden unit 
representations at the time of predicting the tail item. Strikingly, then, and 
somewhat counter-intuitively, learning in Set-size 1 and Set-size 24 seems 
guided by the same underlying principle. An NMS analysis of hidden unit 
trajectories (Figure 8) reveals that the network's behaviour is similar to the Set- 
size 24 condition: different trajectories are traversed ending in three distinct 
regions of the space. 
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Figure 6. MDS analysis of hidden unit trajectories. A network trained on 2 Xs fails to achieve the 
needed separation: all 6 trajectories remain close to each other all the way through the end of 
training. Hence the network can never form correct predictions of the successor to the X. 
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Figure 7. MDS analysis of hidden unit trajectories in the 24X condition: all 6 trajectories start 
out, on the left side, from the same small region, and progressively diverge to result in three pairs 
of two representations. 
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Figure S. MDS analysis for a network trained on 1 X. Like in the 24X case, the network is 
successful in separating out the corresponding internal representations: The terminal points of 
each trajectory end up in different regions of space. 
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Conclusions 
Sensitivity to transitional probabilities of various orders including nonadjacent 
probabilities in sequential learning has been observed experimentally in adults 
and children, suggesting that learners exploit these statistical properties of the 
input to detect structure. Detecting nonadjacent structure is central to learning 
natural languages and poses a genuine problem for simple associative models 
based on knowledge of adjacent items. Following Gomez (2002), a more 
elaborate proposal is that human learners may exploit different sources of 
information, including nonadjacent items, to reduce uncertainty. The amount of 
information gain provided by any element in the input may vary dramatically 
according to the statistical and informational landscape of the specific input. 
In this chapter I have shown that SRNs succeed in accounting for the 
experimental U-shape patterns. This is not an easy feat, as in SRNs better 
predictions tend to converge towards the optimal conditional probabilities of 
observing a particular successor to the sequence presented up to that point. This 
means that minima are located at those points in weight space where the 
activations equal the optimal conditional probability. In fact, activations of 
outputs units corresponding to the three end items to be predicted in set-size 2,6, 
and 12 settle around . 
33, which is the optimal conditional probability for (BIX) 
across conditions. However, n-gram transitional probabilities may lead to 
suboptimal solutions, e. g. they fail to account for nonadjacent structural 
constraints. The network's ability to predict a nonadjacent element is modulated 
by variability of the intervening element, under conditions of either nil or high 
variability. This is achieved by developing separate graded representations in the 
hidden units. An analysis of hidden unit trajectories over training suggests that 
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the network's success at the end-points of the U curve might be supported by a 
similar type of learning, thus ruling out a simplistic rote learning explanation for 
Set-size 1. Together, the experimental and simulation data on the U curve 
challenge previous AGL accounts based on one default source of learning. 
Surprisingly, rather than ruling out associative mechanisms they suggest that 
statistical learning based on distributional information can be more powerful than 
heretofore acknowledged and dynamically attuned to the probabilistic properties 
of the environment. 
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Chapter 4 
The Variability effect across modalities 
Acquiring sequential information is vital in most domains of our life, from 
speech comprehension and production, to reading, to processing visual scenes, 
planning motor behaviour and action planning. To be able to detect sequential 
structures in the world at large humans need to exploit different sensory 
modalities, for instance auditory, visual, and tactile senses. A theoretically 
plausible hypothesis is that statistical learning is subserved by a single, domain- 
general cognitive mechanism, as Kirkham, Slemmer, & Johnson (2002) have 
suggested. Under this scenario, whether experimental stimuli are presented 
visually, auditorily, via tactile sensitivity, or whether different stimuli altogether 
are presented such as tones as opposed to syllables, similar performance effects 
are expected to transfer almost invariably across such conditions. 
Methodologically, gathering converging experimental evidence from different 
variations of the same experiment lends substantial robustness to the putative 
mechanism(s) under scrutiny. For instance, sensitivity to transitional 
probabilities of bigrams as evidenced by Saffran, Aslin, & Newport (1996) using 
chains of nonsense syllables has been corroborated by cross-modality studies. 
The same mechanism seems at work for example, in the segmentation of streams 
of tones (Saffran, Johnson, Aslin, & Newport, 1999) and in the temporal 
presentation of visual shapes (Fiser & Aslin, 2002). Such results support the 
view of a simple general-purpose and general-domain statistical mechanism 
sensitive to transitional probabilities in the input of any type. 
My preliminary results in Chapter 2 on the adaptiveness of learning to 
different statistical landscapes and the emphasis on the potential cascade of cues 
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available to the learner (see Chapter 6) make it likely that modality constraints or 
modality preferences lead to different learning curves. A reduction of uncertainty 
hypothesis envisages a priori the possibility that perceptually salient modality- 
specific cues present in the input may drive structure building in modality- 
specific ways. In Chapter 6, for instance, I will show that adults' preference for 
certain plosive sounds in word-initial position is in itself sufficient to guide 
learner's choice for words versus part-words in a segmentation task, regardless 
of the structure underlying the words, and indeed even when no underlying 
structure is present. Further on, I will also show that generalisation to strings of 
the A_X_B type (see Chapter 2) containing a novel X item can be sufficiently 
explained away by mere preference for any word-initial syllable (again not the 
underlying structure) when this is made perceptually salient by a small preceding 
pause. 
Conway and Christiansen (2002a) have conducted a series of 
comparisons across sensory modalities involving visual, auditory, and tactile 
senses to investigate the extent to which the three modalities afford sequential 
learning acquisition. Using stimuli from a standard AGL experiment in Gomez 
and Gerken (1999) they found that all three modalities performed well over 
chance and over control groups, but that there were also significant differences 
between modalities, with the auditory scoring at 96%, the visual scoring at 86%, 
and the tactile scoring at 74%. Conway and Christiansen (2002b) found further 
data supporting the view that "statistical learning processes are affected by 
modality constraints: vision is biased toward processing spatial input whereas 
audition is biased toward temporal input". Under this interpretation, sequential 
structure learning involves multiple, modality-constrained processes, which may 
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be tied to different non-overalapping brain areas. However, Conway and 
Christiansen also acknowledge that their results could be due to differential 
discriminability or perceptability of items according to the specific sensory 
domain recruited. This view would not necessarily imply differentiation of brain 
resources, but would be simply due to perceptual salience of certain cues. The 
issue of salience will be taken up in more depth in Chapter 6. 
In this chapter I am interested in a preliminary investigation of the 
variability effect across the visual domain. In Chapter 2I presented data in 
support of the variability effect in detecting nonadjacent dependencies using 
auditory stimuli. Below I present three variations of the variability experiment 
with visual presentation of the stimuli. In the first experiment, dubbed Visual 
Sequential, whole strings appear sequentially one at a time on the screen and are 
interleaved by white screen. In the second experiment, dubbed Visual Temporal, 
individual words within the strings appear one after the other on the screen, with 
a blank screen appearing between strings but not between words. The third 
experiment, Visual Sequential Abridged, is a replica of the first experiment but 
with half training, to test the effect of frequency of exposure on detecting 
structure visually. There were no strong predictions on what the results should be 
in these experimental variations. As a null hypothesis, I hypothesised that the 
same U-shape phenomenon found in the Auditory experiment in Chapter 2 
should transfer across the board in the Visual experiments. The results are in fact 
more complex, and will be discussed along the way as well as in the general 
discussion below. 
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Experiment 2- Visual Sequential (VS) version 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty undergraduate and postgraduate students at the University of Warwick 
participated and were paid £3 each. None of them had participated in previous 
experiments. 
Materials 
The stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 1, except that they were 
presented visually, in written form on a computer screen instead of auditorily. 
Procedure 
Exactly the same procedure as in Experiment 1 was used. Participants sat and 
looked at the strings as they appeared on the screen. Training lasted 
approximately 18 minutes, as in Experiment 1. Each string from the language 
was flashed up in black typeface against white background on a computer screen. 
Each string stayed on the screen for 2 seconds and was followed by a 750-ms 
white screen so that the strings could be perceived as independent one from the 
other. These values were chosen so that training lasted as long as training in 
Experiment 1. The test phase was the same as in Experiment 1, except that test 
stimuli were presented visually on the screen. 
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Results and discussion 
An analysis of variance with Set Size (1 vs. 2 vs. 6 vs. 12 vs. 24) and Materials 
(L1 vs. L2) as between-subjects and Grammaticality (trained vs. untrained 
strings) as a within-subjects variable resulted in a main effect of Grammaticality, 
F(1,50) =16.39, p <. 001, but no other significant main effects or interactions. 
Comparisons between adjacent set-size conditions revealed no significant 
differences, in particular no significant increase in performance between set size 
12 and set size 24, t(22)= 1.395, p= . 177, nor a significant 
decrease in 
performance between set size 1 and set size 2, t(22)= 1.697, p= . 104. 
In contrast 
to Experiment 1, a polynomial trend analysis did not show a significant quadratic 
effect, F<1. Figure 9 presents the percentage of endorsements for total accuracy 
in each of the five set-size conditions. Table 1 below presents the percentage of 
endorsements for trained versus untrained strings and total accuracy in each of 
the five set-size conditions. 
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Figure 9. Total percentage endorsements in Experiment 2 for different variability. 
Set Size Trained Untrained Total 
1 97% 79% 88%n 
2 90% 59% 75% 
6 95% 75% 85% 
12 90% 76% 83% 
24 97% 9117c 94% 
Table 1. Percentage of endorsements for trained versus untrained strings and total accuracy in 
each of the five set-size conditions. 
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The confirmatory bias in the Variability Experiments 
In order to compare directly the Auditory significant results and the Visual 
nonsignificant results this section discusses the effects of a positive bias on 
individuals' responses for both experiments. In particular, I pit the positive bias 
scores obtained in the Auditory version against the Visual Sequential version, 
because the latter comes closer to reproducing aU shape. 
The positive bias is a well-known phenomenon in experimental 
psychology, whereby participants required to express judgements in the form of 
binary yes/no choices have a natural tendency to choose YES more often than 
NO, i. e. they tend to confirm rather than disconfirm an option. This seems to be a 
particular case of a more general case for the human tendency to seek out 
information that confirms our beliefs rather than looking for that which disproves 
it. 
The confirmatory bias was found in both the Visual Sequential and 
Auditory versions of my experiment, despite participants being explicitly 
informed of the presence of an equal number of correct and incorrect test stimuli 
among the 12 test items. Methodologically, it might be contended that extreme 
values of positive bias in participants' responses introduce noise in the results, on 
the basis that some participants failed to understand the explicitly required test 
instructions. The Visual Sequential version displays the predicted variability 
effect only to an extent (there is no significant Grammaticality x Set Size 
interaction and t-tests between adjacent conditions - Set Size 1 and 2 and Set 
Size 12 and 24- are not significant). Hence we may want to evaluate whether the 
impact of the positive bias bears any relevance to the weakness of the findings. If 
a participant shows a particularly strong positive bias we may want to discard 
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his/her performance and run a new participant. It must be noted that a high 
positive bias correlates negatively with performance values (at least in the case of 
forced binary choices where the number of required "yes" responses are the same 
as "no" responses). In the extreme case of a response bias of 12 (i. e. all test items 
are responded to as "yes") performance drops at chance level, because only 6/12 
test items are correct when responding "yes". In general, because the positive 
bias is a ubiquitous phenomenon in experimental settings it poses a problem only 
for extreme values (10-12 in our case). Tables 2 and 3 below show number of 
individuals in each condition in the Visual Sequential and Auditory experiments, 
for biases equal or higher than 9,10, and 11 respectively. 
Positive 
bias 
SET SIZE 
1 
SET SIZE 
2 
SET SIZE 
6 
SET SIZE 
12 
SET SIZE 
24 
Total 
>l1 1 4 1 1 0 7 
>10 1 4 1 1 0 7 
>9 2 4 2 1 1 10 
Table 2. Positive bias for the Visual Sequential experiment 
Positive 
bias 
SET SIZE 
1 
SET SIZE 
2 
SET SIZE 
6 
SET SIZE 
12 
SET SIZE 
24 
Total 
>11 0 1 1 1 0 3 
>10 0 2 1 3 0 6 
>9 0 2 1 5 1 9 
Table 3. Positive bias for the Auditory experiment. 
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From a comparison of the totals in the two tables above we can see that Visual 
Sequential has twice the number of extreme positive bias values (i. e. >11) than 
the Auditory, though overall the same number of values that are > 9. In addition, 
the distribution of such values tends to affect the middle points of the U-shape 
curve (conditions 2,6, and 12), not the end-points, in both experiments. This 
does not really run counter to my expected results, as high positive bias values 
mean poor performance, as indeed predicted in these conditions. In fact one 
could interpret high positive bias results as a failure of participants to actually 
detect the correct structure. Bearing in mind that incorrect test stimuli are very 
similar to correct ones it is not surprising that bad performers tend to press 
"Correct" most of the times in the face of indecision and uncertainty. 
I conclude that the positive bias is not affecting the current results in the 
Visual Sequential version. It mainly manifests itself as a biproduct of uncertainty 
in conditions of middle variability where I expect participants to be confused and 
score near chance levels. Because the distribution of positive bias values in the 
two experiments is similar it does not contribute to explaining why the Visual 
Sequential results are not significant. The bow in the Auditory version is more 
marked than in the Visual Sequential version. This could be interpreted as a 
ceiling effect in the Visual Sequential, due to overtraining. To test this 
hypothesis I ran the same Visual Sequential experiment with half training trials. 
The experiment is presented below. 
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Experiment 3- Visual Sequential Abridged version (VSA) 
The results from the Visual Sequential version above are not significant, 
although from Figure 9 one can see that there is a hint of a U-shape in the trend, 
but there is a higher proportion of participants who successfully detect the 
invariant structure in middle size conditions as well. In all variations of the 
variability experiment reported here so far the 432 training strings were 
organised in 3 sets, corresponding to 144 training strings per set, interrupted by a 
break section to allow for participants to take a short break. Perhaps the not-so- 
marked bow may be due to an overtraining artifact coupled with the fact that the 
visual display of whole strings may make the detection task easier for 
participants, thus "giving away" the underlying structure sooner. To test this 
hypothesis, I ran an "abridged" version of the Visual Sequential using half the 
training tokens, i. e. 216 training strings, in the hope that a shorter training would 
make the task slightly more difficult, thus compensating the putative facilitatory 
effect of the visual presentation. 
Method 
Participants 
Fifty undergraduate and postgraduate students at the University of Warwick 
participated and were paid £3 each. None of them had participated in previous 
experiments. 
Materials. 
Training and test stimuli were identical to those used in the Visual Sequential 
Experiment. 
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Procedure. 
Exactly the same procedure as in the VS Experiment was used, except that 
training consisted of 216 strings, exactly half as many as in the VS Experiment. 
Results and discussion 
An analysis of variance with Set Size (1 vs. 2 vs. 6 vs. 12 vs. 24) and Materials 
(LI vs. L2) as between-subjects and Grammaticality (trained vs. untrained 
strings) as a within-subjects variable resulted in a main effect of Grammaticality, 
F (1,40)= 5.199, p< . 027, but no other significant effect. Comparisons 
between 
adjacent set-size conditions revealed no significant differences, although a few 
were not distant from significance, namely between set size 6 and set size 12, 
t(22)= 1.848, p= . 078 and between set size 12 and set size 24, t(22)= 1.881, p= 
. 073. The results disconfirm that a shorter training for visual presentation should 
result a neater U-shape, indeed by looking at Figure 10 there is an almost 
inverted curve to the one predicted, with performance low for set size I 
increasing at a peak for set size 6, decreasing again at set size 12 and increasing 
back again for set size 24. Such patchy results are not entirely understood at 
present and suggest that other aspects of performance than mere token reduction 
may play a role in determining higher rates of successful detection of the 
underlying structure. 
Because the visual versions above display sentences one at a time instead 
of one word at a time, they do not strictly reproduce the equivalent temporality of 
the auditory version in which each word was heard in sequence. For this reason I 
ran the following Visual Temporal experiment. 
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Visual Sequential Abridged (VSA) 
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Figure 10. Percent correct responses for Experiment 3. 
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Experiment 4- Visual Temporal (VT) version 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty undergraduate and postgraduate students at the University of Warwick 
participated and were paid £3 each. None of them had participated in previous 
experiments. 
Materials 
The stimuli and presentation were identical to those used in Experiment 2. Visual 
presentation, however, differed in that individual words were presented one at a 
time. 
Procedure 
Exactly the same procedure as in Experiment ? was used. Participants sat and 
looked at the stimuli as they appeared on the screen. Training lasted 
approximately 18 minutes, as in Experiment 1. This time each word from the 
language was flashed up individually in black typeface against white background 
on a computer screen. Each word stayed on the screen for 666 ms and was 
immediately followed by the next word without a blank screen. Each end-of- 
string word was followed by a 750-ms white screen, so that the strings could be 
perceived as independent one from the other. These timings were chosen so that 
training lasted as long as training in Experiment 1 and 2. The test phase was the 
same as in Experiment 1, except that test stimuli were presented visually on the 
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screen and one word at a time (using the same timing as training stimuli) for 
congruity with the training phase. 
Results and discussion 
An analysis of variance with Set Size (1 vs. 2 vs. 6 vs. 12 vs. 24) and materials 
(L1 vs. L2) as between-subjects and Grammaticality (trained vs. untrained 
strings) as a within-subjects variable resulted in a main effect of Grammaticality, 
F (1,50)= 5.199, p< . 05, but no other significant effect. Comparisons between 
adjacent set-size conditions revealed no significant differences, although a few 
were not distant from significance, namely between set size 6 and set size 12, 
t(22)= 1.848, p= . 
078 and between set size 12 and set size 24, t(22)= 1.881, p= 
. 073. Figure 11 summarises the data. Table 2 below presents the percentage of 
endorsements for trained versus untrained strings and total accuracy in each of 
the five set-size conditions (Visual Temporal version). 
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Visual Temporal (VT) 
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Figure 11. Percent correct responses for Experiment 4. 
Set Size Trained Untrained Total 
1 91170 81% 86% 
2 81%Io 73% 77% 
6 8070 66'/r 73% 
12 90% 88% 89% 
24 77% 72% 75% 
Table 4. Percent correct responses for Experiment 4 expressed in terms of seen (trained) and 
unseen (untrained) items recognised correctly. 
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General Discussion 
As a null hypothesis, I started on the assumption that the same variability effect 
found in the original auditory experiment in Chapter 2 should transfer across 
perceptual domains, for instance visual presentation of training and test strings. 
In this chapter a battery of three visual variations were presented, namely VS, 
VT and VSA. For the VS it looks as if the variability effect is there, although 
with little statistical power. One plausible, intuitive explanation envisaged here is 
that the visual task is cognitively easier, and thus a ceiling counter-effect pushes 
the bow in midsize conditions up to levels of performance higher than predicted. 
In other words, detecting the relationship between the first and the last word in a 
string appears easier when the whole string is presented visually on the screen, 
regardless of middle item variability, perhaps because the two end-items are both 
present at any one time. Several participants reported that training was rather 
long. Given the successful results obtained by several AGL experimenters who 
tested participants for few minutes (e. g. Saffran et al., 1996; Onnis, Monaghan, 
Chater, & Richmond, submitted; see also chapters 6 and 7), if not seconds 
(Jusczyk & Aslin, 1995), there was reason to believe that my participants were 
overtrained. Overtraining usually produces several confusing side-effects that are 
not directly separable and contribute to noise in the data. Firstly, overtraining 
boosts the effect of frequency of exposure to a given item, then promoting rote- 
learning to the detriment of structure building. Secondly, long training sessions 
diminish participants' attention dramatically, to the point that some participants 
may stop attending at the task. Once they re-attend to the task - later in the 
training or at test- they may have been distracted long enough to have 
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"cancelled" the effects of learning accumulated thus far. In both cases, this 
produces noise in the data. 
Unfortunately, the VSA version did not yield the expected clear picture. 
In some sense, the variability effect is reversed, with lower performance in set 
size 1 and a peak of performance in set size 6. Such results are not easily 
interpretable at present and more experiments need to be carried out to extricate 
their significance. 
Turning to the VT version (which presented words one at a time on the 
screen, with no blank screen between words of a sentence and a blank screen 
between sentences) an S-shape is displayed with peaks of performance at set 
sizes 1 and 12 and valleys at set sizes 2,6, and 24. With the limited knowledge I 
have of the variability phenomenon, this curve is not intuitively straightforward 
to account for. Both the VS and VT versions have a spatial as well as temporal 
dimension because items appear on the screen at different times. However, 
whereas it is plausible to assume that outside experimental settings people 
happen to read one sentence at a time quite frequently as in the VS version (for 
instance, peeking at an advertisement in the street, or glancing at the title of a 
book), it is far less ecologically plausible that people read words in a sentence 
one at a time (some TV commercials exploit this technique to attract audience, 
but it is reasonable to assume that this happens quite infrequently). Hence, while 
the VT is the structurally direct analogue of the Auditory version, it is not 
probably the direct analogue in the real world. The decrement in set size 24, 
however, may have two different explanations entirely consistent with the 
variability hypothesis. Firstly, Gomez stressed in her original paper that a 
variability of 24 was not to be taken as an absolute value, rather that a critical 
69 
Chapter 4 
mass of variability is needed to detect invariant structure. A priori, then, this 
critical mass may be "shifting" in dimension across variations of the same task 
according to specific complexity. Hence it is perfectly possible that the critical 
mass for the VT version is around 12 rather than 24. If correct, this interpretation 
has to explain why performance drops again at set size 24. So far, a tacit 
assumption of the variability effect has been that beyond the critical mass 
learners should maintain high performance levels. Hence, in an ideal infinity 
hypothesis condition in which each string presented has a new middle item, 
performance should be at least as good as with the minimal critical mass required 
to identify invariant structure. The theoretical insight underpinning the infinity 
hypothesis is that learners are sensitive to change versus no change and the more 
change the better to trigger individuation of invariant structure. However, this 
hypothesis has not been tested here and it remains entirely plausible that beyond 
a given amount of variability (say 12 or 24) -let us call it the "specific 
variability" hypothesis - detecting structure should be easier or indeed more 
difficult. The decrease in set size 24 for the VT version indicates that it might be 
difficult in a visual temporal task to detect invariant structure with more than say 
12 variant middle items, but I do not have data for larger set sizes than 24 in 
neither of my experiments. As a conclusion, I have just scratched the surface of a 
large project. The promising results obtained so far have highlighted the 
possibility of a critical mass or a specific mass of variability supporting detection 
of invariant structure. The specific mechanisms of interaction with different 
sensory modalities is not fully understood at present. The next chapters will 
further elucidate the possibility of detecting nonadjacent invariant structure in 
order to bootstrap speech segmentation and generalisation. 
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Chapter 5 
Bootstrapping abstract linguistic representations 
Throughout the cognitive sciences generalisation is seen as the hallmark of 
cognition. Understanding how humans generalise is thought to contribute a central 
piece of the puzzle to how the mind works. Given limited exposure to a set of 
stimuli, infants and adults are able to "go beyond the data" by building 
representations that are abstract at some level of analysis. In the study of the 
language faculty, in particular, generative linguistics (e. g. Chomsky, 1957) has 
highlighted the mind's extraordinary power in extracting abstract syntactic 
representations given limited and degenerate exposure to language samples. Two 
fundamental arguments at the heart of the generative program in linguistics have 
made a significant impact on the field of language acquisition: 
a) children and adults produce in their life thousands of novel sentences that they 
have never heard before and for which knowledge of previously encountered 
sentences cannot account as sufficient knowledge. Hence the mind must come 
equipped with some forms of in-built innate language-specific and species- 
specific knowledge to guide learners. This is known as the poverty of the stimulus 
argument. 
b) the core knowledge of language is mainly knowledge of syntactic rules. Such 
rules have long been described as propositional and algebraic in nature, although 
subsymbolic systems like connectionist networks have been shown to generalise 
to novel instances too. In addition, AGL experiments have been used at different 
times to show that generalisation can be supported using distributional and other 
potentially relevant cues present in the input. 
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While the argument from the poverty of the stimulus will be dealt with at 
length in chapters 7 and 8, and the rules-versus-statistics debate will be covered in 
chapter 6, this chapter focuses on the possibility that at least some of the abstract 
linguistic representations that have traditionally been ascribed to innate 
knowledge might in fact be bootstrapped from experience using distributional 
learning. 
The words of natural languages are organised into categories such as 
NOUN, VERB, ARTICLE, etc. that form the building blocks for constructing 
sentences. Hence, a fundamental part of a language user is the ability to identify 
the category to which a specific word, say apple, belongs. The process by which 
language learners bootstrap lexical category membership is not fully understood. 
Some researchers (e. g. Pinker, 1984) have seen the problem as one of mapping 
between prior semantic categories such as object and action and the set of innately 
specified syntactic categories. This semantic boostrapping would make use of 
children's knowledge about word meanings as a basis for an initial classification 
of words. Others have proposed phonological contraints (e. g. Gleitman, Gleitman, 
Landau & Wanner, 1988) based on the fact that members of different word 
classes, e. g. nouns versus verbs display different phonological regularities. For 
instance, stress in English disyllabic nouns tend to fall on the initial syllable 
whereas in verbs it falls predominantly on final syllables, and English polysillabic 
words are mainly nouns (Cassidy & Kelly, 1991). Another form of information 
proposed for boostrapping word classes are prosodic cues such as the mutual 
predictability between the way a sentence is constructed and the way it is said, i. e. 
its prosodic phrasing (Morgan & Newport, 1981). All these are viable hypotheses. 
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The preferred proposal that I will follow here about how children go about 
grouping words into relevant categories is that they perform a distributional 
analysis on the sentences they hear and start categorising together words that 
appear in the same lexical co-occurrence patterns. 
As mentioned in earlier in this thesis, one of the fiercest arguments 
levelled at distributional learning concerns the uninformativeness of such 
mechanisms for detecting linguistically relevant properties (Pinker, 1984). Among 
a series of criticisms Pinker argues that the properties of the raw input that can be 
detected using distributional learning pertain to serial position, adjacency, and 
cooccurrence relations among words, whereas "most linguistically relevant 
properties are abstract, pertaining to phrase structure configurations, syntactic 
categories, grammatical relations, [... ] but these abstract properties are just the 
ones that the child cannot detect in the input prior to learning" (Pinker, 1984 p. 49- 
50). Several scholars (e. g. Redington, Chater, & Finch, 1998) have counterargued 
that the utility of distributional statistics lies not in describing the relevant abstract 
linguistic properties but in helping the learning child to extract such abstract 
representations from the input. These studies have made successful use of 
computational and statistical analyses of child-directed speech in large corpora 
(Cartwright & Brent, 1997; Kiss, 1973; Mintz, Newport, & Bever, 1995,2002; 
Redington, Chater, & Finch, 1998). Redington, Chater, & Finch (1998), for 
instance, have shown that highly local and extremely simple distributional 
statistics collected over large corpora of text such as the CHILDES database and 
the British National Corpus (BNC) are informative in discriminating nouns, verbs, 
adjectives and closed-class words with cluster analysis. This valuable work has 
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shown that distributional information is, in principle, a very useful cue for 
boostrapping syntactic categories, but it has yet to be demonstrated whether young 
children, and learners in general, practically can and do utilise this source of 
information. Promising results have been obtained using AGLs (Gomez & 
Gerken, 1999; Maratsos & Chalkley, 1980; Mintz, 2002) and the present work is 
meant to contribute new evidence that adults are able to build syntactic-like 
categories from the raw input they receive. Given the relevance of nonadjacent 
structure for language acquisition and the findings that its detection is modulated 
by the amount of variability of embedded material as highlighted in chapter 2, the 
aim of this chapter is to establish empirically whether detection of nonadjacent 
frames can support generalisations to new embeddings, via a process of 
categorisation of the class EMBEDDING. Below I provide the rationale for doing 
so and subsequently present a new experiment. 
Generalisation under conditions of variability 
As discussed above distributional information appears to be, in principle, a 
powerful source of information for discovering syntactic classes. However, 
investigations of the claim that learners actually perform a distributional analysis 
over instances of artificial grammars have met in the past with considerable 
experimental limitations. For instance, Smith (1966) was interested in whether 
learners were able to extract lexical co-occurrence patterns. He trained adults on 
an artificial grammar containing 4 non-overlapping categories M, N, P, and Q that 
were arranged in two types of sentences: 
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S->MN 
S-> PQ 
Each category contained four words, and learners were trained on 24 of the 32 
possible sentences. At test, they were asked to decide whether they had heard a 
sentence among the following: 
a) heard sentences 
b) unheard grammatical combinations, adhering to the MN/PQ pattern 
c) sentences adhering to an MQ/PN pattern 
d) ungrammatical sequences (e. g. PM, QP, etc. ). 
He was hoping to find that b) should be preferred to c) and c) should be preferred 
to d), but instead he found that both b) and c) responses were significantly greater 
than d). The results suggest that learners had generalised according to the absolute 
position of the words (first or second), but not their relative position based on the 
lexical co-occurrence patterns (for instance that words belonging to the P category 
only co-occur with words of the Q category). Further studies using the same 
paradigm as Smith found that generalisation of relative position was possible only 
in the presence of extra converging cues attached to some portion of the words, 
such as salient affixes (Braine, 1987; Frigo & McDonald, 1998; Gomez & 
Gerken, 1999). The converging cues seem to act as a necessary bootstrap into the 
distributional patterns that are relevant for category abstraction. 
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In a recent paper Mintz (2002) reasoned that the type of language used in 
Smith (1966) and in following studies might provide too limited distributional 
cues to engage distributional learning mechanisms, as all sentences were only 2 
words long, whereas natural languages typically contain a richer distributional 
environment. He devised a language similar to Gomez (2002), with four shared 
static frames and four medial elements and found that category generalisation was 
supported in classifying medial words based on the surrounding frame. Mintz 
(2002) further elaborated that in performing a distributional analysis a word can 
be both a target word for categorisation while at the same time functioning as a 
categorising element. But while an ideal learner may entertain words as targets 
and environments simultaneously, actual learners may in fact need more reliable 
cues in order to consistently treat a word as either target or environment. He 
argued that this may not be possible using the two-word MN/PQ paradigm as 
there is no basis for making the above distinction. Conversely, the slot-and-frame 
grammar using 3 words might provide a grounding for distributional analysis by 
functioning as a figure-ground distinction. This is consistent with the line of 
argument followed in previous chapters that learners are sensitive to change 
versus non-change. Crucially, Mintz only provided general considerations about 
the figure/ground distinction and the role of frames in language acquisition (but 
see Mintz, in press), hence this work contributes a follow-up and more detailed 
account based on the variability effect. In particular, the question tackled here in 
more depth is as follows: is detection of frames in reference to embedded words 
(as found in chapters 2 and 3) a separate process from tracking the pattern of 
middle words in reference to frames? Or, alternatively, does detection of invariant 
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nonadjacencies afford generalisation of middle items as belonging to the same 
syntactic-like category? My hypothesis is that if the two processes are two sides 
of the same coin, generalisation to a new middle element in the experienced 
frames should occur only in conditions of nil or large variability of the middle 
item category. 
Mintz also left open the extent to which sequences of words in natural 
languages actually display an alternation of frames of the type simulated in his 
language. In chapter 2 it was remarked that the asymmetry in the distribution of 
open class words and closed class words in natural languages such as English may 
effectively help learners detect syntactic constructions that sequentially span one 
or several words. Such nonadjacent dependencies are fundamental to the process 
of progressively building syntactic knowledge of, for instance, tense marking, 
singular and plural markings, etc. Crucially it has been proposed that these 
constructions may function as frames or "construction islands" (see Tomasello, 
2003 for an overview) for subsequently building abstract and productive 
construction patterns. For instance, Childers & Tomasello (2001) tested the ability 
of 2 Ih-year-old children to produce a verb-general transitive utterance with a 
nonce verb. They found that children were best at generalising if they had been 
mainly trained on the consistent pronoun frame He's VERB-ing (e. g. He's kicking 
it, He's eating it) rather than on several utterances containing unsystematic 
correlations between the agent and the patient slots (Mary's kicking the ball, 
John's pushing the chair, etc. ). 
The argument in this chapter is that while detection of such syntactic 
frames may be achieved under conditions of no variability or large variability by a 
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focus on what changes versus what stays invariant, thus leading to "discard" the 
common embeddings in some way, there may be a reversal and beneficial effect 
in noting that common elements all share the same contextual frames. It is 
reasonable to hypothesise, then, that if several words whose syntactic properties 
and category are unknown are shared by a number of contexts, then they will be 
more likely to be grouped under the same syntactic label, for instance VERB. 
Consider a child that is faced with discovering the class of words such as break, 
drink, build. As the words share the same contexts below, a learner may be driven 
to start extracting a representation of the VERB class: 
am-X-ing 
dont-X-it 
Lets-X-now! 
Most importantly, in hearing a new word in the same familiar contexts, for 
instance eat in am-eat-ing, the learner may be drawn to infer that the new word is 
a VERB. Ultimately, having categorised in such a way, the learner may extend the 
usage of eat as a VERB to new syntactic constructions in which instances of the 
category VERB typically occur. For instance s/he may produce a novel sentence 
Lets-eat-now! Applying a category label greatly enhances the generative power of 
a linguist system. 
In continuing to test empirically the viability of category abstraction 
through distributional analysis of the input, the specific question that is being 
asked in this chapter is whether generalisation to new X items in the A_X B 
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artificial grammar used in previous chapters is supported under the same 
conditions of zero or large variability that afford the detection of invariant 
structure. The specific prediction is that detection of invariant contextual structure 
and generalisation to new elements allowable within the invariant structure are 
two sides of the same coin. If constructional frames are acquired under the 
variability hypothesis, generalisation will be supported when there is no 
variability of middle elements as well as when there is large variability of middle 
elements. Likewise, because invariant structure detection is poor in conditions of 
middle variability, generalisation is expected to be equally poor in those 
conditions too. 
As reiterated throughout this dissertation, it is fundamental to establish 
analogies as direct as possible between the artificial grammars constructed and the 
particular aspects of natural language that such grammars are meant to reproduce. 
In predicting aU shape for generalisation I want to motivate such results in the 
light of correlated data from the acquisition literature. The case for generalisation 
under large variability has an analogy in the literature under the "critical mass 
hypothesis" (Marchman & Bates, 1994). Children's early period of productive 
language seems characterised by a strong conservatism with regard to the 
utterances heard. Tomasello (2002, for a review) has noted that early use of verbs 
is restricted to contextual frames, or islands, for each specific verb. Children 
gradually become more productive with novel verbs and with known verbs in new 
contexts at the age of 3-4 years. Likewise, Pine & Lieven (1997) found that the 
articles "a" and "the" are used with different nouns at the age of 2-3 years, and 
Pizzuto & Caselli (1992) have found similar results for Italian morphology. This 
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suggests an item-based process of learning, where children originally possess no 
adult-like abstract knowledge of what constitutes a syntactic category like VERB 
or ARTICLE and construct such knowledge gradually from the items. The 
assumption is that there is a critical mass of exemplars of particular utterances 
necessary to trigger the process of categorisation. However, Tomasello points out 
that the specific nature of the critical mass remains vague. For instance, it fails to 
describe whether types or tokens have to reach the critical mass and the relation 
between types and tokens. The prediction of generalisation under large variability 
is in line with the critical mass hypothesis. Moreover, it helps specify the 
hypothesis further, in support of the crucial role of types rather than tokens for 
triggering categorisation. This is because in the experiment as variability increases 
the number of type sentences increases while the number of token sentences in 
each condition stays the same (432). Hence the relative type/token ratio is 
proportional to variability. 
The prediction of generalisation under no variability is seducing because it 
allows a qualitative and counterintuitive prediction. Remember that in chapter 2 
excellent performance under zero variability was interpreted as detection of 
invariant structure. However, another equally plausible interpretation remained 
open, namely that learners trivially memorise the three type sentences as trigrams 
during learning, given extended exposure to them (each occurs 144 times), and 
then discriminate them successfully against similar but unheard trigrams at test. 
This latter hypothesis trivialises the U shape outcome because it means that 
nonadjacent dependencies are not detected under zero variability and the fact that 
humans learn a few instances by heart is neither surprising nor informative for a 
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theory of learning. However, if learners were to show an ability to generalise to a 
novel embedding under no variability, this would suggest that they do not 
memorise sentences as trigrams, but rather extract the dependency between the 
head and tail of the strings, and sanction as grammatical a novel sentence that 
contains a novel embedding, but not a novel sentence that contains a novel 
nonadjacency. 
The same prediction is also counterintuitive vis-ä-vis making direct 
analogies between AGL/ALL paradigms and theories of language acquisition. 
Empirical data from the acquisition literature suggest that the more frequently 
children hear a verb used in a given construction, the more firmly its usage 
becomes entrenched, and hence the less likely they will be to generalise that verb 
to any novel construction with which they have not heard it (Brooks & Tomasello, 
1999; Brooks, Tomasello, Lewis & Dodson, 1999). If applied to my AGL 
paradigm the entrenchment hypothesis predicts that given the large number of 
repetitions (144) of each of the three sentences in the artificial language, 
memorising trigrams would seem the most effective way to encode the grammar 
and generalisation would be hindered. Indeed, Tomasello has argued that an early 
stage of language acquisition consists of largely unanalysed holophrases, i. e. 
sentences whose components are not been extracted partly or entirely. The extent 
to which we can draw parallels between my AGL results and naturalistic or 
experimental data with children is to be investigated further, but clearly AGL 
experiments are informative in that they can help promote or demote hypotheses 
about language acquisition. Below I present an experiment that tests 
generalisation to new embeddings under conditions of variability. Again, the 
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experiment below was conducted on adults as a preliminary investigation to be 
later extended to infants. Subsequently, given the successful results of SRNs in 
chapter 3 in modeling the variability effect, I present a simulation of the adult data 
to test the extent to which SRNs can generalise to novel items under conditions of 
variability. 
Experiment 5 (Human data) 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-six undergraduate and postgraduate students at the University of Warwick 
participated and were paid £3 each. None of them had participated in previous 
experiments. 
Materials 
The training stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 1, They were 
presented auditorily via loudspeakers located next to the computer screen. The test 
stimuli consisted of 12 strings randomised. 6 strings were grammatical and six 
were ungrammatical. The ungrammatical strings were constructed as in previous 
experiments by breaking the correct nonadjacent dependencies and associating a 
head to an incorrectly associated tail. Six strings (three grammatical and three 
ungrammatical) contained a previously heard embedding, while 6 strings (again 
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three grammatical and three ungrammatical) contained a new, unheard 
embedding. 
Procedure 
Exactly the same procedure as in Experiment 1 was used. Participants sat and 
listened to the strings. Training lasted approximately 18 minutes, again as in 
Experiment 1. After training, test instructions were the same except that they 
contained an additional sentence stating that the strings they were going to hear 
may contain new words and they should base their judgement on whether the 
sentence was grammatical or not on the basis of their knowledge of the grammar. 
This is to guarantee that participant did not select as ungrammatical all the 
sentences with novel words simply because they contained novel words (Rebecca 
Gomez, personal communication). 
Results and discussion 
A polynomial trend analysis showed a significant quadratic effect, F(1,35) 
=7.407, p <. 01. Figure 12 presents the percentage of endorsements for total 
accuracy in each of the three set-size conditions. No other effect was found. These 
findings suggest that people generalise at endpoints of the variability spectrum, in 
the same conditions in which they detect the invariant nonadjacent structure. Thus 
they support the counterintuitive prediction set out at the beginning of the chapter, 
namely that detecting invariant frames and generalising to novel slots may be 
supported by the same mechanisms. 
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Figure 12. Percent accuracy in generalising to a new embedding across 3 conditions of variability: 
null, small, and large. 
Simulation 3 (SRN data) 
The remarkable similarity between the human data in Experiment 1 (chapter 2) 
and the connectionist simulations in chapter 3 that model aU shape curve in 
detecting nonadjacencies as a function of variability prompted another series of 
simulations, which I report below, that attempt to simulate the human data above 
on generalisation in Simple Recurrent Networks. In principle, if non-local 
dependencies serve as the backbone for extracting category membership of the 
embedding, we would expect simple associative mechanisms to master both non- 
local dependencies and generalisation under the same specific conditions of 
variability as obtained with the human data. The following simulations test 
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whether SRNs generalise well in Set Size conditions 1 and 24 but not in Set Size 
condition 2. The results will be plotted against the human data. 
Method 
Networks 
36 SRNs were trained and tested, corresponding to 12 subjects in each of the 3 
conditions in Experiment 5 above. The networks displayed the same structure and 
initialisation parameters as those in Simulation 2 in chapter 3, except that they 
contained an extra input and output unit. Again, input and output vector 
representations were localist, so the new input/output pair served to activate a new 
middle item to be presented at test. Structurally the networks are equivalent to the 
networks used earlier. 
Materials 
Training stimuli consisted of the strings generated from the finite-state grammar 
used in Simulation 1 and 2 (chapter 2). Test stimuli consisted of 3 previously 
encountered grammatical strings and 3 ungrammatical strings constructed with 
previously encountered bigrams (these stimuli were exactly the same as those 
used in Experiment 2). In addition, another 3 new grammatical and 3 new 
ungrammatical strings were presented containing previously encountered 
nonadjacent frames with a new middle item. Such new middle item was 
represented by activating a localist vector where all the units were off except the 
new input unit, which had remained off during training. Hence the networks had 
not encountered this new vector during training. 
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Procedure 
The networks were trained in exactly the same way as in Simulation 2 (chapter 3). 
The 12 test items were randomised for each network. Performance was measured 
as in Simulations 1 and 2 in chapter 3, i. e. by calculating the Luce Ratio for the 
target output node corresponding to the correct tail element of each sentence and 
turning it into the p-grammatical value. 
Results and Analyses 
The results are plotted in Figure 13 against human data results. Two out of three 
expected outcomes were obtained: firstly, generalisation in Set Size 1 was good. 
Secondly, generalisation in Set Size 2 was worse relatively to Set Size 1, as 
expected. However, generalisation in Set Size 24 did not improve to levels similar 
to Set Size 1 and, in any case, was not considerably better than Set Size 2. Hence, 
the U shape on generalisation can be simulated only partially. This result is 
puzzling, and is not fully understood at present. 
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Figure 13. Results from Simulation 3 on generalisation to new embeddings plotted against results 
obtained experimentally in Experiment 5. 
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General Discussion 
Despite the fact that the potential usefulness of distributional learning has been 
discounted in the past as irrelevant for learning abstract and syntactic properties 
of natural languages (e. g. Pinker, 1984), recent times have seen an upsurge of 
computational and experimental studies investigating the role of distributional 
learning as part of the larger research endeavour in statistical learning. 
In this chapter I have extended the paradigm on detection of invariant 
structure successfully used in Chapter 2 to investigate whether the process of 
generalisation of the embedded material is supported under the same conditions 
of variability. The theoretical issue at stake in this chapter was: do human 
learners engage distributional learning mechanisms to induce the grammatical 
category of a word when sufficient and consistent contextual information is 
given in the input? Extensive statistical analyses of large corpora of child- 
directed speech strongly support the idea that, in principle, a probabilistic learner 
would successfully detect the syntactic category structure of words in a language 
by performing a distributional analysis of the raw input. However, it remained to 
be ascertained whether learners, adults and children, actually engage in 
distributional learning. A preliminary step is to test adult learners. Artificial 
grammars using two-word sentences to elicit word categorisation using lexical 
co-occurrence patterns have been successful to the extent that a portion of the 
words are marked by extra cues. However, Mintz (2002) proposed that two-word 
sentences may not provide sufficient contextual information to learners to engage 
successful distributional mechanisms because there is no statistical information 
as to which word constitutes the context and which word constitutes the target to 
be generalised. Using an A_X_B language of the same kind used by Gomez and 
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here in chapter 2, Mintz found that distributional categorisation was possible 
when the to-be-generalised embeddings were shared by four contextual frames. 
By framing generalisation in terms of the variability hypothesis this work has 
expanded both on chapter 2 and on Mintz's results. 
Remember that the learning task in the A_X B grammar was seen in 
chapter 2 as a question of tracking sequential non-local dependencies in the 
presence of different degrees of variability of embedded material. Using a 
figure/ground metaphor, the issue was how to detect non-local invariant 
structure- metaphorically the figure- upon an invariable or an increasingly 
variable ground. Conversely, the task tackled in this chapter is how to build a 
category for embedded material - the figure - and generalise to newly 
encountered embeddings when such embeddings are shared by several contextual 
frames, in the same conditions of variability. Just like Rubin's famous face-vase 
figure (Rubin, 1915), which can be perceived alternatively either as a white vase 
on a black background or as two black faces looking at each other, in front of a 
white ground, it is argued that generalising the frame or detecting the embedding 
are inextricably tied because one leads to the other and vice-versa. The change in 
perspective, frame versus embedding, I would argue, may lie in the eye of the 
beholder, in this case the psychologist, rather than strictly being a psychological 
phenomenon. It is perhaps not psychological in the sense that the same 
mechanisms, I would argue, are at play in detecting invariant structure versus 
generalising the embedded material. Indeed, the major contribution of my results 
is that generalisation to a category EMBEDDING is modulated by the same 
variability constraints imposed on detecting the frames. Knowledge of this 
category leads to an abstract representation where a newly heard word can 
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occupy the embedding slot. Hence, frame detection and generalisation within 
frames appear to be the two facets of a same distributional process. The crucial 
inductive problem is, as Mintz (2002) noted, that the learner does not know a 
priori whether a given word functions as part of a static categorising environment 
or as a word-to-be-categorised. A completely unprincipled distributional analysis 
of the input seems cognitively implausible for small artificial grammars, let alone 
for scaled-up, full-blown language. Perhaps then, learners are naturally biased 
towards change versus non-change (Gibson, 1991; Gomez, 2002) and this 
intuition can be formalised in the reduction of uncertainty principle. 
In addition to human experiments, this chapter investigated whether basic 
associative mechanisms as instantiated in Simple Recurrent Networks can 
replicate the U-shape in the generalisation task just as they replicated so well the 
U-shape in detecting non-local dependencies in chapter 3. Unfortunately, the 
picture is not clearcut: although good results under no variability and low scores 
under small variability were replicated respectively, the average networks' 
performance with large variability was at 63%, slightly but not tremendously 
better than the 61% score of networks in low variability. One possible 
explanation is that the input and output vectors use localist instead of distributed 
representations. This way of coding the input/output matching may not be 
conducive to correct classification in neural networks. From the point of view of 
the network, the new middle item is a completely new vector that bears no 
resemblance whatsoever with previous vectors. This is equivalent, in the human 
experimental setting, to showing a completely unrelated item as new embedding 
at test, say the picture of a cow. It is fairly safe to assume that human participants 
would have a hard time deciding whether the pseudo-sentence pel_<picture of a 
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cow>_rud was grammatical, regardless of the correctness of the frame. Hence, 
distributed representations may be a better way of encoding the stimuli in a 
psychologically plausible way, by representing at least some features of the 
stimuli common to all other stimuli, for instance phonological properties. 
A comment is in order as to the perceptual structure of the stimuli used 
both here and in chapter 2. To the extent that the middle words contain two 
syllables versus the one-syllabled heads and tails, the middle words are 
perceptually augmented by an extra cue. This is because the original Gomez 
(2002) was devised for children and was meant to maximise perception of the 
single words in the language (Gomez, personal communication). It could be 
argued that this study is not dissimilar to the ones mentioned earlier on that 
utilise distributional information in conjunction with extra cues. As a disclaimer, 
because the extra-syllable cue is present in all five conditions of variability, I 
would argue that the crucial factor in both non-local frame detection and 
embedding generalisation remains uncontroversially the variability effect. In 
addition, it is well known that natural languages are abundant with phonological, 
and suprasegmental perceptual cues and a reduction of uncertainty hypothesis 
does not have to restrict useful information to distributional information. On the 
contrary, the larger statistical language learning picture one would hope to draw 
is that learners capitalise on any statistically reliable cues. Recent studies have 
already established that learners may integrate cues from different domains in 
their search for structure (Monaghan, Chater, & Christiansen, submitted). In 
other cases, it may even be the case that some perceptual cues such as stress, 
preference for certain phonemes or pauses in the speech stream may override 
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distributional information altogether. This will be the topic of the following 
chapter. 
Lastly, regarding the extension of the present AGL results to the 
acquisition literature, there is ample scope for debate whether children actually 
perceive frames and generalise at the same time. Recent work has emphasised 
the constructive role of syntactic frames as the first step for building more 
abstract syntactic representations (Gleitman, 1990; Gleitman, Gleitman, Landay 
& Wanner, 1998; Lieven, Pine, & Baldwin, 1997; Olguin & Tomasello, 1993, 
Tomasello, 1992,2000). The most explicitly formulated among these studies (see 
Tomasello & Brooks, 1999; Tomasello, 2003 for an overview) propose that 
children's syntactic development builds upon several consecutive stages from 
holophrases such as I-wanna-see-it (at around 12 months), to pivot-schemas 
(throw-ball, throw-can, throw-pillow, at about 18 months), through item-based 
constructions (John hugs Mary, Mary hugs John, at about 24 months), to full 
abstract syntactic constructions (a X, the Xs, Eat a X). Whether it is possible to 
closely replicate such developmental patterns using artificial grammars is an 
open question. One way of doing this is by exposing adult and infant learners to 
artificial grammars that gradually contain more and more data or that gradually 
increase complexity and see whether at different stages learners converge 
towards underlying structures of increasing abstractness and complexity. In 
general, current artificial grammar experiments with adults and children have so 
far been limited to the formal aspects of language and these have not been 
grounded in the functional, pragmatic, and semantic aspects that cover such an 
important part of language development. For instance, it is implausible to assess 
whether learners acquire thematic roles such as agent/patient or syntactic 
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relational categories such as subject/object without matching the meaningless 
perceptual stimuli to, for instance, objects organised in a visual scene. To my 
knowledge very few experiments have been conducted in this way (Morten 
Christiansen has unpublished data, personal communication), so there is ample 
scope in the future for extending the AGL paradigm to reproduce natural 
languages more closely. 
In the chapters presented so far it has been proposed that statistical 
learning may be powerful enough to deal with complex sequential stimuli 
including detecting nonadjacent structure and generalising to novel stimuli. As 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, a main tenet of standard generative 
linguistic theory and standard cognitive science is that structural linguistic 
representations are instantiated in the brain as formal algebraic rules. The next 
chapter will dwell on the nature of generalisations and on the empirical bases to 
support claims of the distinction between statistical and algebraic computations. 
It is anticipated that the data presented here and in chapter 2 will be further 
discussed in chapter 6 in the light of results on speech segmentation using 
nonadjacent structures. It will be possible to directly compare the two 
experimental paradigms because the structure of the artificial grammars used is 
very similar, namely it involves the now famous 3 nonadjacent dependencies 
with a number of intervening items. 
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Chapter 6 
The debate over the nature of linguistic representations 
What computational processes are implicated in language acquisition, and how 
might we assess them? One recent debate has centered on the extent to which 
language acquisition is dependent on the statistical structure of the language 
environment, or on algebraic, rule-like computations (Marcus, 1999; McClelland 
& Plaut, 1999; Hahn & Chater, 1998). This question has been central to debates 
about language acquisition, and is ubiquitous at all levels of description of 
language structure. 
The traditional view of language acquisition holds that statistical 
computations may be useful for learning the sounds and the lexicon of a specific 
language, but that they are not central to the characterization of grammar, i. e., the 
set of abstract and universal properties of the language faculty (Chomsky, 1957; 
Pinker, 1989). At the level of speech segmentation, statistical distributional 
information might provide information about word boundaries. For instance, in 
the second half of their first year children begin to distinguish strings of sounds 
containing legal sequences of sounds - phonotactic constraints - in their language 
from illegal sequences (/zw/ and /vl/ appear at the beginning of words in Dutch 
but not in English; Jusczyk, 1999). Infants are also capable of exploiting 
statistical regularities as cues to speech segmentation. For instance, when hearing 
a continuous stream of syllables both adults and children were sensitive to points 
where transitional probabilities between speech sounds were lowest (Aslin, 
Saffran, & Newport, 1996; Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996). At the word-level, 
connectionist models, which pick up on distributional information in the 
environment, indicate that statistical information may play a large role in 
determining mappings between written and spoken forms of words and their 
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meaning (Plaut, McClelland, Seidenberg, & Patterson, 1996; Seidenberg & 
McClelland, 1989). Similarly, at the grammatical level, connectionist models 
have renewed interest in the language structure that can be learned from 
distributional statistics (Christiansen & Chater, 1999; Elman, 1990). The shifting 
balance between statistical and rule-like approaches in language modeling can 
also be observed in the changing emphasis between symbolic and statistical 
methods in computational linguistics (Klavans & Resnik, 1996; Manning & 
Shütze, 2000). In this area of studies successful integrative approaches to 
language have been used rather than a commitment to either purely symbolic or 
statistical methods. The core research topic is the probabilistic nature of language 
at all levels of analysis (comprehension, production, phonology, morphology, 
syntax, semantics, sociolinguistics; see Bod, Hay, & Jannedy, 2003). 
Pena, Bonatti, Nespor, and Mehler (2002) provided a set of experiments 
that, they argued, showed that such views could be reconciled: speech 
segmentation operates on the basis of statistical learning, whereas entirely 
separate algebraic computations are necessary for learning grammatical structure. 
In this chapter I present a series of experiments to show that this line of evidence 
does not yet support this segregation of computational processes. I discuss 
methodological questions pertaining to the merits and limits of Artificial 
Language Learning (henceforth ALL) experiments as tools of investigation, and 
caution against theoretical conclusions based on tests without full controls. In 
addition, I evaluate the limits of casting the debate on language learning using 
the current rules versus statistics dichotomy. Recent ALL studies point both to a 
general natural predisposition to discover structure, in whatever form, and to a 
richness of potential cues that both children and adults can exploit. Key issues 
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involve discovering the principles that guide learners to choose among 
competing sources of information, to integrate or discard them. My results 
suggest that salience and learnability of a particular structure may be heavily 
dependent upon the perceptual and probabilistic factors as well as the training 
and test conditions. 
Are algebraic and statistical computations empirically separable? 
Since the first studies using artificial grammars (e. g. Miller, 1967; Reber, 1967), 
convincing evidence has been accumulated that adults become sensitive to the 
deep structure contained in chained events such as strings of letters, sounds, or 
images. This line of research has been successfully extended to infants (see for 
instance Gomez, 1999; Jusczyk, 1999; Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996). This 
learning usually takes place after limited and incidental exposure to complex 
stimuli. In a typical ALL situation, participants are first exposed to numerous 
stimuli and asked to memorize or process them in some way. Subsequently, they 
are informed that the stimuli were generated by a specific set of rules (a 
grammar), and are asked to classify further strings as grammatical or not. 
Typically, participants achieve some degree of success in this classification task 
despite their limited ability to recognize or verbalize overtly the knowledge of 
the features that define grammaticality. The learning mechanisms involved in 
such situations remain controversial. Nonetheless, ALL paradigms have been 
used as an empirical test-bed of the statistical versus algebraic debate in language 
acquisition. Knowledge of algebraic rules is characterized as the representation 
of mental abstract variables. Symbolic accounts of language (Marcus, 2001; 
Pinker, 1999) define linguistic processes as operating over such variables. 
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It has been claimed that rule knowledge is necessary in order to afford 
limitless linguistic generalizations across the board to any novel item, regardless 
of familiarity with the features of previously encountered items (Marcus, 2001). 
For instance, speakers are able to generalise regular inflection such as the -ed 
suffix marking the past tense in English to novel and strange-sounding words 
(Prasada & Pinker, 1993). Several connectionist models of inflection eliminate 
the representation for variables like "stem" and operations like "stem+s" in the 
formation of English plurals (e. g. Daugherty & Seidenberg, 1992; Hahn & 
Nakisa, 2000; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986; Plunkett & Juola, 1999). 
However, Marcus argued that the kind of generalization subserved by 
connectionist models is limited compared to human generalisation: although 
connectionist networks can generalise to a novel item that bears resemblance to 
the trained regular instances (e. g. they can generalise to a novel noun blick 
because of familiarity with previously encountered nouns brick or block), unlike 
humans they fail to generalise to novel nouns like xick (pronounced /xIk/) whose 
features fall outside the training space, as defined by Marcus (Marcus, 1998, 
2001). 
Conversely, statistical language learning studies have highlighted human 
learners' sensitivity to statistical properties of the input. Saffran, Aslin, and 
Newport (1996) familiarised 8-month-olds to a stream of concatenated 3-syllable 
word-like stimuli, such that the transitional probability of a syllable given the 
preceding syllable within a word was 1, whereas syllable transitional 
probabilities crossing word boundaries were . 33. At test, they 
found that infants 
preferred isolated words as opposed to part-words containing syllables that 
spanned word boundaries, i. e., there was a preference for stimuli that maximized 
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the transitional probabilities between syllables. Supporters of statistical language 
learning argue that the brain is endowed with powerful general statistical 
computations similar in style to those implemented in connectionist networks. To 
test this position, ALL experiments have been used to assess participants' ability 
to learn abstract grammatical structure. Such studies have typically focused on 
cases where learning occurs where no apparent statistical distributional 
information is available in the stimuli. In such cases participants are required to 
abstract the underlying rule from a set of training stimuli to a novel stimulus 
which obeys the rule of the training set but which has not been seen previously. 
Such generalisations, however, have been characterized either in terms of rule- 
learning (Marcus et al., 1999), statistical learning (Gomez & Gerken, 1999), or 
both (Redington & Chater, 2002). There remains, however, the possibility that 
both statistical and algebraic computations play a role in language learning. 
Pen"a et al. (2002) provided a set of intriguing ALL studies that seemed to 
suggest that statistical computations are used for segmentation, but cannot be 
used for learning rules in the language. Rather, rule learning is subserved by a 
distinct type of computation. Their participants were presented with continuous 
streams of syllables comprised of words of the form A; X; B;, where there were 
three such Ai-Bi pairs, and Xj was one of three syllables that randomly intervened 
between the A; 
_Bi pair. 
In a subsequent test phase, participants demonstrated a 
preference for words (e. g., A1X2B1) over part-words, i. e., sequences that crossed 
word boundaries (e. g., X2B1A3 or B3A1X2). The nonadjacent dependencies 
between the A; and the B; syllables were learned and contributed towards 
segmentation. Following an identical training phase, Pena et al. (2002) tested 
participants on whether they learned to generalize from the rules of the stimuli. 
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Participants demonstrated no preference for "rule-words", composed of an A; _B; 
pair with a different A or B in the intervening position (e. g., A1B3B1), compared 
to part-words. 
In a third manipulation, 25-ms gaps were introduced between words 
during the training phase of the experiment, and now participants generalized as 
indicated by a preference for rule-words over part-words. Pena et al. claimed that 
altering the speech signal resulted in a change in the computations performed by 
their participants. Statistical computations were used in a segmentation task but 
this was not performed simultaneously with algebraic computations that would 
permit generalizations of the structure. Once the segmentation task was solved by 
introducing small gaps in the speech signal, the underlying structure would be 
learned. 
An alternative explanation to account for the results is that, as 
Seidenberg, MacDonald, and Saffran (2002) point out, certain phonological 
properties of the stimuli may have contributed to preferences for certain words. 
In each experiment, Pena et al. (2002) used syllables in the same positions. In 
addition, all initial and final syllables began with a stop consonant. It is possible, 
then, that phonological properties exert an influence on the results rather than 
that participants learn the subtle statistical or algebraic properties of the stimuli. 
As a first step I carried out a corpus analysis to investigate the distribution of the 
consonants used in Pena et al. 's experiments. The experiments in Pena et al. 
were performed on French speakers, the experiments I present in this chapter 
were on English speakers, so I here consider both languages. 
I assessed the percentage of words (taking into account their frequency) 
in the Brulex corpus of French (Content, Mousty, & Radeau, 1990) and in the 
101 
Chapter 6 
CELEX corpus of English (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & Gulikers, 1995) that began 
with each phoneme from the syllables used by Pena et al. The results are shown 
in Table 5. In French, initial phonemes from Pena et al. 's materials were more 
likely than medial phonemes to begin words, and in English, initial phonemes 
were more likely than both medial and final consonants to begin words. I tested 
the consequence of forming a preference for words over part-words based only 
on the likelihood of the initial phoneme in word-initial position. From the 36 
tests of word/part-word in the segmentation experiment in Pena et al. 's study, in 
French 23 cases produced a preference for a word over a part-word, and in 
English 32 words would be preferred over part-words. In each language, 
response selection on the basis of onset probability of the latent language would 
result in highly significant mean responses. 
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Position Phoneme Percentage 
in French 
of onsets Percentage of onsets 
in English 
Initial /p/ 6.67 3.11 
fb/ 2.20 4.45 
/t1 5.00 4.89 
total: 13.87 total: 12.45 
Medial French /R1, English 3.95 2.16 
/f/ 4.60 4.36 
/1/ 2.02 2.26 
total: 10.57 total: 8.78 
Final /k/ 8.92 3.69 
/g/ 1.22 1.50 
/d/ 6.51 2.99 
total: 16.65 total: 8.18 
Table 5. Percentage of words beginning with each consonant for syllables in initial/medial/final 
word position in Pena et al. 's studies. 
Seidenberg, MacDonald and Saffran (2002) indicated that, in Pena et al. 's 
stimuli, all initial and final syllables began with a stop consonant, whereas 
medial syllables began with continuants. Taken together with my corpora 
analyses, there is mounting evidence that phonology may potentially influence 
task performance in ALL experiments. Given the effectiveness of responding 
according to positional frequencies of phonemes from the latent language I 
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performed a series of experiments to test empirically the extent to which 
phonology may influence task performance in ALL. 
I present below a battery of new ALL experiments that manipulate the 
order and position of syllables, which indicate that the confound of phonology is 
sufficient to account for all of the results obtained by Pena et al. Consequently, 
there is no evidence yet for learning, either statistical or algebraic, on the basis of 
the nonadjacent dependencies in the stimuli. I divide the experiments into sets 
relating to the segmentation task, as proscribed by Pena et al., and to 
generalization of structure. Experiments 1 to 3 concern segmentation, and 
Experiments 4 to 8 explore the issue of generalization. The first three 
experiments test the extent to which phonology can account for word over part- 
word preferences. The first experiment precisely replicates Pena et al. 's 
experiment where words were preferred over part-words. The second experiment 
tests whether the preference for words was due to the particular choice of 
phonemes in different positions within the words, and the third experiment tests 
whether the preference for words over part-words pertains when phonemes 
maintain their position, but the structure is removed. 
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Experiment Pena et al. 
experiment 
Segmentation/Gen 
eralisation task 
Syllable 
positions 
Nonadjace 
nt 
Structure 
25ms 
Gap 
Effect 
6 1 Segmentation Original Y N <. 00001 
7 Segmentation Randomised Y N ns 
8 Segmentation Original Random N < . 005 
9 2 Generalisation Original Y N ns 
10 Generalisation Randomised Y N <. 05* 
11 3 Generalisation Original Y Y <. 01 
12 Generalisation Randomised Y Y < . 005 
13 Generalisation Original Random Y <. 01 
Table 6. Summary of the design of the experiments. The first column lists the Experiment, the 
second column lists the experiment number in Pena et al, 's study. "Syllable positions" indicates 
whether syllables occurred in the original initial/medial/final positions from Pena et al. The 
"Structure" column indicates whether the language contained nonadjacent dependencies or not, 
and the effect indicates the statistical result (* indicates that there was a significant reverse effect, 
i. e., there was a preference for part-words over rule-words in Experiment 10). 
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Experiment 6 
In Experiment 6, I wanted to replicate Pena et al. 's finding that participants have 
a preference for words over part-words. I precisely replicated Pena et al. 's first 
experiment except using English participants and utilizing synthesized spoken 
English. 
Method 
Participants 
10 undergraduate and postgraduate students at the University of Warwick 
participated for £1. All participants spoke English as a first language and had 
normal hearing. 
Materials and design 
We used the same nine word types from Pena et al. to construct the training 
speech stream in Experiment 6. The set of nine words was composed of three 
groups (A; _B; 
), where the first and the third syllable were paired, with an 
intervening syllable (X) selected from one of three syllables. The first set 
(A1XB1) was: [pu-li-ki], [pu-ra-ki], [pu-fo-ki]; the second set (A2XB2) was: [be- 
li-ga], [be-ra-ga], [be-fo-ga]; and the third set (A3XB3) was: [ta-li-du], [ta-ra-du], 
[ta-fo-du]. 
Words were produced in a seamless speech stream, with no two words 
from the same set occurring adjacently, and no same middle item occurring in 
adjacent words. I used the Festival speech synthesizer (Black, Taylor, & Caley, 
1990) using a voice based on British-English diphones at a pitch of 120 Hz, to 
generate a continuous speech stream lasting approximately 10 minutes. All 
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syllables were of equal duration, and were produced at a rate of 4.5 
syllables/second. Words were selected randomly, except that no A; _B; pair 
occurred twice in succession. The speech stream was constructed from 900 
words, in which each word occurred approximately 100 times. The speech 
stream faded in for the first 5 seconds, and faded out for the last 5 seconds, so 
there was no abrupt start or end to the stream. 
Part-words were formed from the last syllable of one word and two 
syllables from the following word (BAX), or from the last two syllables of one 
word and the first syllable from the following word (XB; A1). Participants were 
seated in individual sound-proof labs. E-prime was used to present training and 
test speech, which was played through centrally-positioned loudspeakers. 
Procedure 
In the training phase, participants were instructed to listen to continuous speech 
and try and work out the "words" that it contains. They then listened to the 
training speech. In the testing phase, participants were requested to respond 
which of two sounds was a "word" in the language they had listened to. They 
were then played a word and a part-word separated by 500 ms, and responded by 
pressing either "1" on a computer keyboard for the first sound a word, or "2" for 
the second sound a word. After 2 seconds, the next word and part-word pair were 
played. In half of the test trials, the word occurred first. 5 participants heard a set 
of test trials with one set of words first, and the other 5 participants heard the 
other set of words first. 
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Results 
The results are reported in Figure 14. The top part of the Figure represents a 
sample of the training phase. Colours indicate different words. The rest of the 
figure reports individual scores (single dots) in preferring words (on the left 
hand) versus part-words (underscored on the right hand), expressed in averaged 
percentages. The results replicated those of Pena et al. Participants preferred 
words over part-words, with a mean score of 29.3 (81%) from a possible 36, 
where chance performance equals 18. A single-sample t test (two-tailed) showed 
overall performance significantly better for words over part-words: t(9) = 6.81, p 
< . 
001. In addition, participants preferred words significantly more when they 
had to make a decision against part-words of the form XB; Aj (the mean score was 
15.9 from a possible 18) as opposed to part-words of the form B; AAX (the mean 
score was 13.4 from 18), t(9) = -2.82, p <. 05. 
Discussion 
The replication of Pena et al. is a preliminary requisite to ensure direct 
comparison between the task being carried out on English and French 
participants. I found that, even though the language and the synthesizer differed 
from that of the experiments on French, the same strong preferences for words 
over part-words were found in my study. Given the similarity between the 
distribution of plosives in English and French - plosives occur word-initially 
more than laterals - there remains the possibility that participants are guided in 
their responses by the distributions in their latent language rather than by the 
structure of the artificial language. Additional evidence for the possibility of 
phoneme preferences influencing the results comes from the significant 
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differences in preferences for words over BAjX part-words compared to words 
over XBApart-words. BAX part-words began with a plosive, and thus exhibited 
a small preference for words. In contrast, XB; Aj part-words began with a lateral 
or a fricative, and words, beginning with a plosive, were much preferred over 
these part-words. 
There is thus a distinct possibility that the word over part-word 
preferences exhibited in Experiment 6 were due to preferences for phonemes in 
certain positions. In order to test this possibility, I ran a control version of this 
study that broke the link between certain phonemes occurring in initial, medial, 
or final positions in Experiment 7. An additional source of preference for words 
over part-words was that words occur approximately twice as frequently in the 
training speech corpus as part-words. I control for this potential influence on the 
results in Experiment 7. 
PURAKI _.: 
PUFOKI 
RA K/BE PURR KI 
81.4 
0 50 100 
Figure 14. At the top of the frame, a sample of the training speech is shown, with "words" shown 
in different colours and part-words underlined. Underneath, is a sample of a test pair: in 
Experiments 6-8, words were compared to part-words, in 9-13, rule-words were compared to 
part-words. The results for each participant, in terns of percentage preference for part-word or 
word/rule-word, is represented by a dot. The mean for all participants is indicated above a 
vertical line. Experiment 6- segmentation task. 
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Experiment 7 
In Experiment 7I tested whether performance was guided by preference for 
syllables beginning with /p/, /b/, or /t/ in word-initial position. In order to test for 
this preference, for each participant I randomly assigned each of the nine 
syllables in Experiment 6 to three A, 
_B1 pairs and 
three X's. Each participant was 
exposed to a training corpus that had the same structure, but with phonemes 
assigned to different positions. 
Method 
Participants 
10 students from the same population, but who had not participated in any other 
experiment reported here, participated for a £1 payment. 
Materials and design 
For each participant, I randomly assigned 6 of the syllables from the first 
experiment to the Ai_B; pairs, and the other three syllables to the X1 position. 
Thus, each participant listened to speech with the same structure containing the 
nonadjacent dependencies, but with syllables assigned to different positions. For 
instance, the sequence A1X3B1 was instantiated as [li-ki-pu] for one participant 
but as [ra-be-ga] for another one. Once the syllables had been assigned to the 
positions within the words they remained in those positions for the duration of 
the experiment. In addition, because part-words were half as frequent as words in 
the training phase in Experiment 6, I doubled the frequency of one of the three 
A; 
_B; pairs and then used the other two words compared to part-words comprised 
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of the first or last phoneme of the higher-frequency word together with two 
syllables from a lower-frequency word. In this way, both word and part-word 
sequences at test had been heard with the same frequency. Test items were 
composed of one of the lower-frequency A; XB; words and either a XB; Aj or a 
B; AjX part-word, where Bj and Aj were from the higher-frequency word. All 12 
possible word and part-word pairs were used, and participants responded to 24 
pairs, 12 of which had the word preceding the part-word, and 12 in which the 
part-word preceded the word. 
Procedure 
The training and testing procedure were identical to that for Experiment 6. 
Results 
The results are shown in Figure 15. No preference was found for words over 
part-words. The mean response correct was 11.4 (47%) from a total of 24, which 
was not significantly different from chance, t(9) = -0.56, p= . 58. 
Discussion 
The results for Experiment 7 contrast with those of Experiment 6 strikingly. The 
key change that I made between Experiment 6 and Experiment 7 was to reassign 
syllables to different roles for each participant. The structure of the language was 
identical for both Experiment 6 and Experiment 7, however the strong 
preferences for words over part-words observed in Experiment 6 were 
completely absent from Experiment 7. That is, when preference for phonemes in 
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onset positions was controlled there was no indication of learning the 
nonadjacent dependencies in the speech signal1). This provides strong evidence 
for rejecting the hypothesis that participants learn the underlying structure of the 
language and use this to guide their preferences for certain sequences of speech 
sounds. 
This lead us to run a further control in Experiment 8, where I remove the 
nonadjacent dependency structure from the language but maintain the original 
phonological positions of syllables. This tests whether phonological preference 
alone is sufficient to determine preference for one guides performance. 
RAPUKI RABEKI 
PUKILI RAPUKI 
53.7 
........ 
0 50 100 
Figure 15. Experiment 7- segmentation task with randomized phonology. 
10 Pena et al. repeated their experiment I by interchanging part-words for words during the training phase. 
They found it reduced, but significant, preference for words over part-words. We suggest that testing a 
single control is not sufficient for removing any phoneme positional preferences (note that 
in 4/10 cases in 
our Experiment 7, participants performed at better than chance level which may have reflected respecting 
the phonological preferences of the latent language in 4/10 randomizations of the syllable ordering). 
112 
Chapter 6 
Experiment 8 
If preference for phonemes in certain positions is the explanation for decisions at 
test, then we should also find a significant preference for words over part-words 
when the phoneme positions are as in Pena et al. (2002), but nonadjacent 
structure is removed. Experiment 8 tested whether participants would prefer 
phonemes in particular orders even when there was no nonadjacent structure in 
the speech signal. I maintained the order of phonemes from Experiment 6, but 
broke the dependency between the first and the third syllable in each word. So, 
any first syllable was followed by any second syllable, which could be followed 
by any third syllable. 
Method 
Participants. 10 students (who had not participated in any other experiment 
reported here) at the University of Warwick participated for £1. 
Materials and design. 
The methods in Experiment 8 were the same as for Experiment 6. The speech 
stream differed in that the 9 syllables of Experiment 6 maintained their relative 
positions within words, but any combination of A, X, and B could occur within a 
word. For instance, whereas in Experiment 6 the first syllable [pu] was always 
paired with the last syllable [ki], generating a nonadjacent frame [pu-X-ki], now 
it generated two more frames [pu-X-ga], and [pu-X-du]; likewise for the other 
syllables. Hence, the speech stream was now comprised of 27 word types, and 
each word occurred approximately 33 times in the speech stream in randomized 
order with the constrain that no adjacent two words shared first, second, or third 
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syllable. The test phase consisted of all 27 words, compared to part-words that 
were composed of either the last two syllables of the word followed by the first 
syllable of the word (e. g., the word A; XBj was compared to the part-word BjA; X 
or XBjA; ). 
Procedure 
The training and testing procedure were identical to that for Experiment 6 in 
every other way. 
Results 
The results are shown in Figure 16. Participants in this Experiment preferred 
words over part-words with a mean of 17.2 (63%) from a total of 27, which was 
significantly different from chance, t(9) = 4.20, p< . 005. There was no 
difference in responses to BjA; X or XBjA; part-words. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 8 indicate that, even though there was no structure at 
all in the artificial language, participants still exhibited a preference for words 
over part-words, as defined by positions of phonemes. Taken together, 
Experiments 1 to 3 provide strong evidence that participants have not learned to 
solve the task based on learning nonadjacent dependencies. Experiment 7, which 
maintained the nonadjacent structure from Experiment 6, but randomized 
assignment of syllables to particular positions for each participant, found no 
evidence for learning. Experiment 8, which had no structure, but maintained 
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syllable positions from Experiment 6, found a significant preference for words 
over part-words. Words, in this case, are not defined by the structure of the 
artificial language, but rather by phonological information. I conclude that there 
is, as yet, no empirical evidence in support of Pena et al. 's claims that 
nonadjacent dependencies are helpful for segmentation. 
I have as yet found no evidence for the learning of nonadjacent 
dependencies, but I have found profound influences of phonological preferences 
on task performance. I next assessed the extent to which studies purporting to 
show learning generalizations can be accounted for in terms of phonological 
preferences rather than the learning of nonadjacent structure. 
Pena et al. (2002) tested whether participants identified the structural 
nonadjacent dependencies when presented with novel strings that contained the 
previously seen dependencies and a new intervening middle item. To do this, 
they tested participants' preference for part-words versus "rule-words". These 
were defined as words whose medial syllable was taken from another A, _B; pair. 
For instance, having heard [pu-Ii-ki], [pu-ra-ki], and [pu-fo-ki] during training 
participants where tested on a new sequence [pu-be-ki], with the syllable be 
having occurred as either the initial or final element of another A; _B; pair. 
Experiment 9 tests participants' preferences for rule-words over part-words when 
the training speech corpus was identical to that of Experiment 6. Experiment 10 
tests whether the same results emerge when syllables are randomly assigned to 
different positions for each participant. Experiment 11 tests the influence of 
introducing a short gap in the speech between words in the training corpus. This 
was found to produce a preference for rule-words over part-words in Pena et al. 's 
studies when this was not found without a gap. Experiments 7 and 8 test this 
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effect when syllables are randomly assigned to different positions, and when the 
structure is removed but syllables maintain their original positions within words. 
PURAKI: -'. ,:. PUFODU 
RAKIBE BERAKI 
" 63.7 " 
... .I.. . 
0 50 100 
Figure 16. Experiment 8- segmentation task with no structure. 
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Experiment 9 
We used precisely the same training stimuli as in Experiment 6, but tested 
participants' preference for "rule-words" compared to part-words. Pena et al. 
predicted that distributional information alone could not afford this 
generalization and hence rule-words should not be preferred to part-words. 
Experiment 9 was a replication of Pena et al. 's Experiment 7, but with English 
participants and English synthesized speech. 
Method 
Participants 
10 students (who had not participated in any other experiment reported here) at 
the University of Warwick participated for £1. 
Materials and design 
Experiment 9 was identical to Experiment 6 except for the test items in the test 
phase. Part-words were now compared to "rule-words", which were composed of 
A; 
_B; pairs with an 
intervening item that was either an Aj or a Bj from another 
Aj_Bj pair. I used the same rule-words as Pena et al.: for the A1XB1 set the rule- 
words were [pu-be-ki], [pu-ta-ki], [pu-ga-ki]; rule-words for the A2XB2 set were 
[be-du-ga], [be-ki-ga], [be-pu-ga]; and [ta-ga-du], [ta-be-du], [ta-ki-du] for the 
A3XB3 set. Part-words were constructed in the same way as in Experiment 6, and 
there were 36 test items. 
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Procedure 
The training and testing procedure was identical to that for Experiment 6 in every 
other way. 
Results 
The results are shown in Figure 17. In line with Pena et al., I found no evidence 
for participants learning to generalize from the nonadjacent structure of the 
stimuli. Participants responded with a preference for rule-words over part-words 
17.1 (47%) times from a total of 36. This was not significantly different to 
chance, t(9) = -. 55, p= . 
59. 
Discussion 
We found no evidence for a preference for rule-words to part-words, which 
replicates the results of Pena et al. precisely. These negative results were 
interpreted by Pena et al. as decisive evidence that "a computational mechanism 
sufficiently powerful to support segmentation on the basis of nonadjacent 
transitional probabilities is insufficient to support the discovery of the underlying 
grammatical-like regularity embedded in a continuous speech stream"(p. 606). It 
is possible that the lack of preference for rule-words over part-words, or vice 
versa, was obscured by the phonological preferences found in Experiments 1 and 
3. Experiment 10 tests whether there are preferences when syllables do not occur 
in particular positions. 
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PURAKI' PUFOKI 
RAKIBE PUbeKI 
. 47.5 
0 50 100 
Figure 17. Experiment 9- generalization task. 
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Experiment 10 
To test the possibility that generalizations were learned, but overridden by 
preferences for certain orders of phonemes, I randomized the phonology for each 
of the 10 participants in Experiment 10. The language for each participant was 
thus generated by assigning syllables to different positions for each participant, 
but maintaining the nonadjacent structure. The training speech corpora were thus 
produced in exactly the same way as for Experiment 7 above, except that all 
words occurred with equal frequency. Then, I tested participants on preference 
for "rule-words" versus part-words. 
Method 
Participants 
10 students (who had not participated in any other experiment reported here) at 
the University of Warwick participated for £1. 
Materials and design 
Experiment 10 was identical to Experiment 9, except that the assignment of 
syllables to words was different for each participant, similar to the assignment 
reported in Experiment 7. Rule-words were constructed by taking a syllable from 
one of the other A; _B; pairs 
in precisely the same way as for Experiment 9, such 
that at least one rule-word was composed with an intervening A; and at least one 
with a B; from another nonadjacent pairing. There were 36 test pairs. 
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Procedure 
The training and testing procedure was identical to that for Experiment 9 in every 
other way. 
Results 
Surprisingly, I found a preference for part-words over rule-words, as shown in 
Figure 18. Participants preferred rule-words to part-words a mean 15.1 (41%) 
times from 36, which was significantly less than chance, t(9) = -2.73, p< . 05. 
Discussion 
This control experiment shows that participants preferred sets of syllables that 
they had heard during the training phase over the "rule-words", which were 
novel sequences. This preference was overshadowed in Experiment 9 by the 
preference for certain onset phonemes, and was similar to the preference for 
familiar sequences found when Pena et al. (2002) familiarized their participants 
to an extended 30 minutes of continuous stream in their Experiment 9. It may be 
that familiarity with part-words obscures any learning of structure that admits 
generalization to rule-words. Rule-words are unfamiliar sequences, and the 
interposition of an element that has been learned to occur in a different position 
may interfere with learning. However, it remains the case that no evidence for 
generalization to rule-words was found in Experiment 9 or 5. Experiment 11 tests 
whether the introduction of a short gap between words changes the computations 
involved in learning the structure of the language. 
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... ý_... PURAKI PUFOKI 
RAKIBE PUbeKI 
. 41.9 
0 50 100 
Figure 18. Experiment 10 - generalization task with randomized phonology. 
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Experiment 11 
The next set of experiments (11-13) test whether generalizations occurred when 
subliminal gaps were introduced between words. In Pena et al. 's view, 
generalisation is not triggered by distributional analysis of the input, but by a 
different type of signal. The introduction of a subliminal gap was interpreted as 
relieving participants from the burden of computing transitional probabilities, 
thus allowing them to capture the generalizations in the language. Experiment 11 
replicated Pena et al. 's third experiment, which was precisely the same as my 
Experiment 9 except that gaps of 25 ms intervened between words during the 
training phase. The Experiment tested whether rule-words would be preferred 
over part-words when a gap intervened between words in the training speech 
corpus. 
Method 
Participants 
10 students (who had not participated in any other experiment reported here) at 
the University of Warwick participated for £1. 
Materials and design 
Experiment 11 was identical to Experiment 9 except for the training speech 
stream. Words were now separated by a 25ms pause. The Experiment precisely 
replicated the third experiment of Pena et al. (2002), except that participants 
were English speakers and the speech synthesizer was based on British English 
diphones. 
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Procedure 
The training and testing procedure was identical to that for Experiment 9. 
Results and discussion 
Participants reliably preferred rule-words to part-words, with a mean of 22.8 
(63%) preferences for rule-words from 36 items, t(9) = -3.41, p< . 01. This result 
is consistent with Pena et al. and has been taken to suggest that, once the 
segmentation task has been solved by the introduction of gaps between words, 
participants are free to concentrate on the structure of the language. 
Generalizations from this structure, reflected by preferences for rule-words over 
part-words, were taken to indicate learning the abstract rules of the language. The 
results of the previous Experiments have cautioned against hasty conclusions 
based on results from studies that have not controlled for potential phonological 
preferences. Experiment 12 tested the extent to which preference for certain 
phonemes in different positions within the word might account for the rule-word 
preference. 
.. 
PURAKI [] []PUFOKI[] Li 
RAKIBE PUbeKI 
63.3 
. 
.. 
4. 
0 50 100 
Figure 19. Experiment II- generalization task with gap. 
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Experiment 12 
Pena et al. argued that the introduction of the gap induced a different type of 
computation on the speech signal. Experiment 12 tested whether this effect was 
due to the particular choice of phonemes in Experiment 11 by randomly 
assigning syllables to the different positions and words in the artificial language 
for each participant, but maintaining the A; 
_B; structure 
of the language. 
Method 
Participants 10 students (who had not participated in any other experiment 
reported here) at the University of Warwick participated for £1. 
Materials and design 
The same randomization used in Experiments 2 and 5 was adopted, such that the 
structure of the language was maintained, but syllables were randomly assigned 
to different positions within words for each participant. Training and test stimuli 
were the same as Experiment 10, except for the introduction of the 25ms gap 
between words in the training speech corpus. 
Procedure 
The training and testing procedure was identical to that for Experiment 11 in 
every other way. 
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Results 
The results are shown in Figure 21. Participants responded with a preference for 
rule-words over part-words with a mean of 24.9 (69%) from 36 responses, which 
was significantly greater than chance, t(9) = -4.40, p< . 
005. 
Discussion 
Experiment 12 tested whether there was a preference for rule-words over part- 
words when preference for phonemes in particular positions was controlled for. I 
found that this was the case - rule words were preferred to part-words to a 
significant extent. There are two possible explanations for this effect. First, it 
may be that, as Pena et al. claim, generalizations are learned by participants. In 
this case, phonological preferences cannot account for the results. The second 
explanation, as noted by Seidenberg et al., is that the gap adds salience to the 
initial syllables, meaning that preference for previously heard words is over-ruled 
by the novel words beginning with the salient initial syllables. To test the 
subliminal status of the gaps, Pena et al. ran a control (note 22, Pena et al, 2002) 
where they played two sequences of 1 minute from the artificial language, one of 
which contained the gaps. Afterwards, participants were informed of the gap, and 
asked whether they had noticed any difference in the two sequences they had just 
heard. They were asked which of the two sequences contained them, and 
responses were at chance. 
According to Holender (1986) a more conservative way to test for 
subliminality is to inform participants of the subliminal element before 
presenting the stimuli. I performed this more conservative test using the same 
sound files that Pena et al. used. 10/10 participants identified the sequence with 
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gaps correctly. Under this stricter test, the gaps proposed by Pena et al. can no 
longer be said to be subliminal. The possibility therefore remains that learners 
were not detecting the nonadjacent structure, but rather were responding 
according to the salience of the first syllable, induced by the introduction of a 
gap prior to the syllable. If this is the case, then participants should still indicate a 
preference for rule-words versus part-words even in the absence of nonadjacent 
structure. I tested this possibility in Experiment 13. 
jj 
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Figure 20. Experiment 12 - generalization task with gap and randomized phonology. 
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Experiment 13 
We tested the extent to which performance was due to generalizations or was 
guided by the salience of initial syllables by randomising the structure of the 
language. Experiment 13 presented syllables in the same order as in Experiment 
11 but with no structural relationship between the first and third syllable. 
Method 
Participants 
10 students (who had not participated in any other experiment reported here) at 
the University of Warwick participated for £1. 
Materials and design 
This experiment is analogous to Experiment 8, which removed the structure of 
the language, but maintained the position of syllables within words. I used the 
same training stimuli as Experiment 8, with the exception that 25 ms pauses 
between words were added in the speech stream during training. The speech 
stream was composed of 27 words composed of three syllables, such that three 
syllables always occurred in the first position in the word, three syllables always 
occurred word-medially, and the remaining three syllables always occurred 
word-finally. Syllables occurred in the same position as in Pena et al. 's original 
experiments, thus I randomized structure, but not phonology in this Experiment. 
As in Experiment 8, no initial syllable began consecutive words, which was also 
the case for medial and final syllables. The test stimuli were composed of 36 
forced-choice pairs: each pair contained one of the 36 rule-words that could be 
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generated (3 initial position syllables x3 final position syllables x4 end-item 
syllables in the new medial position) versus their part-word counterparts. There 
were 4 (6 - 2) end-item syllables in medial position because rule-words 
containing a repetition of the first or last syllable. 
Procedure 
The training and testing procedure were identical to that for Experiment 11 in 
every other way. 
Results 
We found a significant preference for rule-words over part-words (see Figure 
21). Participants selected rule-words over part-words with a mean of 22.9 (63%) 
responses from 36, which was significantly greater than chance, t(9) = -3.64, p< 
. 01. In addition, there was no 
bias for choosing rule-words against XB, Aj part- 
words as opposed to rule-words versus BAjX part-words, t(9) = -. 88, p= . 40. 
Discussion 
We found that participants generalized to rule-words even when there was no 
structure in the language. In Experiment 12, too, there was a preference for rule- 
words even when the position of syllables was randomized. These data put 
together suggests that the presence of the gaps suffices in itself to promote 
salience of any first syllable as a perceptual cue to word boundary, independent 
of phonological properties or indeed structural organization of the words 
themselves. This is attested to by the absence of preference for rule-words over 
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different part-words - the added salience of the initial phoneme contributes 
additionally towards a preference for plosives in initial position. Experiment 6 
found that B; AýX part-words generated a smaller preference for words than did 
XBApart-words, as they started with a plosive. This effect is overwhelmed in 
the current experiment by the addition of the 25 ms gap. From these results I 
conclude that under these specific experimental conditions it is not possible to 
claim that participants generalize at all, nor that they do so on the basis of 
algebraic computations. 
.. 
PURAKIf1 [) []PUFODU[] jj 
RAKIBE PUraKI 
63.3 
0 50 100 
I 
Figure 21. Experiment 13 -generalization task with bap and no structure. 
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General discussion 
A summary of the design and the results of the experiments I have presented in 
this chapter is shown in Table 6. In the course of this series of experiments, I 
investigated whether the tasks of speech segmentation and generalization using 
an ALL paradigm can be separated so as to individuate two different types of 
mental computation, one statistical and the other algebraic, as Pena et al. 
claimed. I replicated Pena et al. 's experiments and ran further control 
experiments that do not support, at present, their theoretical segregation. 
The first three experiments explored the extent to which participants 
exploit nonadjacent dependencies in order to individuate words in a speech 
stream of nonsense syllables. The overall view is that segmentation occurred on 
the basis of preference for plosive sounds in initial position. The remaining 
experiments (4-8) were concerned with the ability to generalize to rule-words 
using nonadjacent depedencies that included a previously encountered initial- or 
end-syllable in a medial position. While Experiment 9 replicated the original 
Pena et al., Experiment 10 produced an opposite reverse effect of preference for 
part-words once syllable position was randomized across participants. Equally, 
the last three experiments (6-8), where the speech stream was interspersed with 
gaps between words, indicated that phonological salience of any first syllable 
was enhanced by the presence of the pauses, which in itself was sufficient to 
drive participants' bias for rule-words, even when the structural dependencies 
were eliminated. 
My conclusion after meticulous observations is that there is currently no 
evidence from ALL experiments that people exploit nonadjacent dependencies in 
language learning for either segmentation or generalization. This is in accord 
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with a previous investigation by Newport and Aslin (2000) who, in a series of 
experiments, found no evidence for the learning of nonadjacent dependencies in 
order to segment speech. As with Pena et al. 's experiments, they assessed the 
learning of three Ai_B; pairs when the intervening item varied among a set of 
three syllables. 
These findings, however, pose a problem in interpreting ALL results 
because other experiments have indicated that nonadjacent dependencies can 
indeed be learned under certain conditions. Gomez (2002) found that the 
structure of sentences of the form A; X; B;, where there were three different A; _B; 
pairs and sentences were presented individually, could be learned provided there 
was sufficient variability of Xj words. The structure was learned when 24 
different Xs were presented, but participants failed to learn when Xs varied from 
sets of 2,4,6, or 12. Chapter 2 (see also Onnis, Christiansen, Chater, & Gomez, 
2003) replicated these results and further found that structure could be learned 
with only one middle item, thus revealing a U-shaped curve as a function of 
variability. Furthermore, they found that generalization to completely novel 
middle items was supported only under the same conditions of no or high 
variability (Onnis, Gomez, Christiansen, and Chater, in preparation). Relatedly, 
Mintz (2002) found that participants generalised to a novel X in an AiXXB; triple in 
a categorisation task when there was sufficient overlap with otherA; XB; pairs. 
It seems, then, that nonadjacent dependencies can be learned in ALL 
tasks when there is sufficient variation and when stimuli are clearly delineated by 
(long) pauses. In addition, distinctions between Xs and A; _B; pairs 
are frequently 
introduced in order to assist learning. In Gömez's studies, for example, Xs have 
higher pitch than the A, _B, pairs 
(Newport & Aslin, 2000). One reason for the 
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absence of evidence for generalizations in Experiments 4 and 5 may be due to the 
small variability in the middle items. Another possibility for the lack of effect in 
these experiments is that the A; 
_B; pairs are not sufficiently 
distinct from the set 
of XX syllables. 
Another impediment to learning nonadjacent dependencies in the 
experiments I have presented is that concatenating words adds considerable 
complexity to the task of computing transitional probabilities. In Figure 22 the 
segmentation task used in Experiments 1 and 2 is contrasted to an ALL task with 
stimuli presented separately. The transitional probabilities between words (0.5) 
are higher than within words (0.33)" and this pressures for segmentation within 
words (Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996). If variability of the middle item is 
increased, as seems necessary in order for generalizations to occur (Gomez, 
2002), the transitional probabilities within words will drop further, but remain 
static for between-word transitions (Figure 23). A segmentation task version of 
the zero variability case (Onnis et al., 2003) is not viable either. With only one X, 
transitional probabilities would be high everywhere; word-spanning nonadjacent 
dependencies (AIX) would have high probabilities (0.5), and would be relatively 
frequent in training, resulting in a seamless sequence of alternating nonadjacent 
dependencies (Figure 24). Natural language contains large variability of items 
within grammatical structures, but also lower transitional probabilities between 
words than within words, but these properties are difficult to simulate in small- 
scale ALL experiments. Until such limitations can be overcome I suggest that it 
is premature to conclude that statistical and algebraic computations are not 
performed simultaneously. 
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The negative results reported here and in Newport and Aslin, coupled 
with the positive results of Gomez and chapter 2 instruct us that the issue of what 
is learned in ALL paradigms cannot be settled conclusively without a thorough 
investigation of the interactions between experimental tasks, training procedures, 
and distributional properties of the input being sampled. Perhaps, then, I have 
failed to separate the two computational processes partly because of intrinsic 
experimental limitations, and partly and most importantly because the separation 
of computational processes is the wrong approach to the issue. If a structure like 
nonadjacent dependencies given very similar and comparable training material 
has been shown to be learned in some but not in other conditions, then the core 
issue is not whether it is instantiated in terms of algebraic or statistical 
computations, but what makes it learnable and not learnable in different 
conditions. In addition, are there structures that cannot be learned because of 
their complexity? Gomez has proposed that learners may attend to different 
sources of information and prefer the most statistically reliable source in order to 
reduce uncertainty. Specifically, whether the cognitive system focuses on 
bigrams, trigrams, or long-distance dependencies is largely driven by the 
statistical landscape. As attested by the U-shape found in chapter 2, the fact that 
learners fail in certain conditions, e. g. low variability of intervening items, does 
not entail that learners are unable to learn in other conditions. 
My results are a salutary reminder that ALL experiments need careful 
experimental control, and my results point towards phonological preferences 
being of profound importance in the construction of such controls. The fact that 
the stimuli used are "artificial" does not mean that the building features they are 
" If computations are independent of nonadjacent dependencies, then participants ought to segment within 
words rather than between words. We did not find preference for part-words over words when phoneme 
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composed of (in this case the phonetic features of syllables) are completely new 
to learners. Randomization of syllables in different positions across subjects 
should thus be adopted in further studies to ensure sound experimental practice 
even when the stimuli appear to be either perceptually or conceptually artificial. 
My work is reminiscent of the debate between Johnstone and Shanks 
(1999) and Meulemans and Van der Linden (1997). The latter presented evidence 
for the same separation invoked by Pena et al. between a mechanism based on 
knowledge of chunks of letters in the training strings and the other based on 
algebraic rules. They constructed a measure of chunk strength for their stimuli, 
creating four groups of string items: grammatical and associated (GA), 
nongrammatical and associated (NGA), grammatical and nonassociated (GNA), 
and nongrammatical and nonassociated (NGNA). Associated test strings 
contained bigrams and trigrams that occurred significantly more frequently than 
in nonassociated strings, as measured by the associative chunk strength metric. 
When participants were exposed to few items at training (their Experiments 1A 
and 2A) they classified associated test items more often as grammatical than 
nonassociated ones. Conversely, when most of the grammatical items were 
presented in the learning phase, Meulemans and Van der Linden claimed that 
only an effect of rule abstraction was observed. In reappraising these 
conclusions, Johnstone and Shanks (1999) argued that not only were learners 
sensitive to chunk frequency, but they also gained information during training 
about the legal locations of chunks within training strings. They demonstrated 
that participants classified test strings as ungrammatical not because they 
violated the rules of the grammar but because they contained chunks in novel 
locations with respect to training strings. For instance, the training set contained 
preference was controlled for, due perhaps to the small J rences in transitional probability. 
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the trigram VXR occurring 10 times in only 2 of the 5 possible locations 
(MXRMVXR, MVXR, MVXRVVV, MVXRMXT, MVXRMXR, MVXRVMT, 
MVXRVV, MVXRV, MVXRM, and MVXRVVM), string length spanning from 
three to nine letters. It turned out that the same chunk appeared in a new 
position, namely as fourth trigram in four out of eight nongrammatical test 
strings (MXRVXRM, MXRVXRV, VMRVXRM, VMRVXRV). This chunk 
positional information coupled with chunk frequency could account for the 
highest proportion of the variance in multiple regression tests, thus explaining 
away an effect of grammaticality due to abstraction of the rules of the grammar. 
In general, distinguishing empirically between algebraic rules and other 
forms of knowledge in ALL paradigms remains an elusive problem. In the first 
place this is because the exact nature of rule-based knowledge has been left 
rather vague, despite strenuous argumentations have been put forward for rule- 
based learning (see for instance the discussion between Marcus & Berent, 2003 
and Seidenberg, MacDonald, & Saffran, 2003). The fact is that rules are invoked 
whenever some structure does not seem to be learnable from other sources of 
information. The idea of algebraic rule entails the formation of a higher-level 
abstract mental representation that describes the states (nodes) of the finite-state 
grammar that generated the stimuli. Generalization tasks are often taken as a test- 
bed for algebraic computation because they require abstraction to novel stimuli. 
Such abstraction can in fact be couched both in algebraic terms and in statistical 
terms. For instance, Marcus et al. (1999) exposed seven-month-old infants to 
seamless speech strings containing one of two word patterns, ABA (de-li-de and 
wi-di-wi) or ABB (wi-di-di and de-li-li). While training and test strings contained 
the same pattern, test strings were instantiated with new words (ba-po-ba or ba- 
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po-po). Using a preferential-looking procedure, infants showed familiarity for 
strings belonging to the training pattern but not for strings with a different 
pattern, despite the change in the strings' surface form. 
Marcus and colleagues interpreted these powerful abstraction abilities as 
incontrovertible evidence for the existence of algebraic computation. However, 
abstraction at test could be based on recognizing the perceptual similarity of the 
physical stimuli, for instance noting that instances of the pattern ABB contain two 
physically identical items. Brooks and Vokey (1991) argued that repetition 
patterns could be a sufficient indication of the goodness of a test item: in this 
respect MXVV could be a good match for HJLL without appeal to algebraic 
rules. In fact, Gomez et al. (2000) found abstraction beyond specific word order 
only for grammars that contained repeating elements. This result is suggestive of 
potentially different levels of abstraction. Pattern-abstraction operates through 
comparison over physical stimuli. Conversely, acquiring linguistic 
representations such as Noun-Verb-Noun patterns (John loves Mary), requires a 
knowledge that is category-based, i. e. it involves generalizations that are abstract 
and perceptually unbound (John and Mary are orthogonal instantiations of the 
category Noun), as well as positionally unbound, at least partially (John and 
Mary can be swapped in the chain to obtain Mary loves John; see Gomez & 
Gerken, 2000). In addition, Christiansen, Conway, and Curtin (2000) 
successfully simulated the experiment by Marcus et al. using connectionist 
models that learn by simple associative mechanisms, illustrating the 
precariousness of separating algebraic from statistical computations. 
Redington and Chater (2002) have argued that evidence for abstraction, 
i. e. surface-independent knowledge, does not imply that knowledge is also rule- 
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based, as these concepts are orthogonal. All sources of information, including 
positional, and surface-based, can be instantiated in a symbolic rule. Indeed, my 
results could all be couched in symbolic terms. For instance, learners might have 
internalised the following rule, based on their acquired knowledge of the English 
lexicon: "A syllable that begins with the sounds /p/, /b/, or /t/ appears in a word 
in initial position". Even strings that were constructed without nonadjacent 
dependency structure could still be represented in the symbolic rule: "/pu/, /be/, 
and /ta/ appear in first position while /ki/, /ga/, and /du/ appear in last position". 
Indeed, this is exactly the instruction I wrote in the computer script that 
generated the stimuli for my experiment. 
Framing my results within the recent ALL literature, it appears that there 
is a cascade of potential cues that learners might pick up on in order to detect 
structure: conditional probabilities, nonadjacent dependencies, positional 
information, similarity with previously seen items, gaps between elements, etc. 
My experiments have contributed by elucidating the role of phonological 
sensitivity, a cue that so far has been underplayed in ALL studies but has been 
shown to have a potentially vast role in language acquisition (Cassidy & Kelly, 
1989,1991; Kelly, 1992; Monaghan, Chater, & Christiansen, submitted). In my 
view casting the study of human learning in terms of rules versus statistics may 
be an ill-posited research program far less central to understanding the human 
mind than, for instance a) investigating the training and test conditions in which 
learning takes place, and verifying whether learning transfers across modalities; 
b) determining whether infants and adults learn the same structures in 
comparable conditions; or c) in the face of multiple cues, determining whether 
learners integrate them, discard the less reliable ones, or choose one in a winner- 
138 
Chapter 6 
takes-it-all fashion (see, e. g., Saffran, Newport, & Aslin, 1996). Overall, there is 
wide and growing evidence that language phenomena are probabilistic in nature 
at all levels of analysis, and what needs to be tackled theoretically is how to 
capture this probabilistic nature (Bod et al., 2003). 
The remarkable finding from my studies is that, even when there is no 
statistical structure in the language, participants demonstrate a stable preference 
for certain speech sounds occurring in given positions. And the addition of short 
gaps between words affords salience of any initial syllable as a reliable word 
initial candidate. Phonological preferences impact both segmentation and 
generalization tasks in ALL, and, in the series of experiments presented here, 
obscure any statistical or algebraic computations on the speech signal that might 
take place. The surprising conclusion from Pena et al. (2002) that statistical and 
algebraic processes are distinct in language learning proves to be premature. 
139 
Chapter 6 
0.33 0.33 
AX B2 
1.0 
0.33 0.33 
A3 X3 B3... 
1.0 
0.33 0.33 0.5 0.33 0.33 0.5 0.33 0.33 
Ilk 
... Aý X B1 AX B2 A3 
X3 B3... 
1.1.1.0 
0.5 0.5 
Figure 22. Comparison between a traditional ALL task (above) and the segmentation task used by 
Pena et al. (below). 
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Figure 23. Comparison between the ALL task used by Götnez (2002) with large variability of 
middle items (above) and a hypothetical mirror segmentation task (below), where low- 
transitional probabilities between the As and the Xs would lead to wrong segmentation. 
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Figure 24. Comparison between the ALL task used In chapter 2 with no variability of middle 
items (above) and a hypothetical mirror segmentation task (below), where unwanted nonadjacent 
dependencies between the Xs and the As having relatively high conditional probabilities would 
lead to an impossible task 
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Recovery from overgeneralizations in language acquisition 
Natural languages are most often characterized as a combination of rule-based 
generalization and lexical idiosyncrasy. The English past tense is a familiar case, 
in which the irregular form went replaces the expected +ed construction *goed. 
Baker (1979) notes that this is a relatively benign example for learners, since 
irregular forms are frequently encountered in the course of their linguistic 
experience. The experience of the form went may block *goed, if the learner 
assumes that verbs typically have a single past tense form - thus, an observed 
alternative form can serve as evidence that an absent regular form is not allowed 
in the language (e. g. the Competition model, MacWhinney, 1989). Much more 
troubling are cases where an apparently legal construction is idiosyncratically 
absent, without any alternative. The dative shift in English is a well-documented 
example: 
(1) John gave/donated a book to the library 
(2) John gave/*donated the library a book 
In such cases we can think of linguistic rules as being quasi-regular: they license 
the combination and production of some members of syntactic categories, but not 
others. The difficulty of learning such idiosyncratic absences from partial input 
and without negative evidence (as is the case with natural language) has become 
notorious in the language acquisition literature. In particular, given that only a 
finite set of sentences is ever heard, out of the infinite set of possible sentences in 
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a natural language, it is clear that mere absence of a linguistic form cannot be 
directly used as evidence that the form is not allowed. Yet, such `holes' are clearly 
specific to particular natural languages, and hence cannot be explained by 
adversion to innate linguistic principles. This problem has been viewed as so 
severe that it has been labeled Baker's paradox; and viewed as raising logical 
problems for the theory of language acquisition (e. g., Baker & McCarthy, 1981)12. 
The approach I adopt here is to apply a general principle of learning to explain 
how linguistic idiosyncracies can be acquired. Note that the mechanism must be 
sufficiently flexible to capture the huge range of idiosyncrasies across a vast range 
of linguistic contexts. Moreover, the existence of such a mechanism is required, I 
contend, to explain the existence of idiosyncracies in language evolution: 
idiosyncrasies could not have emerged or survived in its absence, as they would 
have been winnowed out by learning failures by successive linguistic generations. 
In this respect, Baker's paradox raises a secondary paradox for language 
evolution, which is dealt with in the next chapter. The puzzle of how language 
acquisition processes can capture what appear to be idiosyncratic `holes' in the 
language also raises the puzzle of how difficult-to-acquire linguistic patterns 
emerge and are transmitted in the development of languages. Note that, on pain of 
circularity, whatever learning mechanisms are responsible for learning such 
12 Many writers have argued that the general problem of language acquisition inevitably necessitates innate 
language-learning modules: "no known 'general learning' mechanism can acquire a natural language solely 
on the basis of positive or negative evidence, and the prospects of finding any such domain-independent 
device seem rather dim" (Hauser et al., 2002: 1577. See also Chomsky, 1957; Pinker, 1989). Gold (1967) has 
shown that language identification in the limit is impossible for a broad class of formal languages. By 
contrast, Homing (1969) has shown that grammatical inference is in a probabilistic sense, for languages 
generated by stochastic context free grammars. More recently, Chater and Vitänyi (2001) have shown that 
such inference is possible for any computable language, including, a fortiori, any grammars involving context 
sensitivity and/or transformations, if the goal is (arbitrarily close) agreement between the learner's language 
with the target language. The method that underpins Chater and Vitänyi's theoretical result is practically 
implemented in the simulations described here - the learner seeks the simplest description of the corpus 
it has 
received. 
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idiosyncracies must pre-date the emergence of such idiosyncracies. That is, we 
cannot view the idiosyncratic nature of language as a stable environment to which 
biological basis for language acquisition adapted - because without relevant prior 
learning mechanisms already established, language could not have developed with 
such idiosyncracies in the first place. 
Having considered how a cognitive system might learn to detect structure 
and generalise from experience in previous chapters, in this chapter I consider the 
question of learning idiosyncracies by recovering from linguistic 
overregularisations. Firstly, I begin by outlining why they constitute such an 
apparently difficult learning problem. Secondly, I summarise a small number of 
putative mechanisms that have been put forward in the literature. Thirdly, I 
present a model that is able to learn quasi-regular structures in a rudimentary 
language from positive evidence alone, using a very general learning principle: 
simplicity. The model learns by creating competing hypothetical grammars to fit 
the language to which it has been exposed, and choosing the simplest. As an 
explicit metric for simplicity I use Minimum Description Length (MDL), a 
mathematical idea grounded in Kolmogorov complexity theory (Li & Vitänyi, 
1997). In acquiring quasi-regular language structures, this model specifically 
addresses the acquisition problem. 
Baker's Paradox and linguistic quasi-productivity 
A mainstay of linguistic analysis has been that human languages are composed of 
a limited number of basic units (features, segments, syllables, morphemes, words, 
phrases, clauses, etc. ) that can be combined by a small number of generative rules 
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to create larger units. Postulating the existence of recursive rules allows for an 
infinite number of sentences to be created. This generativity goes well beyond 
theoretical linguistic description, as it is typically taken to be embodied in the 
psychological mechanisms responsible for acquiring and representing linguistic 
rules and units. 
Although the capacity to generalize from a limited set of examples to 
novel instances is an uncontroversial aspect of the human cognition, a puzzle that 
has attracted linguists is that natural languages, although productive, are never 
fully regular. There appear to be finely-tuned lexical and syntactic selectional 
constraints that native speakers are aware of. Expected regular structures may 
either be replaced (e. g. went for *goed) or they may be disallowed completely. 
These semi-productive structures may be seen as a special case of irregularity 
where the irregular form is absent, i. e. there seems to be an unfilled slot that 
constrains open-ended productivity. Consider, for instance, a transformational rule 
such as to be Deletion (after Baker, 1979): 
(3)X-tobe-Y 
- X, 0, y 
(4) The baby seems/appears to be happy 
(5) The baby seems/appears happy 
(6) The baby seems to be sleeping 
(7) The baby happens to be sleepy 
(8) *The baby seems/appears sleeping 
(9) *The baby happens sleepy 
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On the basis of positive evidence positing the transformational rule in (3) is 
misleading with regard to the perfectly plausible but ungrammatical predictions 
that it gives about sentences (8) and (9). Such `unfilled slots' cannot be accounted 
for by the general rule. Similarly, consider the lexical constraints on the 
collocations between, for instance, adjective and noun below: 
(10) strong/ high/*stiff winds 
(11) strong /*high/*stiff currents 
(12) strong/*high/stiff breeze 
Quasi-productivities are ubiquitous in the lexicon and it has been proposed that 
they constitute a considerable portion of syntax as well (for a discussion of the 
vast range of syntactic idiosyncrasies including wh-movement and subjacency, 
see Culicover, 1999). In standard generative grammar these `syntactic nuts' have 
traditionally been disregarded as the `periphery' of the language system, where 
the `core' is a set of general fully regular principles requiring a minimum of 
stipulation. Most syntactic constructions, however, are subject to varying degrees 
of lexical idiosyncrasy. Consider another familiar example, the constraints on the 
Dative shift transformation: 
(13)NPI-V-NP2-toNP3 
4 NPI, V, NP;, NP2 (optional) 
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(14) We sent the book to George 
(15) We sent George the book 
(16) We reported the accident to the police 
(17) *We reported the police the accident 
Indeed, as Culicover (1999), and others within the general movement of 
construction grammar (Goldberg, 2003), have argued, such idiosyncracies may be 
so ubiquitous that the `periphery' of standard linguistic theory may encroach deep 
into the `core, ' of standard linguistic theory - so much so, indeed, that explanatory 
principles and learning mechanisms required to deal with the periphery might 
even deal with the core as a limiting case. 
To see why the presence of semi-productive regularities represent a 
particularly difficult learning problem, I now consider arguments concerning 
language learnability and the contribution of innate linguistic constraints. 
The logical problem of language acquisition 
At a general level, the so-called logical problem of language acquisition is that 
learning a language from experience alone is impossible because linguistic 
experience is too incomplete and contradictory. In the first place, a learner 
observes only a limited set of the infinite number of utterances in his/her 
language. From this, he/she must distinguish a certain set of `grammatical' 
utterances among all the other utterances that he has never heard and may never 
produce. The problem is particularly acute when considering the case of quasi- 
productivities, which yield Baker's Paradox (also known as the Projection 
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problem) after Baker (1979). Baker noted that quasi-productive regularities such 
as those above pose a genuine puzzle for any account of language acquisition. 
This is principally because the unfilled slots they create in the language occur 
within the space of allowable sentences and nonetheless are somehow blocked by 
language learners. A crucial tenet of the logical problem is that indirect negative 
evidence in the form of absence is not sufficient to constrain the learner's 
hypotheses about the correct grammar, because there are many linguistic 
sentences that a learner has never heard but are nonetheless grammatical (Pinker, 
1994). There are therefore many hypothesis grammars that would be consistent 
with the positive data available. It is suggested that such a hard learning problem 
necessitates the existence of powerful innate linguistic tools. Since the literature 
has polarised around the acquisition of verbs' argument structure, I focus on such 
examples throughout this and the next chapter. Before I dwell on the simplicity 
model, I summarise two popular accounts that start from different assumptions, 
the semantic bootstrapping model, and the construction grammar approach. 
Learning Argument Structure: semantic bootstrapping 
One proposal involving innate linguistic rules comes from Pinker (1984). Pinker 
has proposed the Semantic Bootstrapping Hypothesis to account for the 
acquisition of Verb Argument Structure, whose main point is that the productivity 
of lexical rules is governed by semantic criteria determining which verbs they can 
apply to. Pinker distinguishes 6 broad semantic classes of argument structure: 
Simple transitives 
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Datives (I will tell/*shout you the message) 
Locatives (I poured/*filled glass into the water, I filled the glass with water) 
Passives (*Amy is resembled by Sue) 
Resultatives (Betty wiped the table clean) 
Causatives (I broke the glass/the glass broke, I cut the bread/*the bread cut) 
Each broad semantic class is associated with characteristic semantic properties, or 
thematic cores. For instance, the transitive construction has the following 
semantics associated to it: 
X acts on Y 
The problem with learning is that within each broad class verbs behave 
differently. Some may take two different syntactic structures (these verbs are said 
to alternate), whereas others are restricted to only one of them. Let us take the 
dative alternation as an example. The dative alternation has two forms: 
1- the ditransitive form NPx-V-NPy-NPz (e. g. I sent Mary a package) 
2- the prepositional form NPx-V-NPz-to/for-NPy (I sent a package to Mary) 
where NPy represents the recipient or goal. Not all dative verbs alternate, and not 
all those that alternate do so in all contexts. Pinker distinguishes three narrower 
classes: 
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1) verbs that alternate (i. e. accept (a) and (b) above): give, bring, offer, send, 
build, promise, make, get, buy, take, throw, leave, forward, refer, allocate, 
guarantee, allot, award, grant, reserve. 
Within this subclass a semantic restriction applies. We do not say I sent the 
border a package. Pinker argues that the ditransitive and the prepositional forms 
have two underlying semantic representations, respectively: 
1- to cause Y to have X (double-object dative) 
2- to cause X to get to Y (prepositional dative) 
2) verbs that accept only the ditransitive form: ask, envy, bet, refuse, charge, 
forgive, spare, lend, teach, cost, deny, fine, tell, show. 
3) verbs that accept only the prepositional form: carry, supply, recommend, 
describe, stir, taste, demonstrate, choose, donate, explain, report, recite, construct, 
deliver, dictate, contribute, reply, present, design, shout. 
4) verbs that accept only the full prepositional form: credit, entrust, reward, 
present, honour (usually "with"). 
So for Pinker "membership in a broad conflation class is only a necessary 
condition for a verb to alternate" (p. 103). The meaning component added by an 
argument structure cannot in itself explain so-called negative exceptions such as 
the following: 
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(18) John took Mary the ball 
(19) *John carried Mary the ball 
What determines the alternation is the membership of each verb to a small set of 
narrow conflation classes, which are sensitive to subtle semantic distinctions. 
Crucially, the correct association between a verb's semantic structure and an 
argument structure is carried out via linking rules, which are innate. Children 
learn to avoid generalisations by learning more and more accurate meanings for 
more and more verbs. Once the child has correctly identified the verb's meaning 
generalisation errors should disappear. 
Several critiques have been levelled at Pinker, notably because his 
proposal does not seem to have empirical support. If narrow conflation classes are 
learnt lately by children, one would expect children to be overproductive earlier 
than 3-4 years of age (Bowerman, 1990). In addition, Slobin (1998) argues that 
innate rules are too general to constrain all languages across different forms over 
historical time. And there is much variation across languages as to what verbs take 
which argument structure. It seems that for Pinker language is a completely 
logical system and that the child only needs to discover progressively this system 
by application of innate linking rules. The exact functioning of such rules remains 
unclear and yields little explanatory power. Pinker discards a priori the existence 
of indirect negative evidence in the form of non-occurrence as being a surrogate 
for negative evidence. In his words, "there is always an infinity of sentences that 
[the child] hasn't heard that are grammatical" (page 14), so indirect negative 
evidence is simply a restatement of the learning problem. 
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Learning Argument Structure: Construction Grammar 
A different view on how children learn verbs' argument structure is provided by 
Goldberg (1995), who proposes a construction grammar approach. The semantics 
of argument structure cannot be associated completely to a specific verb because 
verbs usually appear in multiple argument structures. Also, many verbs share the 
same argument structure. At the same time, there appear to be regularities 
between form and meaning of an argument. So the construction, SUBJ-Verb - 
OBJ1 -OBJ2 carries the meaning of transfer. In Construction Grammar, C is a 
construction iff it is a pairing of form and function such that some aspect of the 
form or the function is not strictly predictable from the component parts of C. 
Constructional meaning in learning arises from so-called "light verbs" (do, make, 
take, go, give, put, find). These are highly frequent and learned early. In a first 
phase, AS is initially associated on an item-by-item basis. As vocabulary 
increases, abstract constructions emerge. This is in line with most work done by 
Tomasello and other researchers recently. AS emerges from being associated with 
light verbs. In the Semantic Bootstrapping Hypothesis (Pinker, 1989) meaning is 
predictable given a complete lexical specification of a verb's meaning and innate 
linking rule. Syntax is highly abstract, while it is the lexicon that contains all 
information. In Construction Grammar on the contrary, it is possible to have a 
generalisation such as She sneezed the foam off the cappuccino although the verb 
sneeze is intransitive. This is because the argument structure SUBJ-Verb-OBJ 
OBLlocative captures the meaning of caused motion. There is no need to have an 
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entry in the lexicon with a special transitive meaning for sneeze. For the 
inseparability of syntax and lexicon see also Bates & Goodman (1997). 
Other researchers have proposed that children learn argument structure by 
exploiting both semantic and syntactic cues (Gleitman, 1990). Allen (1997) 
developed a connectionist network that learned argument structure using both 
syntactic and semantic cues extracted from a sample of the CHILDES database. 
Learning Argument Structure from non-occurrence 
The paradox raised by Baker is that even postulating a Universal Grammar that 
restricts the search space for potential grammars does not solve this particular 
problem, since unfilled slots are highly idiosyncratic across languages. I contend 
that because these constructions cannot be derived from universal principles, they 
must be determined by the learner on the basis of exposure to the language, thus 
providing a solution to Baker's paradox. Although semantic knowledge may help 
the learner, this apparently intractable computational problem will not disappear 
in the face of simple appeal to semantics. For instance, we have seen that 
transitive and intransitive verbs may be distinguished by virtue of the fact that 
transitive verbs refer to sequences involving both agents and patients, whilst 
intransitives involve only agents: 
(20) John broke the cup 
(21) The cup broke 
(22) John kissed Mary 
(23) *Mary kissed 
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However, Bowerman (1996) has noted that it can be misleading to predict 
syntactic behaviour from semantics, for instance donate and give in examples (1) 
and (2) have similar semantics but donate does not allow for dative shift. It is 
worth noting that younger speakers of English will often fail to judge the phrase 
John donated the library a book as ungrammatical. This may be an example of 
regularization, but this does not weaken the argument. Consider also: 
(24) John waved Mary goodbye 
(25) John waved goodbye to Mary 
(26) *John said Mary hallo 
(27) John said hallo to Mary 
or, again from Baker: 
(28) It is likely that John will come 
(29) It is possible that John will come 
(30) John is likely to come 
(31) *John is possible to come 
Hence, I argue that some degree of arbitrariness must be accounted for in quasi- 
regular constructions (see also Culicover, 1999, on the case for at least partial 
independence of syntax from semantics in the case of unfilled slots). If 
idiosyncrasy is to be found at the core of grammar and can neither be accounted 
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for by universal principles nor semantically determined completely, it must be 
learnable from experience, possibly from a distributional analysis of the input. 
Causative alternations in child-directed speech 
Suppose we have a language in which verbs belong to three distinct classes (VI, 
V2, V3). Each class is related to two syntactic contexts (Cl, C2). One class of 
verbs (VI) appears in both contexts. Two other classes of verbs (V2 and V3) occur 
in one context only. We can produce a simple table to visualize the alternation: 
cl C2 
vl 1 1 
V2 0 1 
V3 1 0 
Table 7. Alternating and non-alternating verbs across contexts. 
The causative alternation in English is of this kind. Verbs like break behave both 
transitively (I broke the vase) and intransitively (The vase broke), whereas verbs 
like disappear behave only intransitively (The rabbit disappeared is allowed; but 
*I disappeared the rabbit is not) and verbs like cut are found only in transitive 
contexts (*The bread cuts is not allowed). An analysis of CHILDES revealed that 
verbs in child-directed speech fit the pattern of the above idealization: a number of 
verbs are exclusively transitive or intransitive (see Table 8). 
Children eventually generalize the structures of the language they are 
exposed to. A typical generalization occurs when children say Don't you fall me 
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down (Bowerman, 1982; Lord, 1979). This is an overgeneralized use of a non- 
causative verb as causative. In the causative construction, some verbs like break 
can be used both transitively with a semantic element of cause (I broke the vase) 
and intransitively (the vase broke). Verbs like break alternate between two 
constructions. However, fall can only be used intransitively, and hear only 
transitively. The acquisition of verbs' argument structure seems particularly 
complicated as the way verbs behave syntactically is largely arbitrary. 
Semantically similar verbs like say and tell, or give and donate allow for different 
constructions. 
Bowerman (1982) and Lord (1979) recorded a total of 100 different cases 
in which two-argument verbs are used with three arguments (e. g. You can drink 
me the milk). The developmental literature suggests that when children acquire a 
new verb they use it productively in both constructions, without specific 
directional bias (Lord, 1979). It is also worth noting that alternations can be 
theoretically distinguished from other forms of irregularization like the irregular 
past tense. In the case of goed-went for example, recovery from the 
overgeneralized form *goed can be accounted for by directly invoking a 
competition strategy (MacWhinney, 1987): as the number of went in the input 
increases, it will win over the irregularised form goed, which has 0 frequency in 
the input. Alternations are interesting theoretically in that the competition model 
does not seem applicable for these. The overgeneralized form does not have an 
irregular alternative: there is simply a "hole" in the language. This argument was 
raised by Baker in his distinction between benign exceptions (like the past tense) 
and truly problematic alternations like the ones I consider here (Baker 1979). 
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For the purpose of showing how such problematic irregularities can be 
learnt using a simplicity principle, I take the causative alternation described above 
as a working example. I extracted verb frequencies from the CHILDES Database. 
CHILDES contains a total of nearly ten million words of child-directed speech. 
Because I am interested in showing that the input the child receives is rich enough 
for recovery of overgeneralization by induction, only the adult speech in the 
corpus was selected and analysed. 
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erb 
Transitiv 
occurrence 
Intransitiv 
occurrence 
bounce 7 11 
break 1251 26 
burn 8 6 
lose 85 5 
reeze 1 61 
row 5 33 
Category move 96 56 
Vi en 159 23 
0 10 15 
ri 13 9 
roll 40 16 
shake 14 2 
slide 6 5 12 
swin 3 9 
ear 16 2 
urn 269 60 
arrive 41 
come 1843 
dance 37 
Category die 141 
V2 disappe 
r 73, 
all 2945 
go 6519 
rise 1 
run 156 
sta y 141 
brin 302 
ut 131 
l drop 640 0 
Category kill 12 
V3 l ift 39 
ush 160 
put 2715 
r aise 25 
ake 972 
hrow 209 
Table 8. Verbs in child-directed speech occurring in transitive and intransitive contexts pooled 
from the CHILDES English sub-corpora (MacWhinney, 2000). 
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Simplicity and Language 
The simplicity principle (Chater, 1996) states that in choosing among potential 
models of finite data, there is a genera] tendency to seek simpler models over 
complex ones and optimize the trade-off between model complexity and 
accuracy of model's description (i. e. fit) to the training data. Complexity is thus 
defined as: 
C= C(model) + C(datalmodel) 
The favoured model of any finite set of data will be that which minimizes this 
term. 
In order to compare different grammars we need a measure of simplicity 
and a "common currency" for measuring both the model complexity and the 
error term complexity. Fortunately this is possible by viewing grammar induction 
as a means of encoding the linguistic input; the grammatical organization chosen 
(the "knowledge" of the language) is that which allows the simplest encoding of 
the input. A tradition within mathematics and computer science, Kolmogorov 
complexity, shows that the simplest encoding of an object can be identified with 
the shortest program that regenerates the object (Li & Vitanyi, 1997). 
Every sentence generated from a lexicon of n words may be coded into a 
binary sequence. The length of a message refers to a binary string description of 
the message in an arbitrary universal programming language. The binary string 
can be seen as a series of binary decisions needed to specify the message; smaller 
lengths correspond to simpler messages. The brevity of an input A; is associated 
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to its probability P(A; ) of occurrence. Shannon's (1948) noiseless coding 
theorem specifies that: 
Length=Logt[ 1/P(A; )] 
More probable events are therefore given shorter codes. Li & Vitanyi (1997) 
have shown that the length K(x) of the shortest program generating an object x is 
also related to its probability Q(x) by the following coding theorem: 
K(x)=1og2[ 1/Q(x)] 
Finally, the invariance theorem (Li & Vitanyi, 1997) assures that the shortest 
description of any object is invariant (up to a constant) between different 
universal languages, thus granting a measure of simplicity that is independent of 
the data and of the programming language used to encode the data. The above 
formalizations allow us to replace "Complexity" with "Length" and state that 
"the best theory to infer from a set of data is the one which minimizes the length 
of the theory and the length of the data when encoded using the theory as a 
predictor for the data" (Quinlan and Rivest, 1989; Rissanen, 1989). 
Modeling language learning with simplicity 
In any study of grammar induction, and in particular in the simplicity framework, 
it is crucial to see a grammar as a hypothesis about the data. The best hypothesis 
is the one that compresses the data maximally, so we can also think of a grammar 
as compression of the data. We can see the achievement of adult linguistic 
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competence as a process of building different hypotheses about the language in 
order to achieve optimum compression. The essence of compression is to provide 
a shorter encoding of the data, enabling generalizations and correct predictions. 
Alternations are particularly informative about the possibility of a cognitive 
system to capture dependencies from limited data. If linguistic structures were 
completely regular, then generalizing from a few data would be easy. But as 
alternations are quasi-regular, meaning there are exceptions to their regularity, a 
learner must capture fine dependencies in order to generalize whilst avoiding 
overgeneralizations. 
The issue is to choose the candidate model of the right complexity to 
describe the corpus data, as stated by the simplicity principle. We can compare 
different hypotheses (grammars) at different stages of learning and choose, for 
each stage, the one that minimizes the sum of the grammar-encoding-length and 
the data-encoding-length. In the following section I compare data compression of 
corpora by two similar models. The difference between them is that one posits a 
completely regular rule, whilst the other posits a regular rule and some 
exceptions to it. We can think of the second model as having `invested' in 
exceptions. Each exception initially produces less compression overall, since the 
exceptions cost some bits to specify. However, each exception shortens the code- 
length for each item in the corpus, and the second model thereby `recoups' its 
investment over time. 
The Models 
This approach to language acquisition does not focus on how learning occurs. 
Rather, these simulations run several models concurrently to show that the rate of 
increase of code-length differs between structures. This section describes the 
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structure of two hypotheses (grammars); the first gives rise to overgeneralization 
phenomena whilst the second does not. These were designed in conjunction with 
a very simple artificial language, which was subsequently used to test the 
models. A brief outline of the language is given here to facilitate the description 
of the model. A more detailed consideration of how the artificial language relates 
to data from corpora of child-directed speech is given below. 
The artificial language used consists of two syntactic categories. These 
can be thought of crudely as nouns and verbs. They can be combined to form 
two-word sentences. Sentences may be of the form NV or VN. Forms NN and VV 
are disallowed. In addition, a number of sentences are disallowed. Let us imagine 
that there are four nouns (n1-n4) and four verbs (v1-v4) in the language, and that 
v4 is blocked in the sentence final position. From this it follows that four 
sentences are disallowed: each of the four nouns in combination with v4 in an 
NV-type sentence. 
Each model is comprised of 4 elements: word-level categories, sentence- 
level categories, exceptions, and code-length. Both models described here 
contain two word-level categories, comprising nouns and verbs and two 
sentence-level categories comprising the two sentence types (NV and VN). The 
exceptions category discretely specified all the disallowed sentences. In the first 
model this was an empty set. The code-length specified length of code, in bits, 
that would be needed to specify models just described and the corpus data given 
the model structure. The code-length for each sentence in the corpus is 
consequent on the model structure. 
Calculating Code-Length for each element 
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The length of code necessary to specify any object, i, is given by: 
Bits(i)=Log2(1/p; ) [1] 
where p; is the probability of object i. In many cases described below, pi can be 
thought of as choosing one of I options. Where this is the case, 
Bits(i)=Log2I [2) 
This section describes how this formula is applied to calculate the code-length 
for each section of the model and for the data given the model. 
If a language contains r word types and n syntactic categories, then the 
probability of specifying one distribution of word types into categories is the 
inverse of the number of ways in which r word types can be distributed between 
n categories, assuming no empty sets. This is given by: 
Distributions(r, n)= (-1)° 
(n v)' 
-o (n-v)! v! [31 
The codelength for the word-level element is therefore: 
Word-level bits(r, n) 
"': L092 v=o inn v)! v! [4) 
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Specifying a particular sentence-level rule (e. g. that a sentence may be of the 
form NV) is a function of the probability of that sentence type given the number 
of categories specified in the word-level element. Given that in the artificial 
language sentences only ever contain two words, there are four sentence types 
possible from two syntactic categories (NN, NV, VN, M. The probability of any 
sentence type (e. g. NV) is therefore 1/4. When this has been specified, the 
probability any remaining sentence type (e. g. VN) is 1/3. The code-length for 
specifying two sentence types is therefore: 
Sentence-level bits=Log2(4)+Log2(3) [5] 
Specifying the cost of an exception is the same as specifying the cost of a 
sentence. This is done by specifying the cost, in bits, of the first word based on 
the probability of its occurrence, and the cost of the second word in the same 
way. The probability of a word's occurrence is the inverse of the total number of 
possible words. The term to specify the first word in any sentence is therefore: 
Bits(i1)=Log2(Tw-Tei) [6] 
where Bits(il) is the bits required to specify word i in the first position, TH, is the 
total number of word types in the language and Tel, is the total number of words 
blocked in the sentence initial position as listed in the exceptions category. 
The first word specifies which sentence type is being used. The pool of possible 
words from which the second word must come is therefore reduced to the size of 
the sentence final category as defined by the sentence type. For example, if the 
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first word in a sentence is a noun, the sentence type must be NV and the second 
word must therefore be from the category V. The term to specify the second 
word in a sentence is therefore: 
Bits(j2)=Log2 (T,, -Te211) [7) 
where Bit(j2) is the number of bits required to specify word j in the second 
position, TWA is the total number of word types in category c, and Te2t1 is the total 
number of words specified in the exceptions element as blocked in position two 
given the word in position 1. The number of bits for specifying any sentence i, j is 
simply: 
sentence bits; j=Bits(i1)+Bits(j2) [8] 
Specifying the code length for each exception is the same as specifying code 
length for a sentence given the existing exceptions. Each exception in a list of 
exceptions therefore requires slightly fewer bits to code than its predecessor. 
It is important to note that these models code corpus data in batch mode - the 
order in which sentences are coded is not taken into account. A more 
psychologically realistic (i. e. incremental) algorithm might make use of the fact 
that frequently occurring words have a higher probability of occurrence and 
therefore cost less to code. A refined and incremental model is presented in 
chapter 8 to account for the transmission of irregular languages over generations 
of simulated learners. 
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Simulating recovery from overgeneralization with an artificial 
language 
The models described above were implemented in a computer program. They 
were then exposed to successively large corpora of sentences from an artificial 
language, which reflected the structure of the transitive/intransitive alternation 
phenomena found in the CHILDES database (see Table 2, above). The artificial 
language is outlined above. In these simulations the word-level categories 
contained 36 verbs, reflecting the number of verbs in Table 2, and 36 nouns. It 
was decided to keep the number of nouns equal to the number of verbs in order 
to avoid disparity between the code-length necessary for different sentence types. 
There were two sentence-types (NV and VN) reflecting the transitive and 
intransitive contexts of the verb constructions. Ten verbs were blocked with all 
36 nouns for each sentence type (see Table 2), resulting in a total of 720 
disallowed sentences. 
Two of the four-element models described above were exposed to 
increasingly large corpora of this language. The first model contained word-level 
information about the 36 nouns and verbs, and sentence-level information about 
the NV and VN sentence types, but the exceptions element was empty: it did not 
contain any information about the 720 disallowed sentences. In this respect it 
was analogous to a learner who has acquired knowledge of word categories and 
sentence production rules, but has not learned that some sentences are illegal. 
This model would therefore be prone to overgeneralizations such as I 
disappeared the rabbit. The second model, by contrast, did contain information 
about the disallowed sentences. This model therefore required considerably more 
bits to specify initially, but the number of bits required to specify each sentence 
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of the corpus was fewer. In addition, a language learner who had learned these 
exceptions would not make the same overgeneralization errors that the first 
model would. Table 9 shows the relative simplicity of each model for 
increasingly large corpora as measured by the number of bits necessary to encode 
the model and the corpus data. 
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orpus Siz 
(sentences) 
odel 
odelength 
(bytes) 
1: odel 2: 
odelength 
(bytes) 
r-I 7.6 
000 5.4 51.1 
8000 0.8 4.7 
12000 136.2 138.3 
16000 181.5 181.8 
20000 226.9 225.4 
24000 272.2 268.9 
Table 9. Code-lengths of Models 1 and 2 for successively large corpora. Code-lengths in bold 
show the shorter codes for the corpus size. 
It can be seen that for relatively small corpora (up to about 16,000 sentences), 
Model I gives a simpler encoding: less bits are required. For a learner who had 
heard relatively few alternation constructions, therefore, the tendency would be 
to code the data in these terms, resulting in overgeneralizations. For a more 
experienced learner, however, the simpler encoding would be that shown by 
Model 2, which requires fewer bits to encode relatively large corpora. 
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Conclusions and future directions 
These results provide an initial confirmation that simplicity may provide a 
guiding principle by which some aspects of language may be learned from 
experience without recourse to a specific language-learning device. However, the 
simulations presented here are coarse-grained approximations of both the 
language and the language learner. Children do not process the language in 
batches of several thousand utterances. The models presented here were neither 
exposed nor sensitive to different word-type frequencies. A number of further 
studies which would provide considerably firmer support for the simplicity 
principle as a driving force for language acquisition suggest themselves. 
Firstly, mathematical results show that word-type frequencies are 
important to the simplicity-driven learner, in that they may be the key as to when 
it becomes advantageous to posit exceptions to rules. Chater and Vitänyi (2001) 
show that languages are approximately learnable given sufficiently large 
amounts of data. The CHILDES data in Table 2 therefore provides an indication 
of the order in which one would expect the learner to cease overgeneralizing 
words. An examination of children's speech that confirmed this order would be a 
major step towards providing robust support for the simplicity principle in 
language. Secondly, it would be useful to compare the timescale of recovery 
from overgeneralization in children with that of the model. This could be done by 
an examination of CHILDES database to determine an approximate relation 
between a child's age and the number of transitive/intransitive alternation 
constructions to which they have been exposed. It would then be possible to 
compare the learning rate of the child with that of the model. Again, this would 
be a useful source of evidence concerning the simplicity principle in language. 
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This chapter presented an alternative to Gold's idealization of the 
problem of language acquisition. It is suggested that there is sufficient statistical 
information in the input for a learner to learn quasi-regular alternating structures. 
These results are achieved by choosing the model of the language that provides 
the simplest (shortest) description of the linguistic data that has been 
encountered. These results re-open the question of the viability of language 
learning from positive evidence under less than ideal conditions, with limited 
computational resources and amounts of linguistic data available. They therefore 
also bear, indirectly, on the arguments concerning the balance between nativism 
and empiricism in language acquisition. More concretely, I suggest that the 
working hypothesis that the search for simplicity is a guiding principle in 
language acquisition deserves serious attention. 
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Acquisition and Evolution of quasi-regular languages: Two 
puzzles for the price of one 
The logical problem of language acquisition discussed in the previous chapter can 
be seen as the starting argument for raising a paradox about the evolution of 
natural languages: Firstly, if quasi-regular structures in languages are such hard 
cases for the learner, why are they so pervasive in contemporary natural 
languages? More specifically, why do not we see the emergence over time of 
simpler, more easily learnable languages? Secondly, the speculation that 
irregularities should tend to be replaced by regular forms over time leads 
immediately to a second puzzle: how did such language become quasi-regular in 
the first place? 
This chapter falls into 3 main sections. Having discussed the ubiquity of 
quasi-regular constructions in the previous chapter I firstly discuss here the 
relationship between acquisition and evolution, in particular the idea that any hard 
learning problem of culturally transmitted information entails evolutionary 
puzzles. Secondly, I detail several simulations based on an Iterated Learning 
Model (ILM, e. g. Kirby, 2001) in which a probabilistically generated artificial 
language is transmitted over 1,000 generations of simplicity-based learners. The 
results of these simulations chart not only the stability but also the emergence of 
quasi-productivities in the language. In particular I show that: 
a) Exceptions are stable across successive generations of simplicity driven 
learners. 
b) Under certain conditions, statistical learning using simplicity can account for 
the emergence of quasi-productivity in a language. 
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In the final section I discuss the results of the ILM simulations, in particular the 
conditions in which quasi-regular structures might emerge. 
The logical problem of language evolution 
In this chapter I consider two questions for language evolution raised by the 
existence of idiosyncrasies. The first is a problem of transmission: what kind of 
learning mechanism could ensure the stability of idiosyncratic absences across 
generations and be sufficiently flexible and general to pre-date their emergence? 
The second is one of emergence: even assuming that such a mechanism exists, 
what conditions might give rise to these irregularities? 
Simplicity-Based Language Learning: The Learner as Gambler 
Chapter 7 showed that a batch learner - i. e., a learner that runs all calculations, 
after the entire corpus has been encountered - employing this strategy is able to 
distinguish genuine constructions from blocked ones as a result of exposure to 
data from the CHILDES database of child directed speech (MacWhinney, 2000). 
Here, I implement an online version that is able to postulate exceptions and create 
new hypotheses during the course of exposure to a rudimentary toy language. 
Algorithmic details are given in Appendix A; the following two sections describe 
the toy language and the learner's ability to discover exceptions in it. 
The simplicity principle, outlined above, demonstrates how the simplest 
model of experience can be thought of as that represented by the shortest binary 
code. In this instance the binary code must represent two things: firstly a 
hypothesis, or grammar, that describes the language to which the learner is 
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exposed. Secondly, all the language that has been heard must be represented 
under the hypothesis. This may be expressed formally: 
C= C(H) + C(DIH) [2] 
Where C is the total length of code (in bits), C(H) is the number of bits necessary 
to specify the hypothesis (grammar) and C(DIH) is the number of bits necessary to 
specify the data (all the language heard) given the hypothesis. The length of code 
necessary to represent data will differ between hypotheses. 
My model of the learner does not acquire vocabulary or induce categories 
and rules from scratch. I take productive rules to be already learned. Thus my 
model is already at the stage at which children make over-general errors. The task 
is to spot which of the constructions allowable under the rule are in fact blocked--- 
to find the holes in the language. Learning proceeds by a series of "gambles. " The 
learner bets that a particular construction is not allowed and that it will therefore 
never be encountered. In making this gamble it must specify the construction as 
part of a new hypothesis, H. Coding this specification requires some bits of 
information, so the complexity of the new hypothesis increases. However, the 
learner has reduced the number of allowable constructions that it can expect to 
encounter. It has therefore increased the probability of those remaining. The 
number of bits required to specify future data under the new hypothesis is 
therefore reduced. Thus, if it is true that the construction is not allowed, the 
learner will gradually win back the number of bits that it gambled in specifying 
the exception. As more language is heard the new hypothesis will eventually 
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come to be associated with a shorter codelength than the original. If the gamble is 
inappropriate, however, the learner will encounter a construction that it has 
wrongly presumed to be disallowed. This is associated with a probability of 0, and 
hence an infinite code-length, so the `gamble' is abandoned. my model generates 
a new hypothesis every time it gambles on a particular construction, with all 
hypotheses running in parallel. The preferred hypothesis is always that associated 
with the shortest codelength. 
Learning a rudimentary language 
A toy language was used to simplify the simulation. It was comprised of two 
syntactic categories, A and B, and two production rules, S, and S2. The categories 
A and B each contained four words. The language also contained an exception 
element, specifying sentences that were producible under the re-write rules but 
were disallowed. Each sentence contained only two words, AB or BA. The 
language may be expressed formally as in [3]: 
SJ->AB, 
S2->BA, 
A->IaI, a2, a3, a41, 
B->(bl, b2, b_?, b4), 
*->[(a2), (azb2), (a2b3), (azb4), (bjaj), (b2a1), (b3ai), (b4aj)i [31 
where the examples generated by * are blocked. This language can mimic the 
pattern of alternations, for example transitive and intransitive verb constructions. 
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In English, verbs can nominally occur in either a transitive or an intransitive 
context, but some are blocked from occurring in one or the other. This is 
analogous to the patterns in my toy language, where items in either category may 
in principle occur in either the first position, but can be blocked from doing so by 
entries in the exceptions element. This is illustrated in Figure 25. 
ransitive ntransitive 
ut (Icut the cake) *I cut 
*I fell the bicycle all (I fell) 
break (I broke the cup) reak (The windo 
roke) 
B A 
al B *Bai 
*a2B Bat 
a3B, a4B Ba3, Ba4 
Figure 25. The structure of the toy language mimics that of Baker's Paradox for alternations. a, 
and a2 could be blocked from occurring in BA and AB constructions respectively by entries in the 
exceptions element such as a2b1, a2b2 or b1ai, b2ai etc. For the first generation agent in each 
simulation, however, all As occurred in both contexts (that is, they were 'alternating'). `Cut', 
'fall', and 'break' are examples of alternating and non-alternating verbs. Levin (1993) provides an 
extensive list of alternations in English. 
Samples of the language were produced by a parent agent and experienced by a 
learner agent. I assume that parents and learners share knowledge of word 
frequency. This allows both to associate each word with a probability of 
occurrence. Sentence probabilities are taken to be the product of two probabilities: 
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that of the first word and that of the second word, given the first. Parent agents use 
these probabilities to produce samples of the language stochastically. Learners use 
them to calculate codelengths (in bits) for different hypotheses. I assume that 
word frequencies are distributed according to Zipf's law (Zipf, 1948), an 
ubiquitous power law distribution in natural language (Bell, Cleary & Witten, 
1990): If we rank words in terms of frequency, then frequency of any word is the 
inverse of its rank. Details are given in Appendix A. 
Learner agents begin with a single, completely regular hypothesis about 
the language i. e., all sentences are allowed. This is equivalent to [3] with the 
exceptions element empty. As they experience samples of the language, the 
learner agents compare the probability of each sentence with the total number of 
sentences they have heard. A new hypothesis is generated if the total exceeds a 
threshold (where the threshold is a function of sentence probability; thus the 
threshold is different for each sentence). Each new hypothesis is simply a clone of 
the most recent hypothesis to be generated (or the original, if it is the first) with 
the addition of the sentence in question to the exceptions element. This addition 
entails an increment in the codelength associated with the new hypothesis, and a 
re-scaling of the probabilities for the remaining sentences. 
Each sentence encountered entails an increment in the number of bits 
associated with each hypothesis, but since the creation of a new hypothesis 
involves rescaling sentence probabilities, this increment differs between 
hypotheses. All algorithmic details are given in Appendix A. Figure 26 illustrates 
the codelengths associated with all the hypotheses entertained by a learner agent 
after exposure to 50 sentences of a language containing 11 exceptions. 
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Figure 26. The codeleneth (number of bits) associated with each hypothesis grammar entertained 
by a learner after exposure to 50 sentences of a language containing I1 exceptions. The shortest 
codelength is obtained by the 12`x' hypothesis, i. e. the one containing 11 exceptions. (the first 
contains none, being completely regular). Although it is not obvious from the figure, the 12`x' 
hypothesis specifies exactly the II exceptions contained in the language. 
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Figure 26 illustrates that the learner agent creates many hypotheses, but 
that the shortest codelength is associated with the one that matches the language 
to which it was exposed. It is important to note that the sentence comprised of the 
two least frequent words was associated with a probability of approximately 
1/100. It was therefore highly unlikely that it would have occurred in a corpus of 
50 sentences. In addition, the learner received no feedback on its learning, other 
than more samples of the language. These conditions mirror to a modest extent 
the `poverty of the stimulus', according to which children never hear all the 
possible sentences of a language and do not typically receive explicit negative 
feedback. In addition, our language contains, of course, no semantics and has no 
communicative function: I do not attempt to model the relationship between 
meanings-signals-referents nor try to give functional explanations of language 
change as in other models. In general, however, part of the fascination of the 
constructions investigated here is that their idiosyncrasy does not seem to be 
primarily semantically or functionally determined. 
In spite of these restrictions, the learner agent was nonetheless able to 
distinguish between admissible and inadmissible sentences which it had not heard. 
It is also worth noting that this mechanism need not be restricted to spotting the 
idiosyncratic absence of single sentences: the same process could equally well be 
used to recover from overgeneral errors made as a consequence of (for example) 
semantic contexts. To see why this is so, it is helpful to consider how the 
sentences allowable under a grammar such as [3] can be represented in a 
contingency table: 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
2 
3 
b4 
al a2 a3 as b, bz b3 b4 
Table 10. Sentences allowable under [3]. Rows are first words, columns are second words. The re- 
write rules license half the sentences in this table; blocked sentences are denoted *. The learner 
was able to discover exceptions to the rules such as a2 appearing in first position or a, appearing in 
second position. 
It is suggested here that a simplicity-based learning mechanism such as that 
outlined above is sufficiently powerful and general to offer a solution to the first 
of the evolutionary questions I posed, namely the transmission problem - i. e. once 
quasi-regularity is established, a learner can, in principle at least, learn this quasi- 
regularity, avoiding overgeneralization by using the simplicity principle. I now 
place the single learner in the context of an Iterated Learning Model (ILM) to 
consider the second question: conditions for the emergence of such idiosycrasies. 
Language Learning over Generations - ILM simulations 
Although developed independently, my model proposes an MDL learner 
embedded within an Iterated Learning Model (ILM), which has been used 
extensively by Kirby and colleagues, and others (e. g. Kirby, 2001, Brighton, 
2002; Teal & Taylor, 2000; Zuidema, 2003). In the ILM, parent agents generate 
language for children agents, who in turn, become parents for the next generation 
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of learners. A simplifying assumption is that there is one agent per generation, so 
issues of population dynamics are neglected. All agents were "genetically" 
homogeneous, i. e. all were equipped with identical learning facility and started 
from the same point in their development. The first generation agent was exposed 
to probabilistically generated samples of the completely regular toy language used 
in the single-learner simulation. Subsequent agents were exposed to 
probabilistically generated samples of the language as learned by the preceding 
generation. Although complete regularity at the outset is probably unrealistic, my 
intent is not so much to replicate an historic development of languages as to test 
the conditions for the emergence and stability of irregularities. I test this in the 
least favourable condition for their emergence, i. e. an ideal fully regular language. 
The mean number of sentences heard by each agent was the same within each 
simulation, but varied between simulations. In different simulations, successive 
generations of learners heard between 25 and 65 sentences. Again, it was unlikely 
that any agent was exposed to all the sentences in the language, and agents 
received no negative feedback on their learning. When an agent had been exposed 
to the required number of sentences, one hypothesis entertained by that agent was 
selected. This hypothesis was then used as the basis for generating the sentences 
that would be heard by the succeeding generation. The hypothesis chosen was 
always that associated with the simplest interpretation, i. e., that with the shortest 
code length. 
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Results 
Figure 27 charts the emergence and stability of exceptions in four simulations. 
The number of sentences heard by each generation was critical to both. Where 
each generation heard a short corpus (mean number of sentences, n, of 30, Fig. 
27(a)), exceptions frequently emerged but were highly unstable: they rarely 
remained in the language for more than a few generations. With a long corpus 
(mean n=60, Fig. 27(d)) exceptions were less likely to emerge; in contrast to Figs 
27(a) - 27(c) no exceptions emerged for almost 400 generations. However, once 
they had emerged they were much less likely to be lost from the language than 
with shorter corpora. 
Figure 27 suggests that exceptions are posited during the early stages of 
language acquisition. With a relatively small amount of data, learners may 
postulate that the language contains many exceptions that do not in fact exist. As 
more data becomes available, such early hypotheses are either confirmed or 
exposed as spurious. These simulations suggest a trade off between emergence 
and stability of exceptions. The crucial factor mediating this trade off is the 
amount of language heard by each generation. If each generation hears a great 
deal of data, exceptions are unlikely to emerge: any that are posited will later be 
shown to be false. However, if exceptions are to be stable, each generation must 
hear enough language to learn the exceptions that existed in the previous 
generation. 
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Figure 27. The number of exceptions contained in the language transmitted by each learner to the 
subsequent generation in four simulations with differing corpus sizes. Where the number of 
exceptions was stable across several generations, for example seven exceptions in c) or the final 
600 generations of d), the sentences specified as exceptions were the same for each generation. It 
is important to note the difference in scale for number of exceptions for a), b), c) and d). 
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Discussion and conclusion 
In this chapter and in Chapter 7I started by noting that most phenomena in 
natural languages seem to be of a quasi-regular nature, which traditionally poses 
a learnability problem. Baker's paradox arises whenever the child has to recover 
from perfectly plausible and attested overgeneralisations such as (Fisher, 1976): 
*I gave my mummy it 
without the aid of direct negative evidence. Because a putative Universal 
Grammar can only capture general syntactic behaviours, it looks like most 
syntactic constructions have to be learned from experience. I contended that if 
the acquisition of such idiosyncrasies is hard, then their transmission over 
generations of speakers should be `filtered out' over time to improve learnability 
and communication. I subsequently presented a computational simulation where 
such hard cases are in fact successfully learned and transmitted from positive 
evidence. My solution to the learning problem is that a learning bias toward 
simplicity of representation makes language learnable from experience. This bias 
need not be specific to language -indeed simplicity principles have been used in 
the context of linguistic (Brent & Cartwright, 1997; Goldsmith, 2001 Wolff, 
1982) and non-linguistic contexts (e. g., perception, Hochberg & McAlister, 
1953; van der Helm & Leeuwenberg, 1996; categorization, Pothos & Chater, 
2002), and have even been viewed as general frameworks for cognition (e. g., 
Chater, 1999; Wolff, 1991). In my model there is no a priori `correct' grammar, 
i. e. a grammar that is valid prior to linguistic experience. The development of the 
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final-state grammar corresponding to adult linguistic competence is a matter of 
choosing the simplest competing grammar. 
The quest for simplicity is hardly a new idea and appears, for instance, in 
the early works of Chomsky (1955; 1965: 25): under the notion of markedness 
the grammar being constructed directly reflects the linguistic input. If the input 
contains information that points to a certain complex grammatical relation, the 
learner will acquire it, but if the input lacks such information, the principles that 
govern generalization will prevent the learner from constructing the more 
complex grammar. The markedness approach was abandoned in generative 
linguistics, in part because of the lack of a metric for establishing the simplicity 
of grammars, and partially for the rise of the `poverty of the stimulus argument' 
whereby linguistic experience seems hopelessly unreliable. Such caveats are 
dealt with in this chapter: firstly, the MDL approach provides a quantitative 
metric for simplicity; secondly, the poverty of the stimulus instantiated in the 
transmission bottleneck seems a necessary precondition for the emergence of 
exceptions rather than a hindrance to language evolution. There is a critical size 
for the bottleneck: too little or too much exposure to the language fails to yield 
stable patterns of quasi-productivity 13. 
Another defining feature of the simulations described in this chapter is 
that they rely on word frequencies to assign probabilities to sentences. I have also 
assumed that the distribution of word frequencies follows Zipf's law (Zipf, 
1948). These assumptions merit some discussion. There are two important 
reasons for applying a power law distribution to word frequency: firstly, it has 
13 Brighton (2002) and Kirby (2001) found that both compositional ity and irregularity emerge thanks to the 
bottleneck. Interestingly, I seem to have modelled the reverse timecourse of Brighton's simulations, which 
start with a non-compositional language to attain compositionality. The converging end-point is, however, a 
stable state of quasi-regularity modulated by the bottleneck. 
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been shown in the past to have important implications for the emergence of 
irregularities in ILM simulations of language evolution (e. g. Kirby, 2001), and 
secondly, such frequency distributions are ubiquitous in natural language. 
Kirby (2001) has shown that benign irregularities14 will spontaneously 
emerge in compositional language structure if frequency distributions follow 
Zipf's law. When this is the case, the very frequent phrases at the `head' of the 
distribution are shortened to irregular forms, resulting in selection under a similar 
MDL metric as that described here. This phenomenon does not appear to occur 
when frequencies do not follow a power law. We can see the impact of Zipf's 
law on the simulations by considering the likely results if word frequencies had 
been evenly distributed (i. e. if all sentences had been assigned equal probability). 
In such a case, the threshold number of sentences for learning a particular 
exception would have been the same for every sentence. Thus the learner would 
either encounter enough sentences to learn all the exceptions at once, or would 
not learn any exceptions at all. Any sentences not encountered before the 
threshold was reached would be posited as exceptions. It is not impossible that 
exceptions would emerge and survive under such conditions, but it seems 
unlikely that we would see the patterns of emergence and stability outlined 
above. 
In following Zipf's law, the frequency distribution of words in my toy 
language mirrors that found in natural languages: word frequencies in natural 
language text and corpora follow such distributions quite precisely, as do a 
14 whereas I investigate the case of accidentally unfilled slots in syntactic paradigms, Kirby models the case 
of slots filled by irregular forms, e. g. the emergence and replacement of went for *goed. Baker called these 
`benign' exceptions vis-a-vis the learnability paradox: recovery from overgeneralisation of *goed can be 
safely arrived at by positive evidence, as the correct alternative went is present in the input. In addition, Kirby models meaning, and the pressure to invent random forms for meanings for which no rule exists is 
what gives rise to the irregularities in the first place. Because I purposely modeled the emergence of quasi- 
productivities without a meaning space, comparisons with Kirby's work can only be indirect. 
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number of other natural language statistics (Bell et al., 1990). The assumption 
that the probability of a given sentence is perceived as a function of word 
frequencies is more controversial. It seems highly unlikely that this would be 
exclusively the case in natural language; I would be surprised if factors such as 
semantics and phonology did not play a role. However, no factors other than the 
frequency and collation statistics were available in the language. I contend that it 
is a plausible assumption that these factors also play a role in determining our 
perceptions of the probability of a particular sentence occurring. I speculate that 
in the absence of other factors they must determine them exclusively. 
Anecdotally, it seems that young speakers are losing the 
Germanic/Latinate distinction that allows Dative shift for give but not for donate. 
Hence *John donated the library a book is more likely to be accepted as 
grammatical in contemporary usage. However, *John said Mary hello is more 
recalcitrant to regularization, perhaps because donate is a low frequency verb 
whereas give has a high frequency. In the group of collaborators I work with we 
have ourselves found that our intuitions concerning `holes' in the language are 
surprisingly volatile - we find it hard to reject some of the ungrammatical 
examples we have used several times as examples in our discussions. The same 
`lifelong learning' phenomenon also affects linguists who feel that subjacency 
violations become weaker the more often they produce them (Culicover, 1995). 
This is consistent with my model. In addition syntactic constructions such as 
Dative shift may undergo local regularization while still preserving idiosyncratic 
behaviour in some other area (waved/say hallo, or send/report). More 
interestingly, my simulation results defy intuition in that a reverse trend from 
local regularity to idiosyncratic behaviour can also occur. 
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Although relatively stable, a given idiosyncrasy may die out quickly 
leaving the place to new ones or to a regularized form. Local structural 
reorganizations of syntactic paradigms (such as Dative shift for donate) can take 
place within a single generation. An implication of my model, not tested directly, 
is that linguistic diversity will emerge spontaneously in different spatially 
distributed linguistic communities, even in those that share a similar culture, as 
attested in different varieties of English in the English-speaking world. These 
considerations remain speculative as I have not attempted to model language 
change driven by social factors, language contact, multilingualism, or other 
factors. 
In this chapter I have shown that a potentially hard problem of language 
acquisition, that of quasi-regularity, gives rise to a paradox of language 
evolution. The acquisition problem may be solved by incorporating a learning 
bias towards simplicity. This solution goes some way towards resolving a related 
paradox in language evolution: given sufficient exposure to samples of language, 
quasi-regular structures are learnable, and hence stable over generations. In 
addition to this I have shown that under some conditions, quasi-regular structures 
may emerge in a language even if it were initially completely productive. 
However, I make no assumptions as to the origins of language in the human 
species. The starting point of a fully regular language should not be taken as an 
hypothesis about historical languages. It rather served the purpose of 
demonstrating that quasi-regular structures may emerge spontaneously, and 
hence constitute a natural stable equilibrium for languages across time. 
It is worth mentioning the striking analogy between natural languages and 
many complex systems in the natural world. The sciences of complexity have 
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recently started to note that most natural phenomena are truly complex, i. e. they 
occur at a transition point between two extremes, perfect regularity on the one 
side and pure randomness on the other (Flake, 2001). Perfect regularity is orderly 
and allows for high compressibility, whereas strictly irregular things are random 
and cannot be compressed because completely unpredictable (Gell-Mann, 1995). 
If syntactic constructions were completely idiosyncratic (irregular) they could 
only be learned by heart and no generalisation to novel instances would be 
possible. On the other side, the sort of innate constraints for acquisition 
postulated by a Universal Grammar and characterized in terms of maximally 
general and universal syntactic principles would lead all languages to develop 
perfectly compressible grammars, which is not the case for natural languages in 
the world. For example, a truly general transformational rule like Dative shift 
movement raises the projection problem noted by Baker, as it predicts that *We 
reported the police the accident is grammatical. Hence, it is ultimately contended 
that the very nature of irregular, idiosyncratic, and quasi-regular forms so widely 
spread and stable in natural languages suggests that they are arbitrary and 
unconstrained except by the requirement that they be computable, i. e. learnable 
(see also Culicover, 1999). A language learning mechanism must be capable of 
accommodating the irregular, the exceptional, and the idiosyncratic. I have 
proposed that a general-purpose learning mechanism driven by simplicity has the 
computational power to do so. 
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Discussion and conclusions 
In this thesis I have attempted to extend empirically and computationally the 
basis for a reappraisal of probabilistic accounts of language learning. 
Traditionally, statistical learning in the classical associative sense has been 
associated with behaviourism and hence been downplayed as having quite 
limited power. Knowledge built out of relations based on temporal and spatial 
contiguity can account for pattern recognition and memory retrieval based on 
similarity assessment, but not, it seemed, for abstract structural dependencies 
such as nonadjacencies and phrase structure. The naive view of statistical 
learning has pushed researchers in search of more sophisticated computational 
tools (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). In language in particular, the domination of the 
rationalist position with Chomsky has caused serious resistance to accept 
statistical learning as a viable research project. However, much of the work in 
this thesis contributes to the idea that statistical learning need not be as naive as it 
is portrayed by its detractors. 
The agenda for statistical learning can be divided into two main 
concurrent lines of enquiry: the first investigates the probabilistic nature of the 
input and the availability of reliable statistical cues potentially available to the 
learner. The contribution of the present work provides sound evidence for a 
cascade of potentially useful statistical cues - several yet to be discovered - that 
span from n-gram statistics to nonadjacencies, to perceptually salient acoustic 
and phonological cues. In this sense we can begin formulating an argument for 
the "richness of the stimulus", contrary to the received wisdom of the poverty of 
the linguistic stimulus. The second line of enquiry is a direct consequence of 
such richness in statistical cues. Given the combinatorial explosion of analysing 
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each possible combination of statistical relations in the input, learning must be 
guided by some powerful inductive principle imposing constraints on the 
possible interpretations (i. e. hypotheses, or grammars) and arbitrary 
dependencies from a finite amount of data. Positing statistical learning 
mechanisms does not necessarily imply commitment to a tabula rasa position. It 
is not psychologically realistic to assume that the learner will blindly search for 
all possible relationships between a vast range of properties. This forms a valid 
response to Pinker (1987) who, in criticising distributional methods, pointed out 
that a distributional analysis of sentences 1-3 below would lead the learner to 
incorrectly categorise fish and rabbits together and to overgeneralise to 4, and 
that these errors are not found in childrens' spontaneous productions. 
(1) John ate fish 
(2) John ate rabbits 
(3) John can fish 
(4) *John can rabbits 
distributional analyses need not be as simplistic as those suggested in Pinker 
(1984). Redington, Chater, & Finch (1998) have convincingly argued that the 
fact that nave "spurious correlations" based on single examples lead to 
erroneous generalisations does not rule out the entire class of distributional 
analyses, which is in fact more powerful. 
The reduction of uncertainty hypothesis, the connectionist models 
implemented, and the simplicity principle advocated in this thesis can all be 
regarded as equivalent formulations - at some general level - of an inductive 
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principle that specifies what needs to be done, namely filtering the information 
available in search for a reliable and economical compression of the data. A 
comparison between such formulations is beyond the scope of this thesis. Neural 
networks and simplicity are formalised and computationally implemented 
specifications of a learning algorithm, while reduction of uncertainty can be 
regarded as a general working framework, underspecified computationally. On 
the one side, there is great overlap between such theoretical proposals: for 
instance, to the extent that the connectionist simulations can replicate the 
Variability effect they can be regarded as an instantiation of reduction of 
uncertainty. On the other side, the search for reduction of uncertainty as 
discussed in the early chapters focuses more on filtering among potential 
candidate sources (bi-grams, trigrams, nonadjacencies), whereas the simplicity 
principle was used in the simulations in chapters 7 and 8 to select among 
competing hypothesis grammars given a set of chosen linguistic elements. These 
differences, however, may only depend on which angle the researcher chooses to 
tackle the issue of learning from positive data. 
Another issue that was tackled in the thesis is the orthogonality argument 
with respect to the traditional argument for the separation of statistical and 
algebraic styles of computation. Although statistical learning as a field of 
research tends to "flirt" more with associative styles of computation, it need not 
take a conclusive stance on the issue, at least not until experimental segregation 
can be shown to be effective (and the null results in chapter 6 would suggest 
caution against hasty interpretations). In fact, whereas I use a neural network to 
model the Variability effect in chapter 3, recovering from overgeneralisations 
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using simplicity specifies rules for verb category assignment and rules for 
exceptions and is implemented in standard symbolic programming. 
Limits and future directions 
Before concluding, I would like to highlight below some limits of the current 
work and suggest potential avenues for research to follow up. 
Extensions to the variability effect 
Here I provide a number of possible extensions to test the robustness of the 
variability effect. The first obvious next step would be to test the zero-variability 
condition on children, given that Rebecca Gomez found the variability effect on 
both adults and children in her original paper. At the time of writing Gomez is 
currently testing this hypothesis (personal communication). 
Another experiment, the "infinite-variability condition" would test 
whether there is an optimal degree of variability (accidentally 24 embeddings), or 
whether the more variability the merrier. In this condition, each training string 
would appear with a new (unseen) embedding. If the hypothesis that learners 
disregard the embedding as irrelevant with large variability is truly correct, then 
having potentially infinite variability should not constitute an hindrance to both 
detecting nonadjacencies and generalising to new embeddings. If anything, it 
should make the task easier and performance could be better than in the Set size 
24 condition. 
Another control experiment would involve testing participants on six 
frames and one embedding. In this way the number of type strings would be the 
same as in Set size 2. If participants performed well, then it could be argued that 
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learners did not learn well in the zero-vari ability condition because they only had 
3 type strings to memorise. Partly this control becomes less necessary given 
successful generalisation to novel middle items even in the Set Size 1 condition, 
as evidenced in Experiment 5, which suggests that the strings are not merely 
learnt by rote. 
Yet another interesting new condition to test, the "asymmetrical 
grammar" condition, came up as a result of a conversation with Axel 
Cleeremans. Servan-Schreiber, Cleeremans, & McClelland (1991) addressed a 
similar problem of learning nonadjacent dependencies. Their connectionist 
simulations suggest that learners may be able to learn with a low variability of 
embeddings, say only 3 embeddings, provided that these have slighly different 
frequencies, e. g. X1=40%, X2=30%, X? =30%. An analogous version would 
involve embeddings appearing with different frequencies with different 
nonadjacent dependencies. For example, the XI in the AI_B1 frame would occur 
with a frequency of 0.4 and the same XI in the A2_B2 frame would occur with a 
frequency of 0.6. Servan-Schreiber et al. argued that the rationale for these 
asymmetries in connectionist terms is that the recurrent networks preserve 
nonadjacent information better if the embedded material is statistically 
differentiated during training. 
In general, two critiques could be levelled at the artificial language used 
here for detecting nonadjacencies. Firstly, although non-adjacent, the 
dependencies are still somewhat local because they only span one intervening 
word. Secondly, they always occurred in third and last position. Instead, 
nonadjacencies in natural languages can span several embedded words and 
typically occur in different relative positions. This non-fixedness of constituents' 
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relative position means that learners must ultimately abstract beyond the ordering 
of specific words. Because distributional methods have been criticised for being 
unable to accommodate free-ranging relative position, further experiments could 
test whether participants are able to detect nonadjacencies when the training 
items include strings such as AxyzB and AxByz, with dependencies placed in 
different relative positions during training. 
Regarding the connectionist simulations, these are far from providing a 
comprehensive and accurate picture of the variability effect. Firstly, the U- 
shaped results from the generalisation experiment could not be simulated entirely 
- performance was low on Set size 2 and high on Set size 1 as expected, but not 
high on Set size 24. Secondly, the simulations did not capture the differences in 
performance found across modalities. Both problems might be overcome by 
changing the input and output units from localist to semi-localist or distributed. 
Localist encoding is not the best way to elicit correct generalisation in neural 
networks. From the point of view of the network, the new middle item is a 
completely new vector that bears no resemblance whatsoever with previous 
vectors. This is equivalent, in human experimental settings, to showing a 
completely unrelated item as new embedding at test, say the picture of a cow. 
Now it is reasonable to assume that human participants would have a hard time 
deciding whether a pseudo-sentence pel_<picture of a cow>_rud was 
grammatical, independent of the correctness of the frame. Hence, distributed 
representations may be a better way of encoding key features of the stimuli 
common to all other stimuli, for instance phonological properties. In the same 
vein, performance discrepancies found across modalities could be found by 
coding the difference associated with hearing a stimulus as opposed to seeing it 
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on the screen. Overall, it is not known at present whether connectionist models as 
a general class of learning models could scale up to the complexity of real natural 
languages. And it is not immediately obvious that simple recurrent networks can 
represent nonadjacent dependencies that are free to range in relative position, as 
opposed to coding a specific position, as it was the case with the A-X-B language 
used in my simulations. In most natural language sentences, the material that 
separates two nonadjacent constraints is hardly of the same length, so a harder 
testbed for SRNs would be to learn such cases. 
What is learnt in Artificial Grammars 
In devising an AGL experiment using finite-stage grammars the experimenter 
decides what is the correct set of responses, although several grammars might 
generate the set of data that participants are trained on. Take as an example the 
A_X_B language used in the variability experiments. Participants were asked to 
discriminate between a, x2_bj, and *al_x2_b.?, although positionally the 
ungrammatical string does not violate any rule. One could have easily conceived 
of a set of rewrite rules that construct the very same training stimuli by simply 
indicating the position of items in sentences. Specifically: 
S->AXB 
A -> aj, a2, a 
X->xf, X2 
B -> b1, b2, b3 
It is possible to further assign equal probabilities to each element: 
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A -> al, (. 33), a2, (. 33), a3 (. 33) 
and to subsequently choose a subset of all possible sentences generated by the 
rewrite rules such that only As and Bs with same subscript (e. g. al x2_bj, but not 
a j_x2_b? ) are included in the training set. Notice that this new training set would 
be exactly the same as the original one used by Gömez and in this thesis. At test, 
the experimenter might be interested in testing whether participants have 
generalised positional information instead of nonadjacencies, In this case the 
forced choice test might require a distinction between a, x2_b3 versus *x2_ aj_bi. 
Notice that the string that in my experiments was considered ungrammatical now 
has become the grammatical one. However trivial this example might seem, it 
suggests that the notion of what is grammatical and ungrammatical in AGL 
experiments and the notion of underlying rule dictating allowable sentences may 
be sensitive to what choices participant are required to make their judgements 
upon. In the eye of the necessarily naive participant the same training items may 
be classified under differentially interpretable but overlapping patterns. In 
particular, it is possible that participants implicitly and concurrently entertain 
different hypotheses, which they disambiguate at test on being prompted with the 
forced choice task. Anyhow, it would be a mistake to assume that participants 
who scored poorly on the variability task are not able to detect any sort of 
structure. A more plausible explanation is that they may have picked up on 
different patterns, for instance the one specifying positional information outlined 
above. For these participants, a j_x2_b j, and aj x2_b3 are both positionally 
correct, which would explain the higher than chance ratio of yes responses in low 
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variability conditions. After-test verbal reports carried out informally during my 
experiments suggest that some learners were focusing on positional information. 
For instance, in Experiment 1, one participant said "The rule is that wadim 
always occurs in middle position". These considerations do not undermine the 
results of course, but invite us to consider what is learnt in AGL more carefully. 
Specifically, theoretical questions such as "are there rules or statistics in 
language learning? " or "can participants learn this structure? " progressively 
loose interest in favour of questions such as "given several potential cues and 
interpretations available, under what specific conditions do learners converge 
towards the same structure hypothesis? " Absolute positional information is not 
less worthy a hypothesis about the potential organisation of a set of stimuli than 
other forms of structure, for example nonadjacent structure. However, some 
types of structure may be more affordable or perceptually more salient than 
others: for instance, learners may be naturally biased toward classifying stimuli 
based on positional information as a default hypothesis. We have seen that this 
may be particularly true of artificial grammars containing two-word long 
sentences (e. g. Smith, 1966). Smith found that learners acquire only absolute 
positional information in his AGL study that explored the role of lexical co- 
occurrence patterns as a means for abstracting category structure without form- 
based cues. In addition to these considerations, learners may be more prone to 
pay attention to bi-gram transitional probabilities, and then trigrams, before 
focusing on nonadjacencies. As an example, in English whether a noun precedes 
or follows a verb almost invariably determines whether it is a subject or an 
object. Consider John ate the broccoli. It is true that to abstract categories such 
as NOUN and VERB learners must acquire representations that are independent 
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of context, for instance in hearing the word "joy" outside context one 
immediately knows it is a NOUN. But because nouns and verbs typically appear 
in patterned contexts, positional information - which is most readily available to 
learners - may be the cue they pick up on in the first place and may represent a 
first step towards building more abstract categories (see Gomez & La Kusta, in 
press). Besides, positional information in English is an essential component to 
distinguishing meaning, for instance agent and patient thematic roles in sentences 
like John ate the broccoli and The broccoli ate John. 
Following from the above considerations, a project deserving more 
research is thus whether hypothesis testing in AGL and natural languages is 
modulated by hierarchies of cues, in the sense that learners might prefer some 
hypotheses over others as default. Also, do multiple cues augment learners' 
ability to detect structure or do cues act in a winner-takes-it-all manner where 
one cue prevails over the others? For instance, in the segmentation experiments 
of chapter 6 learners' preference for plosive sounds in word-initial position 
seemed to annihilate the contribution of distributional structure. Likewise, in the 
generalisation experiments of chapter 6 the plosive sound cue seems to be 
suppressed by a preference for syllables following silent gaps, however small the 
gaps may be and whatever phoneme follows the gap. That distributional cues 
may be overridden by perceptual cues such as stress patterns and coarticulatory 
cues has also been documented in Johnson & Jusczyk (2001). 
In addition, what happens in the presence of conflicting cues? How can 
learners distinguish relevant from irrelevant linguistic input? Gomez and Lakusta 
(submitted) found that learners are capable of suppressing noise in the input up to 
a limit. Although all these questions will not find an answer in this work, my 
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results seem to point towards an increasing role of the environment in guiding 
learning and to the fact that learning from the environment is much more 
powerful than previously acknowledged. In particular, the connectionist 
simulations suggest that simple associative mechanisms may be powerful enough 
to detect nonadjacent dependencies. 
Another relevant issue to take into consideration is how experimental 
instructions interact with training and test procedures and may indirectly guide 
learners' choices at test. For instance, participants' knowledge of the subjacent 
structure may be very fuzzy up to the point of test instructions telling them that 
half of the strings they are going to hear are ungrammatical. At test, participants 
focusing on positional structure may find all sentences grammatical because they 
all conform to the rule. Some of these may switch from positional to nonadjacent 
structure after inferring that the first few test items encountered "can't just be all 
grammatical". In this case, perhaps a Signal Detection Analysis would reveal a 
high ratio of inconsistencies between first and second trial, with a high 
Error/Correct ratio. The case for "learning" taking place at test has been made by 
Redington & Chater (2002). Although definitely speculative, these 
considerations are a first step towards a more ecologically aware methodology of 
experimental testing. 
Solving the language acquisition and evolution puzzles with Artificial 
Grammars 
The simulations presented in chapters 7 could find a natural follow-up in a series 
of AGL experiments that would test whether it is possible to learn to generalise 
and, at the same time, constrain overgeneralisations. Using the now familiar 
A_X B language, one could think of three frames, arbitrarily corresponding to 
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three abstract syntactic patterns. The embeddings would represent the class of 
possible words (e. g. verbs) allowed under each pattern. Some embeddings could 
be matched with all three patterns while some others would either be associated 
to only one or two of them. At training, participants would be showed a subset of 
all possible sentences with an associated probability distribution, for instance a 
Zipfian distribution. A forced choice recognition test would probe whether 
participants could generalise to unseen sentences, one with high probability of 
occurrence, the other with low probability. Using a between-subject design one 
condition might include a relative short training, in which one would hope to 
elicit overgeneralisations. The other condition would include a prolonged 
training using the same stimuli in the hope that indirect negative evidence in the 
form of a highly expected but never encountered string would have accumulated. 
The prediction is that learners would be able to judge successfully which one 
among pairs of possible strings would be more likely to be part of the language. 
If this experiment turned out to be effective, an evolutionary experiment 
could be set up to replicate the findings of chapter 8, where each generation 
would be represented by a participant learning the AGL and subsequently 
transferring to a new learner. The participant would be asked to participate in an 
experiment of language survival, by listening to sentences from a newly 
discovered African language on the verge of extinction. They would be required 
to try to learn (or memorise) the language in order to transmit it to a new learner. 
Overcoming some (non-trivial) caveats associated with eliciting a set of 
sentences from each participant, it could be possible to feed each new 
generation/participant from the language produced by the previous participant. In 
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this way, one would hope to see the emergence and stability of syntactic holes in 
a similar way to the trend obtained in Figure 27 with the computer simulations. 
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For the language to be probabilistically generated and understood, it was 
necessary to assign several sets of probabilities. I took the probability of any given 
linguistic construction to be a function of the frequency of its components. Thus 
constructions comprised of highly frequent words are taken to be much more 
probable than those comprised of low frequency words. This was done by 
applying Zipf's law (Zipf, 1948) which states that the frequency of any word is 
given as the inverse of its rank. This distribution is frequently encountered in 
natural languages (see, e. g. Bell et al., 1990) 
Initially all words, As and Bs, were ranked arbitrarily. Subsequently all 
possible sentences allowable under the production rules were generated, minus 
any specified in the exceptions element. The result is illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
Each word could occur in a number of distributional contexts, with different 
probabilities for occurrence in each. 
W, w1 Rank I Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 
Rank 1 a, b, b, b, b, 
Rank 2 a, b, b, b, b, 
Rank 3 b, a, a, a, a, 
Rank 4 a, b, b, b, b, 
Rank 5 b4 a, a, a, a, 
Rank 6 b, a, a, a, a, 
Rank 7 a4 b2 b, b, b, 
Rank 8 b, a, a, a, a, 
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Figure 2.1. A completely regular hypothesis grammar. The left hand columns show a 
frequency ranking for all As and Bs as the first word of any sentence. The right hand columns 
show the frequency rankings of As and Bs as the the second word of any sentence given the first 
word. For example, word b2 was the most likely to occur in position two with a, in position one, 
but the third most likely to occur in position one. No exceptions are specified in [1] so all 
sentences were allowable. 
The probability of a word occurring in a particular distributional context is given 
as: 
n=- [4] 
where p is the probability of a word, f is the frequency of that word and f are 
the frequencies of the n words in the distribution. Any sentence, involves two 
probabilities p(,, n) and P(w2IWI) where p(, » is the probability of the first word and 
p(w2lW» is the probability of the second word in the distributional context of the 
first word (see Figure. 2.1). p(wfl is given by equation [2] with Ef operating over 
all eight words. Forp(w2wl), f operates over the distribution of possible second 
words associated with wi. With no exceptions specified there were always four 
possible second words (Figure 2.1). If exceptions were specified, however, the 
number of possible second words would vary between first words (Fig. 2.2). 
Once a table such as those in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 had been set up, samples 
of language were produced by generating random probabilities to select the first 
word of the sentence and then the second word given the first. 
224 
Appendix A 
Figure 2.2. A hypothesis grammar containing exceptions. In this specification, a2 can only 
appear in the first word position. A number of sentences are therefore specified as exceptions. This 
alters the number of possible second words following some first words. 
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It was possible to specify both data and hypotheses in exactly the same 
way. All learners entertained one initial hypothesis. This was the completely 
regular hypothesis expressed in [3]. The only difference between this and later 
hypotheses was the number of exceptions specified. The code length necessary to 
specify the syntactic categories A and B and the production rules were identical 
for every hypothesis and therefore need not be considered. The only hypothetical 
element that needed to be specified was the final, exceptions, element. This 
element, when it was not empty, consisted of a set of sentences of exactly the 
same form as those generated as samples of the language. The code length 
necessary to specify an exception was therefore exactly the same as the code 
length necessary to specify that sentence were it to be encountered as data. 
Following [1], the code length necessary to specify a sentence wl, w2 is given as: 
bits(W,, 
w2) =Loge 
i 5] 
P('l) ' P(w24Wn 
where bits(wl W2) is the number of bits necessary to specify sentence wl, w2, 
is 
the probability of w, and is the probability of w2 given w1. These values are 
found using [4]. In the event that the second word was unknown given the first, 
i. e. that the sentence was disallowed under the hypothesis, the code length 
necessary to specify it was: 
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bits(Wl. 
W2) = 
L092 
1 
[61 
P(Wu ' Pcw2) 
where P(W2) is the probability of w2 irrespective of w1, as if it were a first word. 
The second word was thus coded as if it were one of eight ranked possibilities 
making the overall probability of the sentence lower than if it were allowable and 
increasing the code length. In this way hypotheses that posited spurious 
exceptions were punished with longer data code lengths when those exceptions 
were encountered. 
As mentioned above, each learner agent began by entertaining a single 
completely regular hypothesis without any exceptions. Initially, therefore, all data 
was coded under one hypothesis only. As more hypotheses emerged they ran in 
parallel with previous ones so that data coded under all hypotheses 
simultaneously. Each new hypothesis was a clone of its immediate predecessor 
with the addition of one exception. Thus the initial hypothesis contained no 
exceptions, the second contained one, the third two and so on. A new exception 
was postulated when a particular construction had never been heard and an NML- 
derived parameter, [7] was satisfied. A derivation is given at the end of this 
appendix: 
N 
1092("P)) 
[71 
P 
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where N is the total number of sentences heard so far and p is the probability of a 
particular sentence. This parameter merits some discussion. 
A learner's decision to posit a particular sentence as an exception is 
dependent on two data: the total number of sentences heard and the number of 
times that the sentence in question has been heard. How these are combined to 
determine the precise point at which an exception is posited is to some extent 
arbitrary. For simplicity, I will only consider the case in which no sentence is ever 
posited as an exception if it has been encountered in the data. The critical value 
that determines when a particular sentence is posited as an exception is therefore 
the number of sentence that have been heard. Two normative criteria for this 
threshold exist: on the one hand it should not be so low that the learner concludes 
there is an exception when in fact none exists; on the other, the learner should not 
fail to spot genuine exceptions after a exposure to a reasonable amount of data. 
The consequences of failure to meet either of these criteria can be seen in both 
cognitive and linguistic terms. Both will result in longer codelengths: the former 
will incur long data codes when it encounters the sentences that it has specified as 
exceptions; the latter will incur long data codes that it could reasonably have 
avoided by specifying exceptions earlier. Linguistically, in the former case the 
learner will have legitimate sentences pruned from its productive repertoire; in the 
latter it will continue to produce illegitimate sentences for longer than necessary. 
In these simulations not all sentences were equally probable. Less probable 
(and absent) sentences should require more language to be encountered before 
they could be considered exceptions. This was taken into account by making use 
of a general derivation (not specific to these simulations) based on the premise 
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that an exception should be postulated at the point at which the investment of bits 
necessary to specify it would have been recouped had it been postulated before 
any language was heard. 
Suppose that a learner wants to know whether to consider sentence x as an 
exception, where is p(x) the probability of x. If it is postulated as an exception, we 
can increase the probability of the other sentences that have not been ruled out. 
These probabilities used to sum to 1- p(x) but with x as an exception they sum to 
1. The most neutral way to rescale these probabilities is to multiply them all by 
the same factor 
1. 
This increase means that the code for each item reduces 
1- p(x) 
1 
by log, (See [1] in the main text). Thus if the learner hears a corpus of 
1- pcXý 
N sentences, never encountering x and having postulated x as an exception, it will 
make a saving of NlogZ 
1 
over the whole corpus. Thus x may be 
1- pW 
postulated as an exception when this saving exceeds the cost of specifying x as an 
exception: 
logf__1_-)> N logt i 
If we assume that the probability of any particular sentence is small (i. e. near 0), a 
Taylor expansion gives that loge approximately equals p(x). From this 1- pcxý 
we can conclude [7] 
ýý4 
